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ABSTRACT 
 The sport industry came to a standstill after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Major sporting 
events were postponed or canceled in lieu of the tragedy and for a week, while the nation 
mourned, the country went without sports. For many of the leagues it was the first extended 
hiatus for a non-labor dispute in nearly a century. On September 17, Major League Baseball 
returned, the first sport to resume, and when the games did recommence there were noticeable 
changes. Throughout this period, the New York Times, one of the country’s most prestigious 
newspapers, produced a sports section in every edition. The purpose of this study was to examine 
how the New York Times framed sport’s response to 9/11. 
 Framing theory provided the theoretical framework of this examination, which 
incorporated a textual analysis of each article printed from September 12, 2001 to December 31, 
2001. Additionally, four journalists from the Times were interviewed to provide supplementary 
context to the framing of sport’s response to tragedy. The culmination of this methodological 
procedure produced five frames: diminished significance of sport, sport as a distraction, united 
community symbolically moving onward, logistical understanding, and loss of innocence. Each 
contributed to the overall framing, or understanding, of 9/11. Diminished significance of sport 
defined the re-evaluated importance of sport in contrast to the tragic realities illuminated by 
terrorism. The sportswriters often referred to sport as a couple hours away from reality, assuming 
the role of a distraction. Many of the sporting events following the attacks held ceremonies or 
tributes that were heavily reliant on the use of symbolism, which was representative of the 
nation’s feelings. There were also logistical measures described in order for sport to navigate the 
upheaval of scheduling caused by 9/11. Finally, there was a demarcation of pre- and post-9/11 
infused with loss that shaped the loss of innocence frame.  
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 The conclusion was an understanding that sport was less important comparatively to the 
tragedy, but through symbolism and distraction did play a distinctive role in the recovery. There 
were logistical challenges in resuming and when the games did return, they were not the same.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
September 11, 2001 
The 9/11 Commission (2004) estimated that on an ordinary workday in lower Manhattan, 
upwards of 40,000 people would be in or around the World Trade Center buildings. However, 
September 11, 2001, was not an ordinary workday for many reasons. It was the day that four 
hijackings of American jetliners resulted in horrific plane crashes that were part of an 
orchestrated terrorist attack against the United States, consequently causing the largest single-day 
death toll on American soil since the American Civil War. The World Trade Center in New York 
City, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. and a field near Shanskville, PA, were the sites where 
nearly 3,000 people died on 9/11 (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). September 11 also happened to 
be primary election day in New York and it was also the first day of school for children in the 
city. Both events caused a large number of employees to be late for work that day, which 
unbeknownst to many at the time, likely saved thousands of lives. Averill et al. (2005) estimated 
that approximately 16,400 to 18,800 people, less than half that were normally there, were in the 
World Trade Center before 9 a.m. that day. The tardiness of many would leave just enough time 
for people to see the commotion that was stirring outside the North Tower of the WTC and 
prevent many from attempting to go into the buildings (Aust et al., 2002). 
At 8:46 a.m. on 9/11, American Airlines Flight 11 flew directly into the North Tower, 
instantly killing all 87 passengers and hundreds working on the 94-96 floors. The fire and 
infrastructural damage was so severe that all escape routes were blocked from the crash, 
essentially trapping everyone from the crash site up to the 110th floor. All 1,355 people that were 
on those floors died that day (Averill et al., 2005). Almost 17 minutes later, at 9:03 a.m., United 
Airlines Flight 175 crashed nose-first into the 81 floor of the South Tower killing all of its 60 
passengers and hundreds of occupants located on floors 77-85 (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). 
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First responders were actively evacuating people from both towers by that point and it is 
believed that nearly 40% of those that were in the South Tower had completely left the building 
by the time Flight 175 hit it. Eighteen civilians were able to find an unobstructed stairwell on the 
west side of the building, allowing them to escape from the floors above the wreckage. They 
were the only known survivors from floors 80 and higher. A total of 619 people at or above the 
crash site in the South Tower died during 9/11 (Averill, 2005).  
A little more than 230 miles to the south in Washington, D.C., news had spread 
throughout the Pentagon about the plane crashes in New York City. As air traffic controllers 
frantically tried to reconcile the events of the last half hour, two planes, American Airlines Flight 
77 and United Airlines Flight 93 were unaccounted for. At 9:37 a.m., less than an hour after 
Flight 11 crashed into the WTC, Flight 77 flew into the outer west wall of the Pentagon. The 
damage was extensive. All 64 people aboard the Boeing 757 were killed as well as a mix of 125 
civilians and military personnel inside the building (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). It was 
becoming clear to authorities by this point that these events were purposeful and orchestrated. At 
9:42 a.m. the FAA grounded all scheduled flights at every airport. Three minutes later (9:45 
a.m.) the White House, Capitol Building, and other high-profile buildings were forced to 
evacuate (Aust et al., 2002). It would take another 18 minutes for people throughout the world, 
who had watched these events unfold on their televisions, radios and some even in person, to 
find out the fate of Flight 93 (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). 
The 9/11 Commission’s (2004) report stated that the passengers of United Airlines Flight 
93 were aware of the other hijackings and collectively tried to take back control of the plane 
from the hijackers. Phone records and witness testimony indicated that at 9:57 a.m. the 
passengers began their assault on the hijackers to regain control of the cockpit. Two minutes 
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later, in New York, the South Tower crumbled to the ground sending a plume of dust and smoke 
throughout lower Manhattan (Averill et al., 2005). Just four minutes after that (10:03 a.m.) the 
hijackers of Flight 93 downed the plane in a field near Shanksville, PA. It was the last hijacked 
plane and the site with the fewest number of casualties in large part because of those passengers 
forcing the hijackers to crash the plane in an open field before making it to their intended target 
(The 9/11 Commission, 2004). Then, at 10:28 a.m., The North Tower of the WTC, which had 
been the first building hit 102 minutes prior also collapsed to the ground. In total, 2,959 people 
died on 9/11 (not including the hijackers), 2,749 of those casualties were at the World Trade 
center, 512 of which were first responders (FDNY: 434; PAPD: 37; NYPD: 23; 
Hospital/Paramedic: 7; Federal: 2; Volunteers: 9) who went into the buildings after the North 
Tower was hit (Averill et al., 2005). 
The Aftermath 
Fear and vulnerability were etched into the overall societal mindset immediately 
following the terrorist attacks. The United States was not actively at war in 2001, nor had it ever 
been attacked in such a manner within its continental boarders. The sudden loss of nearly 3,000 
lives, many of which happened in plain view on televisions across the country, was 
disconcerting. The effect of which provided a resounding call for ample changes to security and 
risk management policies across the board (Goodrich, 2002). The reality of this need was 
realized with the images of people desperately hanging out of the windows of a 110-story 
burning building, some ultimately jumping to their deaths, which was broadcast throughout the 
world. Millions watched as two of the largest and most iconic buildings in America collapsed 
into rubble in the most populated city in the United States (Kellner, 2004).  
4 
 
 Media. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the aftermath, was the most watched media event 
in the last 50 years (Bauder, 2012). Morning television shows, many of which were based in 
New York, were finishing their broadcasts as Flight 11 hit the North Tower of the World Trade 
Center. Networks were able to provide extensive coverage to the events that followed because of 
the media presence based out of New York City. Media consumers were exposed to some of the 
most dramatic and graphic images shown in television history. Millions of viewers watched 
Flight 175 fly into the South Tower on live television, helpless victims jump from the highest 
floors of both towers, the eventual collapse of the buildings, and the aftermath that unfolded on 
camera for three consecutive days without commercial interruption. The media response became 
a spectacle (Kellner, 2004). 
 Scholars have criticized the media and the manner in which journalists displayed the 
events through various platforms (Anker, 2005; Butterworth, 2005; Kellner, 2004). The constant 
stream of news, uninterrupted by commercial break, created a demand for continuous content. 
Those viewing the coverage on television repeatedly saw a plane bank its wings and fly directly 
into the World Trade Center or two skyscrapers crumble to the earth on a virtual loop. 
Broadcasts perpetually showed images of death and destruction were perpetually shown which 
collectively developed into a narrative presented by media. The interplay of a distinctive good 
(Americans, victims, first responders) versus evil (Al Qaeda, hijackers, Osama bin Laden) set the 
stage for an unparalleled melodrama (Anker, 2005). Anker’s definition of the concept read, 
“Melodrama is traditionally defined as a dramatic storyline of villainy, victimization, and 
retribution, in which characters’ emotional states are hyperbolized and externalized through 
grandiose facial expression, vivid bodily gestures, and stirring musical accompaniment” (p. 23). 
The effect of an emotionally charged depiction assuredly evoked a unifying response for 
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whichever side one rooted for. For instance, it has been extensively written that September 11 
incited a feeling of nationalism among Americans creating a demand for immediate response. It 
could also be argued, conversely, that those who endorsed the demise of the West would unite 
behind the adversarial acts, rendering support for the terrorists (Kellner, 2004). The discourse 
was fertile for political rhetoric that reinforced the necessity for reaction by the United States 
(Butterworth, 2005). 
 The role of media, specifically in a risk management discussion and in regard to crisis 
response, has merit for two reasons. First, media were the primary source of information for the 
majority of Americans that watched the aftermath of 9/11 unfold. Although the tragedy impacted 
thousands of families, it was media that gathered and disseminated pertinent information relative 
to the agenda. The influx of additional stakeholders and resulting strong public response was 
evidence of social amplification of risk (Kunreuther, 2002). Second, as Lule (2002) and 
Chidester (2009) connoted, the journalistic response to 9/11 was a single-minded reflection 
focusing solely on the attacks. For instance, every editorial appearing in the New York Times the 
week following 9/11 was written specifically about the attacks (Lule, 2002). The nature and 
magnitude of the attacks created turmoil for publishers and reporters scrambling to meet new 
deadlines. It also created an intensely focused dissection of the events fostering the opportunity 
for speculation, sensationalism, and overreaction.       
Sport’s response. By late morning on 9/11 it was clear that what transpired that day was 
catastrophic. Schools dismissed students early, businesses shut down, and events scheduled for 
that day were cancelled. Media outlets went to a 24-hour news cycle for more than three days, 
providing viewers and listeners with the most up-to-date information available. The aftermath 
was a seismic event. Terrorists had infiltrated the airlines and compromised a mode of 
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transportation that had become essential to team and fan travel. They attacked buildings 
symbolic of Westernization, which many people considered sport venues to be as well 
(Kunreuther, 2002). The objectives appeared to be to target a mass population and execute the 
plan by unanticipated means; tenants of major American sporting events.  
The totality of these factors influenced the decision-makers of sport leagues and 
organizations. Although precedent, such as the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Kennedy 
Assassination, had dictated that sport return to action as soon as possible after a tragedy, it did 
not seem appropriate for commissioners to encourage play under the circumstances. Major 
League Baseball was in its final three weeks of the regular season and had a full docket of games 
scheduled for that day. Similarly, the National Football League was preparing for the second 
week of its regular season with 15 games scheduled for that weekend. The NCAA, which was 
comprised of more than 1000 schools, had hundreds of events scheduled for that week (Dodd, 
2001). MLB immediately postponed its games for that day, as did member institutions of the Big 
East and Big Ten conferences of the NCAA. The NFL waited to make a decision as league 
administrators weighed the options, but ultimately postponed their games as well. That eventual 
became the case for the remainder of Division I schools in the NCAA.  
Major League Baseball. Tygiel (2002) wrote, “Each baseball generation has its signature 
moment, an event that will be recalled, recounted, and relished in popular memory for decades to 
come” (p. 17). Her examples of Jackie Robinson breaking the color barrier in 1947 or Hank 
Aaron hitting homerun number 715 in 1974 personify her assertion. A future generation saw 
Sammy Sosa and Mark McGwire pursue Roger Maris’ single-season homerun record and Cal 
Ripken Jr. break Lou Gehrig’s mark for consecutive games played. It saw a season-ending labor 
strike that cancelled a World Series for the first time in 90 years, an overhaul of a long-standing 
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playoff structure, and a “Subway Series” pinning two teams from the same city against each 
other in the World Series. However, as the events of 9/11 unfolded in or near cities with rich 
baseball traditions, a different type of signature moment would take place in Major League 
Baseball. In fact, it could be argued that the significance of the moment stemmed from the office 
of Commissioner Allan H. “Bud” Selig and not on the field at all. That moment was defined by 
his decision to suspend play of the regular season amidst the tragedies, allowing Americans to 
grieve. Selig’s role evolved into becoming the face of Major League Baseball and the decision to 
cancel games during a time when baseball was at its season’s peak was unprecedented. The 
magnitude of the event was reinforced in measure by baseball’s reaction upon returning to play 
through ceremony and an attempt revisit normalcy.  
Commissioner Bud Selig. Bud Selig was originally named the “acting” MLB 
commissioner in September of 1992 and was officially named the ninth commissioner of 
baseball in July of 1998 (Moffi, 2006). Selig’s ascension into the role of commissioner started as 
the owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, a team that he bought as the Seattle Pilots and promptly 
moved to his hometown of Milwaukee, WI. As commissioner (acting or official), Selig was 
integral in changing the landscape of baseball. He increased league revenue, strengthened league 
regulations on performance enhancing drugs, incorporated the wild card into the MLB playoffs, 
enforced a luxury tax, and helped navigate baseball into an unprecedented technological era 
(Zimbalist, 2006). Selig was in charge of baseball during a tumultuous time, which included an 
ugly labor dispute and a six-year span of uncertainty in leadership. He was successful in 
navigating baseball through those times and his verve was lauded by ownership (Holtzman, 
1998). His dexterity would be tested in the fall of 2001.  
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Selig was the commissioner of Major League Baseball at the time of 9/11. Years prior to 
the tragedies, Selig had the opportunity to forge a working relationship with, then part-owner of 
the Texas Rangers, George W. Bush. This link would have an impact on the role baseball would 
play in the recovery from September 11. Selig’s role during the tragedies was critical to 
baseball’s decision when to play following the attacks and what responsibility the sport would 
have in the recovery (Butterworth, 2005). Comparisons to Pearl Harbor and President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s subsequent “Green Light Letter” to then Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain 
Landis have been made to 9/11 and Major League Baseball (Brown, 2004). Roosevelt’s letter 
was sent to convince Landis to keep playing baseball despite America’s involvement in World 
War II, which Landis agreed to do. The similarities drawn between the two events regarding the 
role of baseball during a time of peril and the necessity for a distraction were certainly 
warranted. Pearl Harbor, however, occurred in December of 1941 and the letter was sent in 
January of 1942, several months before the start of the baseball season. The attacks of September 
11 happened on a Tuesday during the regular season that had more than a dozen games 
scheduled for that day. The commissioner’s office was forced to make a decision on whether to 
cancel the games immediately and when baseball did resume play, determine the appropriate 
way to react to the tragedies. Selig was quick and firm in his decision to postpone games and was 
praised for his leadership during the attacks (Chidester, 2009).     
Playoff Chase. On September 10, 2001, the New York Mets trailed both the Atlanta 
Braves and Philadelphia Phillies in Major League Baseball’s National League East Division. The 
Mets, who were the National League representatives in the World Series the year before, were 
eight games back of the first place Braves and, with only 18 games left in the season, were vying 
for another playoff berth. Also in contention for the postseason were the San Francisco Giants, 
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St. Louis Cardinals, Chicago Cubs, Los Angeles Dodgers, and Philadelphia, who were all within 
4.5 games of each other for at least a wild card playoff spot. The American League was less 
contentious with the New York Yankees, Seattle Mariners, Cleveland Indians, and Oakland 
Athletics (Wild Card) holding comfortable leads in both their divisions and wild card race. 
However, Seattle was chasing a historical milestone for wins in a single-season and the Yankees 
were trying to win their fourth consecutive World Series title.    
Not all of the news was good for baseball, but it was compelling nonetheless. MLB was 
facing criticism over escalating ticket prices, robust player contracts, labor union issues, and 
even rumors of financial instability (Kraus, 2003). Barry Bonds, whose San Francisco Giants 
were leading the wild card chase on 9/11, was pursuing Mark McGwire’s single-season homerun 
record. Bonds was an unlikeable protagonist for the majority of fans, even referred to as an 
antihero later in his career (Pearlman, 2006), but was on pace to break one of baseball’s most 
prestigious records. While the villainous Bonds hit home runs at a record rate, two of baseball’s 
most beloved legends Cal Ripken Jr. and Tony Gwynn were retiring from the game (National 
Baseball Hall of Fame, 2002). The culmination of the playoff chases, the issues off the field, and 
the record-breaking scenarios led to a riveting time in Major League Baseball. It also made for a 
challenging scenario navigating the reconciliation of the desire to continue to play and 
respectfully waiting for the appropriate time to resume the games.  
To Play or Not to Play. There were 15 games scheduled to be played in baseball on 
Tuesday, September 11, 2001. The earliest game was at 1 p.m. between the Atlanta Braves and 
Philadelphia Phillies at Turner Field in Atlanta, GA about 640 miles southwest of the Pentagon 
in Washington, D.C. Shortly after the attacks the commissioner’s office sent out a statement 
notifying the public that all of the day’s games had been cancelled. The following day, the league 
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office sent out another statement saying that games scheduled for September 12 would also be 
cancelled as well. Major League baseball decided to postpone play until Monday, September 17, 
which led to the cancelation of 91 games in six days. It was the longest stoppage of play for a 
non-labor reason in 83 years (Kraus, 2003).  
Commissioner Selig’s official statement on the afternoon of 9/11 read, “Given the 
continuing national horror and the many significant challenges faced by our government, our 
cities, and our citizens, I believe it is appropriate to postpone all Major League Baseball games 
for Wednesday, September 12, 2001” (Kraus, 2003, p. 88). The 9/11 postponements were the 
first time that Major League Baseball had canceled games for a non work stoppage since June 6, 
1944 (D-Day). The cancelled games on the following day, September 12, marked the first time 
MLB suspended play for consecutive days since 1918 (World War I). Baseball was the first 
major sport to publicly declare that it would not play on 9/11, triggering other leagues to make 
the same decision (Blum, 2001). Minor League Baseball, the subsidiary of MLB, was already 
into its playoff schedule when the attacks occurred. Minor League president Mike Moore echoed 
Selig’s sentiments about not playing and cancelled all scheduled playoff games until at least 
September 14. All minor league members later decided that they would not only suspend play, 
but cancel the remainder of the season as a whole, awarding championships to teams that were in 
first place at the end of the regular season or who had won completed playoff series (Kraus, 
2003). 
FIFA, soccer’s international governing body, decided to proceed with their World Cup 
qualifying matches and their World Under-17 matches that were to be held that week. FIFA 
president Sepp Blatter responded to why the matches would be played. “In tragic circumstances 
such as these, [soccer] must symbolize the ideals of fair play and nonviolence. The world today 
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is no longer the one we knew but [soccer] must remain a beacon of hope” (Blum, 2001, para. 
27). Many thought that American sports like baseball or football would serve as that same 
symbol of hope in the United States. Butterworth (2005) argued that baseball had an opportunity, 
if not a responsibility, to respond to the terrorist attacks through its ritualistic nature and medium 
for tribute. Both President Bush and Commissioner Selig urged Americans to try to return to 
normalcy, which in part meant engaging in previous routines like enjoying the entertainment of a 
baseball game (Butterworth, 2005). It was this incentive that seemed to necessitate the return of 
sport back into the fray of society following the attacks. Commissioner Selig, resolute in his 
decisions about when to play the games, decided that baseball would allow players, coaches, and 
families the opportunity to take the weekend and resume play on Monday, September 17.      
Games Resumed. In 2009, author John Feinstein offered a unique perspective on the role 
of sport in coping with crisis. After having septuple bypass surgery on his ailing heart, he wrote 
about sports, “they were there so I didn't have to think about how sore my chest was or how 
hungry I was or how hard it was to sleep on my back” (Feinstein, 2009, p. 76). For Feinstein, and 
millions of other Americans, sport was a means to think about a simple game for two and a half 
or three hours rather than a calamity happening in reality. Sport served a purpose as a diversion. 
Baseball made its return on September 17, 2001, with six games, all in the National League, 
including the New York Mets playing at the Pittsburgh Pirates. The Mets had been in Pittsburgh 
to start a 3-game series on 9/11 and the two teams were scheduled to play another 3-game series 
starting on September 17 in Shea Stadium in New York. The original series was never played, of 
course, and when baseball recommenced the rest of the league resumed with their original 
schedules. The Mets, however, traveled back to Pittsburgh, swapping their home series with the 
Pirates because Shea Stadium had become a triage after the attacks (Lopresti, 2011). It was MLB 
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that first decided to stop playing because of the tragedy and it was baseball that returned first to 
the playing field.  
Ten days after the attacks, most sports resumed play or would start playing by the 
weekend. On September 21, the Mets hosted the Braves at Shea Stadium for a pivotal game in 
the playoff standings. It was the first major sporting event to happen in New York City after the 
attacks. Mets’ catcher Mike Piazza hit a two-run game-winning homerun in the bottom of the 8th 
inning against the rival Braves. Daily News sports writer Christian Red described the homerun as 
a “forever moment” and noted how powerful the moment was for those who watched it. Piazza 
said in the article, “In that particular moment, people just really wanted something to cheer 
about” (Red, 2011, p. 42).  
A similar occasion arose a month later in the World Series. The Yankees advanced to the 
World Series, losing the first two games to the Arizona Diamondbacks in Arizona. The Yankees 
returned to New York and, after a relatively pedestrian win in Game 3, hit dramatic homeruns in 
the 9th inning on consecutive nights, which led to remarkable wins. Yankee Stadium, which was 
less than 13 miles from Ground Zero in lower Manhattan, became the site of two of the most 
extraordinary baseball games in MLB history. HBO’s documentary “Nine Innings from Ground 
Zero” detailed the impact of the series and how a reeling city and a nation turned to baseball to 
help the healing process (Bernstein, Gavant & Greenberg, 2004). The Mets did not make the 
playoffs and the Yankees did not win the World Series, but they provided at least a city, if not a 
country, an outlet to recover from tragedy. The culmination of all that transpired in baseball 
following 9/11 led to what Tygiel (2002) referred to as a generation’s signature moment.  
National Football League. The NFL had just completed its first weekend of the regular 
season with a Monday Night Football game between the Denver Broncos and New York Giants, 
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which ended just hours before the attacks of 9/11. In fact, the Giants charter jet landed at Newark 
International Airport at 5:45 a.m. (Pennington, 2001), which was the same airport that Flight 93 
would depart from less than three hours later. At the time of the attacks, Paul Tagliabue was the 
NFL commissioner. Tagliabue, much like Selig, would be thrust into the forefront of the NFL’s 
reactions to 9/11, including the decision whether to play and how to properly resume the games 
at the appropriate time.  
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue. Tagliabue took over as NFL commissioner in November 
1989, succeeding Pete Rozelle who had held the position for 29 years. Many thought that Jim 
Finks would be appointed commissioner after an extensive search by a group of NFL owners, but 
Tagliabue was eventually chosen for the position. Tagliabue’s relationship with the NFL began 
as Rozelle’s legal counsel, which gave him familiarity with the league (York, 1994). The NFL 
had experienced sound prosperity while under the Rozelle regime, but Tagliabue’s steady 
influence elevated the sport to new levels. In Rozelle’s final year as commissioner (1988), the 
NFL took in $975 million in revenue and the average worth of an NFL franchise was 
approximately $100 million. By 2006, Tagliabue’s last year as commissioner, league revenues 
were estimated at $6.2 billion and the average worth of a franchise had risen to approximately 
$898 million (Oriard, 2007). Tagliabue had settled the growing dissention between the labor 
union and the owners, expanded the league for the first time in 20 years, and negotiated the 
largest television contract in professional sports history to date. While Rozelle was long 
considered the preeminent NFL commissioner, Tagliabue unquestionably had success in his own 
right during his term as commissioner (Elfin, 2006). The two men were inextricably linked 
because of their successor/predecessor relationship, as well as having to deal with a national 
tragedy.  
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On November 22, 1963 President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. It was a 
Friday afternoon when the president was pronounced dead, just two days before the NFL was to 
play a weekend’s slate of games. Commissioner Rozelle was charged with deciding whether or 
not to play the games as scheduled. Rozelle, after consulting with various colleagues and friends, 
decided that teams should play the games as scheduled. Many that participated in those games 
were hesitant at first, thinking that it was too soon. However, the resounding feedback from most 
was relief that football was there to distract from the terrible tragedy suffered just days before. 
Rozelle, though, would later say that his decision to play was his biggest regret during his 29 
years as commissioner (Chidester, 2009). That declaration would resonate with Commissioner 
Tagliabue. Tagliabue served as legal counsel under Rozelle for 20 years when he took over 
leadership of the NFL. Thirty-eight years after the Kennedy assassination, Tagliabue and the 
NFL found themselves in an eerily similar situation in deciding whether to play their scheduled 
games just days after tragedy. September 11 was a Tuesday, five days before the next games on 
September 16. Tagliabue had three more days and the experience of seeing Rozelle’s regret, 
which impacted his decision on whether he should cancel the games (Brown, 2004).   
To Play or Not to Play. The NFL was more diligent in the decision process simply 
because it was afforded more time than MLB. Major League Baseball had games scheduled 
every day that week, while the NFL had until the weekend to decide. Logistically, the FAA had 
not lifted its restrictions on flights in the U.S. and there was no concrete timeframe to when that 
would happen. Security was also a significant concern as many believed that stadiums packed 
with 60,000 to70,000 fans could be a target for another attack. Emotionally, teams had expressed 
a desire to postpone the games, with some players even threatening to boycott the events if they 
were played (Battista, 2001). The White House staff, the NFL’s television broadcast partners, 
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and the Executive Director of the NFL Players’ Association Gene Upshaw all consulted with 
Tagliabue about the decision. Ultimately, on Thursday, September 13, the NFL decided to 
postpone the weekend’s games (Burton & Crow, 2002).  
Tagliabue said of the decision, “We wanted to be sensitive, certain and right, certainly 
not superficial. At a certain point playing our games can contribute to the healing process. Just 
not at this time” (Freeman, 2001b, p. C13). The NFL, specifically Tagliabue, was praised for its 
choice not to go forward with the games. Although it did appear that some of the commissioner’s 
motivation was to avoid dissention among the players, the consensus remained that the NFL did 
the right thing in the wake of the tragedy (Brown, 2004). The next priority was coordinating the 
resumption of play and how to handle addressing the tragedy through ceremony.  
Games Resumed. The first games back for the NFL saw poignant tributes performed in 
many ways and through multiple forums. Every stadium held a moment of silence, there were 
thousands of fans waving small American flags at each game (1 million of them were bought and 
distributed by the NFL), and flag decals were displayed on the back of every players’ helmet 
(Mihoces, 2001). More than 75,000 Kansas City Chiefs fans cheered on the visiting New York 
Giants at Arrowhead Stadium. A similar acknowledgment occurred in Foxboro, MA as New 
England Patriot fans applauded their rival New York Jet counterparts. There was an 
overwhelming feeling that the teams from New York represented much more than football teams 
on that day (Mihoces, 2001). On the sidelines throughout the league, players and coaches tried to 
hold back tears as “God Bless America,” “the Star-Spangled Banner,” and video tributes were 
played over the public address systems. In Dallas, a massive 100-yard long American flag 
covered the entire field as the Cowboys prepared to play the Oakland Raiders (Saraceno, 2001). 
16 
 
The NFL went to great lengths to address the incident and try to memorialize those that were 
victims of the attacks.  
Baseball was in action for six days before the first NFL games took place. Although 
baseball’s popularity had been surpassed by the NFL’s by this time, there was still a 
romanticized perception of MLB and its position in the fabric of American culture. The 
ritualistic nature of baseball was conducive to memorials and the World Series was the first 
major national sporting event after the attacks. These factors, paired with the dramatics of the 
aforementioned playoff races, positioned MLB to be at the forefront of response (Butterworth, 
2005). Football, however, was situated on major cable broadcasting airwaves and scheduled 
during visible viewing hours on Sunday afternoons and Monday nights. The Super Bowl was an 
exceedingly popular sporting event, traditionally among the highest rated television programs of 
the year (Oriard, 2007). All of these conditions arguably positioned the NFL’s response as the 
broader, more far-reaching reactions of all sport leagues. It was a stage through which the NFL 
delivered moving tributes to the tragedy.  
Super Bowl XXXVI between the St. Louis Rams and New England Patriots was a 
platform for the NFL to truly memorialize those who lost their lives on 9/11. The pre-game 
ceremonies were filled with representatives from the United States’ Armed Forces and tributes to 
those who lost their lives during the attacks. The half-time show was an emotional performance 
by the band U-2, who played “Where the Streets Have No Name” in front of a screen with a 
scrolling list of all the people who died during the September 11 attacks. The game itself was an 
appropriate match-up of an overwhelming favorite in the Rams, who had won the Super Bowl 
two years prior, and the underdog Patriots, who seemingly had no chance in the game. The game 
fittingly ended with the Patriots kicking a game-winning field goal as time expired for the 
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victory, which some would draw parallels in the symbolism of the United States’ pending 
resurgence against an “evil” and faceless foe.  
National Collegiate Athletic Association. Cedric Dempsey was the executive director of 
the NCAA from 1994 to 2002 and was the head executive of the highest level of collegiate sport 
at the time of the attacks. The NCAA was in the midst of its fall season of sports at the Division 
I, II, and III levels on 9/11. The dynamic of decision-making with regard to the choice to play or 
not to play following the attacks was different than that of MLB and the NFL. Dempsey oversaw 
the operations of many sports at several levels, while Major League Baseball (Selig) and the 
National Football League (Tagliabue) operated as one sport with a commissioner who had the 
authority to cancel or suspend games. There were more than 1,000 schools that had events 
scheduled for that week and cancelling those games created financial and logistical difficulties 
for those schools that chose not to play (Smith, 2001). Ultimately, the decision on whether to 
play was strictly up to the conferences or the individual schools.  
The most visible sport that was in-season at the time was Division I football, which had 
just completed its second week of the regular season. In an interview with ESPN.com, Dempsey 
admitted that he did not have the authority to decide on whether the games were played and 
actually saw his role as a liaison between the White House and the Conference Commissioners 
(Katz, 2001). He said in the interview that there were two messages that were prevalent with the 
administration; to return to “normalcy” as soon as possible and to acknowledge a national day of 
prayer that may be held on Saturday, September 15, which could conflict with the games (Katz, 
2001). There was growing apprehension about the timeliness of playing games so close to a 
national tragedy. Some believed that playing the games too soon would trivialize one of the 
greatest tragedies in American history (Brown, 2001). An additional concern was safety at major 
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sporting events, which were thought to be viable targets for more terrorist attacks (Katz, 2001). 
The culmination made the decision to play more difficult for those stakeholders in charge.   
Some college football venues had the capability to hold extremely large crowds during 
home football games. Places like Michigan Stadium (Michigan), Beaver Stadium (Penn State), 
Ohio Stadium (Ohio State), and Neyland Stadium (Tennessee) were venues that routinely 
exceeded 100,000 fans in attendance on Saturday afternoons, much larger than most NFL 
stadiums. The majority of college football games were canceled that weekend. Conferences like 
the Big Ten and Big East were quick to suspend play, which ultimately triggered the other 
conferences to follow. The risk of compromising the safety of so many people, paired with the 
sting of tragedy made the decision not to play easier for those stakeholders charged with the 
decision. It would also mark a turning point in the way that major facilities would view their 
security precautions moving forward.  
Sport after Tragedy 
On January 15, 1942, succeeding the United States’ entry into World War II, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote the Green Light Letter to the then commissioner of Major League 
Baseball, Kenesaw M. Landis. The correspondence implored Landis to resume baseball in the 
spring, stating that the American people “ought to have a chance for recreation and for taking 
their minds off their work even more than before.” He continued, “Baseball provides a recreation 
which does not last over two hours or two hours and a half, and which can be got for very little 
cost” (Roosevelt, 1942, para. 3-4). The sentiment served as a benchmark for those instances later 
in the century that raised the question whether sport should resume through a crisis. Not only did 
the letter, and ensuing playing of the 1942 baseball season, set a standard for playing through 
crisis, it also established a precedent that sport was a medium with which the American public 
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would associate normalcy (Brown, 2004). The Green Light Letter would be referred to after the 
assassination of President Kennedy, the 1972 Munich Olympics tragedy, the Persian Gulf War, 
and, of course, the terrorist attacks of September 11 (Brown, 2004).  
Pearl Harbor. Barnstorming in baseball was a popular routine in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Players like Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig would travel around the country playing baseball games 
for townspeople who did not ordinarily get to see those baseball stars play in person. Of course 
names like Ruth and Gehrig were well known throughout the country in no small part because of 
newspapers. In 1931, Gehrig led a team of all-stars to Tokyo, Japan, to play an exhibition game 
against a team from Rikkyo University. More than 65,000 Japanese fans attended the game and it 
was clear to the Americans that their Japanese counterparts were fanatical about baseball. Three 
years later Ruth and other American all-stars went on a country-wide barnstorming tour 
throughout Japan, playing in front of thousands of fans (Crepeau, 1982). Baseball was 
developing into a national sport in Japan, which many Americans thought was a positive 
indication that tensions would lessen between the two countries. Warlords and other political 
leaders, however, were displeased with the American presence in the game and began to 
eliminate all American influences from it. By August of 1941, four months prior to the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, baseball was terminated in Japan (Crepeau, 1982). 
The United States was fully entrenched in WWII when President Roosevelt sent the 
Green Light Letter. Two months after Commissioner Landis received the letter, the first Major 
League Baseball players reported for active duty in the United States military. On May 7, 1942, 
Detroit Tiger’s superstar Hank Greenberg famously was inducted into service (Obermeyer, 
2010). Major League Baseball was etched into American culture as the national pastime at this 
point. World War II threatened baseball’s ability to carry on because of players enrolling into the 
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service and an unease that people would not want to concern themselves with a game during a 
time of war (Bazer & Culbertson, 2001). Americans had been gearing up for war in Europe, but 
Pearl Harbor was a stinging reminder that there was an enemy on the other side of the world as 
well. Roosevelt knew that Americans were facing tremendous adversity and baseball was an 
outlet that he saw for society to use, if not just for a couple of hours (Chidester, 2009). It was 
FDR’s assignment of sport as an escape and function of normalcy that set precedent to future 
scenarios that were similarly demanding on society. It was also the premise behind this 
dissertation’s critical analysis of sport’s role in society.  
Kennedy Assassination. For a generation of Americans that were born before the 1960s, 
the media coverage of September 11 was not unprecedented. On November 22, 1963, President 
John F. Kennedy was shot and killed while riding in a motorcade in Dallas, TX. It was a 
signature moment similar to Pearl Harbor that later begged the question, “Where were you when 
this happened?” The days that followed the assassination were filled with a 24-hour news cycle 
similar to that of 9/11. Network affiliates stayed on the air for nearly four consecutive days, 
dedicating all their coverage to the assassination (Zelizer, 1992). President Kennedy was 
assassinated on a Friday and NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle was charged with the decision of 
whether to play the scheduled games for that Sunday, November 24. After consulting with 
various sources, including presidential press secretary Pierre Salinger, Rozelle decided games 
would be played as scheduled (King, 1993). Rozelle later called the decision the worst of his 
career (Chidester, 2009). Rozelle’s decision would be referred to by MLB and NFL 
commissioners Bud Selig and Paul Tagliabue after 9/11, as both men realized their decisions 
impacted a significant number of people and would ultimately affect their legacies as 
commissioners.  
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King (1993) noted that Salinger’s advice to Rozelle following the Kennedy assassination 
was to play on that Sunday. In a commemorative Sports Illustrated story about the decision 30 
years after the assassination, Salinger was quoted agreeing with the choice, “Absolutely, it was 
the right decision. I've never questioned it. This country needed some normalcy, and football, 
which is a very important game in our society, helped provide it" (King, 1993, para. 2). The NFL 
did make a concerted effort to honor President Kennedy during the games. Pre-game ceremonies 
were held in the stadiums that included moments of silence, singing of hymns, and other patriotic 
gestures made in remembrance (Brown, 2004). The games continued throughout the country, but 
the significance of each event was perhaps matched by the ceremonies acknowledging the 
tragedy. Playing the games allowed masses of people to congregate and openly display their 
grief, while also having an outlet to cheer and watch a football game.  
Munich. The 1972 Summer Olympic Games held in Munich, Germany, was the site of 
one of the most infamous acts of terrorism to directly involve sport in history. Tensions were 
prevalent throughout the games between varying country representatives, specifically the 
Germans and Israelis and the United States and the USSR (Schiller & Young, 2010). The 
Olympic site was just a few miles from the German concentration camp at Dachau and these 
Olympics were only 36 years removed from the Berlin Games, which were also filled with 
political turmoil. The United States was engaged in battle with their Cold War combatant, the 
USSR. Although many noted the cordiality of the games in the first days, September 5, 1972, 
would change the complexion entirely (Reeve, 2000). Eight terrorists from the Palestinian group 
Black September took 11 Israeli Olympians hostage in the Olympic Village. After a long 
standoff with German officials at the village, the terrorists negotiated an arranged escape flight to 
Cairo, Egypt. The terrorists and hostages were taken to Fürstenfeldbruck airport by helicopter 
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where a German ambush was staged but went awry. The totality of lives lost that day was 17, 
which included all 11 Israeli hostages, five of the terrorists, and one German policeman (Schiller 
& Young, 2010).  
A memorial service was held on September 6 and IOC officials, after much deliberating, 
decided that the games should continue, in part as a tribute to the Israeli team members who were 
killed. Teams withdrew from the competition and there was an overall sense of uneasiness 
throughout. It was decided to play in an effort to “put this day and its crude frenzies behind us” 
(Schiller & Young, 2010, p. 208). These Olympic Games were seemingly marred from the 
beginning with all of the tension that existed. The terrorist attack, and subsequent criticism to 
how the German authorities handled the crisis, was a reminder of the Isreali bloodshed not far 
removed by both time and proximity. The carrying on was an example of how society views the 
role of sport in response to crisis. The Munich Massacre, as it was later deemed, has many 
parallels to 9/11, specifically in regard to the aftermath.  
Gulf War. The Persian Gulf War is also referred to as the “metaphor-war” (Nadelhaft, 
2004). Sport and war have long overlapped in various clichés and monikers. Journalists have 
incorporated the use of hypermasculine analogies and war-like clichés to link war and sport. 
Terms like “blitz,” “offense,” “defense,” and “bomb” have moved past cliché in sport and have 
become commonalities among the sport vernacular (Jansen & Sabo, 1994). Nadelhaft (2004) 
observed that it was more than journalists, but also military and government leaders that 
embraced the use of sport metaphors in describing the Gulf War. General Norman Schwartzkopf 
described an offensive incursion on the enemy as a “Hail Mary,” President Bush spoke of 
“teamwork” and a “game plan”, and Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Mike Townsend said “Just as 
a golfer would have to approach a green carefully to avoid these hazards, a fighter pilot must 
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approach a target taking into account these things” (Nadelhaft, 2004, p. 25). The relationship 
between the metaphor and the consumer was useful for two primary reasons. First, the metaphor 
provided an applicable visual for the public to understand what was happening during the war. 
The general population has a much greater exposure to sport than it does the commonalities of 
war. Secondly, the sport metaphor made it seem less like war and more a strategic execution of, 
as President Bush noted, a game plan (Nadelhaft, 2004).  
The United States’ involvement in the Gulf War also introduced a new enemy to 
Americans. The Middle East was an area of uncertainty and there was an uncomfortable lack of 
knowledge about who the United States was fighting against. More troubling was that, although 
the fighting was predominantly happening in the Middle East, the rogue threat of Iraqi 
nationalists in this country was a growing concern (Le Billona & El Khatibb, 2004). Super Bowl 
XXV in Tampa, FL, was thought to be a potential target for an attack. The United States had 
only been in the war for two weeks, which also led to some anxiety among Americans. However, 
after Whitney Houston sang the “Star-Spangled Banner,” the game turned into a rallying point 
for the war effort and support for the troops (Kooijiman, 2004). The strength of one of the most 
widely viewed sporting events in America (the Super Bowl) unifying a nation in support was 
palpable.  
9/11. When President George W. Bush threw a strike as the ceremonial first pitch in 
Game 3 of the World Series, October 27, 2001, at Yankee Stadium, there was undoubtedly a 
message sent to all Americans watching. As the President walked out of the New York Yankees’ 
dugout wearing a blue New York City Fire Department jacket, he took the mound less than 13 
miles from the World Trade Center site and “made the most symbolic pitch of any World Series” 
(Moran, 2001, para. 1). It was the first time that a sitting president had thrown the first pitch in a 
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World Series since 1956 and it represented a movement forward from the tragedies of 9/11. Not 
only was the act symbolic of the Bush Administration’s desire to return to normalcy, it also 
demonstrated the rhetorical outlet sport, specifically baseball, could be. Baseball stadiums 
became cathedrals used for memorializing the victims of 9/11. Speeches from government 
officials, community prayer services and vigils, and televised concerts turned into routine 
activities at baseball games following the attacks. Major League Baseball made rituals of games 
and echoed much of the rhetoric the Bush Administration disseminated after the terrorist attacks 
(Butterworth, 2005). President Bush, a former owner of MLB’s Texas Rangers, had laid out his 
plan to the American public for the war on terror a month before the beginning of the World 
Series. The Yankees, who were seen interacting with rescue workers at Ground Zero after the 
attacks, advanced to MLB’s biggest stage, which provided President Bush a platform to evoke 
national unity and public support for military action. The administration also relied on the 
editorial pages of newspapers, particularly the New York Times and Washington Post, to lay out 
the agenda of the War on Terror (Billeaudeaux et al., 2003). The efforts were an attempt for the 
American public to return to normalcy, deny the terrorists’ efforts in changing the American way 
of life, and to incite unity behind an ideology of nationalism. This identity through sport is what 
Coakley (2009) described as “we-ness” (p. 452). Sport’s response to September 11, in effect, 
became a rallying point to keep striving together as a nation and to keep playing, a place of 
remembering heroes, a forum to honor individuals, and taking on the role of a healer.  
Media, Sport, and 9/11 
The importance of media as a social institution was thrust into cognizance as citizens 
throughout the world learned of the events of September 11. The majority of Americans lived 
and gained an understanding of the tragedies through their televisions, newspapers, and radios 
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(Anker, 2005). Mainstream media were on a 24-hour news cycle and had become the eyes, ears, 
and mouths of the viewing public as people throughout the world watched the events unfold. 
This dissertation defines mainstream media using Abrahamian’s (2003) backdrop of news 
organizations with reputable and quality-driven standards. His qualification of print media 
explicitly stated, “Quality newspapers and journals read by the American literati and 
intelligentsia, whom political scientists would describe as the ‘attentive public.’ The papers 
include the New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post” (p. 530). September 11 
provided a benchmark for change in the way media, especially the aforementioned 
conglomerates, functioned and journalism transformed (Zelizer & Allan, 2002).  
The immediacy and unsuspecting nature in which the terrorist attacks occurred was as 
much a part of the change as the events that followed. It was an ordinary Tuesday morning that 
started with a report of billowing smoke coming out of the North Tower at the World Trade 
Center in lower Manhattan. Morning television shows were signing off the air when reports of 
the oddity began to surface. At 9:03 a.m., as another large plane came into television frames 
across the country and disappeared by plunging into the South Tower, it was increasingly clear 
that these events were not accidents. For the next 91 consecutive hours, the major networks 
provided commercial-free coverage of everything that transpired that day and the days following 
(Carey, 2002). Journalists scrambled to report any new information with timeliness suddenly an 
equal, sometimes overemphasized, priority over accuracy. It was an ushering out of the 
sensationalism and frivolous reporting and the reemergence of serious journalism. It was a 
prominent moment of “sobering up” and “an end to soft news” (Waisbord, 2002, p. 273). This 
was believed to be a turning point for a profession that was lost in a self-indulgent, self-
promoting tailspin.  
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Ten years after their first edition of Journalism after September 11, Zelizer and Allan 
(2011) published a second edition of their work with an updated view of the changes in media 
and journalism. The initial contention of a completely altered media landscape originally 
presented by Waisbord (2002) and others was retrospectively overzealous. Their assertions were 
not necessarily incorrect, but because they were made at a time when the industry and country 
were still reeling from tragedy, they were over-generalized. Zelizer and Allan (2011) in their 
follow-up publication relented, “it may be that we have entered a new period in which journalism 
in its recognizable form has changed […] Conversely, it may be that the events of September 11 
provided no more than a period of temporary respite” (p. 2). This vacillation is indicative of the 
effects and influence 9/11 had on media. Media has changed and in no small part because of 
9/11. Perhaps it is not in the way that business is done, but an awareness that the unlikely can 
happen.  
Topic Relevance. Media consumption varies from person to person, as does the preferred 
medium through which a populous engages media. The majority of media consumers rely on 
multiple platforms, both print and electronic, to satisfy their media appetite. The collective is 
fundamental in consumers constructing an understanding of a reality through images and 
narratives (Coakley, 2009). Sport and mass media have what Smith and Blackman (1978) called 
a symbiotic relationship. Sport is a form of entertainment that people want. Media is a method 
for the masses to consume it. Both sport and media profit from the supply and demand dynamic 
(Smith & Blackmon, 1978). The demand is quite high for many sporting events, which 
television, radio, print, and internet outlets are more than willing to meet expectations on the 
supply side. The viewing audiences of sport can and have reached upwards of several billion 
viewers for international events like the World Cup or the Olympics. In the United States, the 
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Super Bowl has attracted the largest audiences in media programming in the country. The 
vastness of the consumption simply means sport, and the stakeholders that present sport via the 
media, have an expansive reach to project a message (Hundley & Billings, 2010). The result of 
these projections is a forum for the media to present identities and ideologies.  
The assertions of mediated sport that Coakley (2009) and Hundley and Billings (2010) 
made are closely related and of a seemingly causal dynamic. Coakley stated that media are a 
venue for consumers to gain a conceptual understanding of a reality. Hundley and Billings noted 
that identities such as hegemonic masculinity and ideals on ability/disability were commonplace 
in sport media. Therefore, those who consume sport media, a notable population, are exposed to 
a set of norms perpetuated by sport, which ultimately influences a truth. For example, Denham 
and Duke (2010) examined the perceptions of American cyclist Lance Armstrong in both the 
United States and internationally. The findings of their study indicated that the American media 
presented Armstrong as a courageous and defiant hero, symbolic of the American ideals. 
Conversely, international media did not project Armstrong fondly, depicting him as a rogue 
similar to internationally maligned President George W. Bush. Armstrong was seen as a sport 
hero by Americans and an extension of this proud nation, while international perceptions were 
alternatively quite different. The dichotomy of perceptions of Armstrong is an example of 
media’s influence on shaping identity and a subsequent reality. Of course, this projection was 
seen prior to his admission to widespread doping during his career, which villainized him to all 
audiences. 
Sport and media are individual societal institutions that have the tendency to merge, 
creating a symbiotic relationship driven by demand and subsequent fiscal gain (Smith & 
Blackman, 1978). This assertion dates back to a time when cable television, internet, or even 
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major binding television contracts were not even a thought between the two entities. As 
technology has grown, public interest expanded, and media cycles inflated, what Rowe (2004) 
referred to as “media sport,” is now engrained into the normal, everyday lives of people, sport 
and non-sport fans alike. Wenner (1998) coined the phrase “MediaSport” and defined it as an 
appraisal of the interaction of sport and media and its impact on culture. Events like the 
Olympics, the Super Bowl, and FIFA’s World Cup are international media events that not only 
garner viewership, but also act as a platform for industry and politics to interject their agendas on 
an active audience (Wenner, 1998). This relationship has led to an infusion of monetary gains for 
sports leagues, media organizations, and sponsoring companies that have positioned themselves 
appropriately. In essence, leagues, organizations, media outlets, and advertisers have converged 
through symbiosis to achieve financial successes that were unmatched by each entity separately 
and are relatively unseen in other industries.  
The New York Times and 9/11. The New York Times printed its sports section upside 
down on September 12, 2001, and did so every day for the remainder of that year (Lule, 2002). 
Additionally, the entire newspaper referred to their coverage of the attacks as “A Nation 
Challenged,” which was a concentrated campaign slogan dedicated solely to the response to 
9/11. The format change continued until the newspaper’s first publication of 2002, a total of 111 
days. Printing the section upside down allowed readers who began reading from the front page to 
view the entire paper upright from front-to-back. The 16-week alteration was practical because 
the Times’ “A Nation Challenged” campaign could be viewed in a uniform front-to-back fashion 
(Lule, 2002). The new format was also symbolic in that the paper, which previously had four 
distinct sections, now used a unified layout to cover the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The efforts 
and resources employed by the New York Times Company paralleled its previously amplified 
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wartime coverage and, in turn, earned the newspaper several Pulitzer Prizes for its reporting 
(Hertzberg, 2002). A Nation Challenged was a dedicated effort by the New York Times to 
provide expansive coverage to the local and national response to the terrorist attacks, which 
included the sports sections during this time.  
Purpose of the Study 
This study aimed to provide insight through framing analysis into how one of the nation’s 
preeminent newspapers chose to cover one of the largest tragedies in American history on the 
pages of its sports section. The New York Times was chosen because of its uniquely positioned 
status of industry leader in print journalism, as well as its transformation into a local publication 
due to the proximity to Ground Zero. The purpose of this study was multi-layered in that the 
findings (1) explored what frames were used in the response to 9/11; (2) explored how the 
journalists addressed the attacks through their writing; and (3) defined how the interplay between 
the two aforementioned qualifiers impacted the frames used during the aftermath of September 
11. Framing analysis through textual analysis and semi-structured interviews was used to analyze 
the data and framing theory provided the ideological backdrop to the final results.  
Chapter I of this study provided an introduction to 9/11, the precedents that impacted 
reactions by certain stakeholders, and the conditions of sport and media’s symbiotic relationship 
that inspired this investigation. It additionally offered research questions that guided the study 
and provided a framework for literature on the topic. Chapter II of this study illuminated the 
seminal moments that have shaped the convergence of sport and media, which was integral in 
demonstrating how important the sport section of the New York Times was during this period. 
The review of literature then focused on the implications of September 11 on primary social 
institutions in the United States. The juxtaposition of the events within varying institutions was 
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increasingly important when describing the magnitude of 9/11. The perspective led to an 
examination of how things changed following these tragic events. Chapter III gave an 
explanation of the methodology used to study the framing of 9/11. Finally, Chapter IV and 
Chapter V provided the findings and a discussion of the implications subsequent to those results.  
Research Questions 
The following research questions guided this examination of how journalists at the New 
York Times produced content following a national crisis: 
RQ1: What frames were prevalent in the sport section of the New York Times following 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11? 
RQ2: How did the terrorist attacks on 9/11 impact the reporting of sports journalists at 
the New York Times during the “A Nation Challenged” campaign?  
The first question was formed to determine how journalists at the New York Times were able to 
employ frames in their coverage. In other words, what frames appeared the most during the post-
9/11 coverage? The second research question was formed to gain insight on how those very 
journalists continued in their jobs as information suppliers at such a critical time. For example, 
what was their focus when writing stories for each day’s publication? How did they choose to 
write about relevant topics of the day? What aspects of their jobs had changed in lieu of 9/11? 
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Symbiosis of Media and Sport 
Examining the relationship between sport and media was important because of its 
expanse and its influence. Sport is a global pursuit and one that has captivated millions of people 
in a multitude of ways. Thousands of fans pour into massive stadiums to watch European 
football games, millions turn on the television to watch American football games each weekend, 
and even more dedicate time reading about the games in sports sections of newspapers across the 
globe (Coakley, 2009). Media’s role throughout these scenarios is the message sender, which is 
an influential function in the communication process. Rowe (2004) referred the analytical 
processes of culturalization and mediatization in order to explain how media sport operates 
within this dynamic. Culturization is the impact on society that the infusion of media sport has, 
while mediatization describes the mediums (newspaper, television, radio, etc.) that are actors in 
penetrating culture. This study was interested in the mediatization aspect of sport and media and 
how the influences of historical advances developed the current landscape of the industry. 
Examining the seminal moments that advanced the relationship of sport and media allowed for a 
furthered understanding of its evolution and escalation into prominence. 
Sport and media, at least in the semblance known today, are historically intertwined in 
American history. As middle-class Americans became more invested in physical activity and 
sporting events during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, media in the form of newspapers 
and magazines were growing in popularity as well (Boyle & Haynes, 2009). Sports like boxing, 
baseball, and horse racing, along with specific clubs like the New York Knickerbockers, were 
gaining recognition across the country. The increased attention to sport, teamed with the impetus 
of education, specifically with regard to literacy, created a growing demand for reading materials 
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about sports, which were mostly in the form of periodicals and newspapers (Smith & Blackman, 
1978). Baseball, or “base ball” as it was referred to at the time, had been thought of as a juvenile 
game that struggled to indentify itself from English games called cricket and rounders. However, 
in the fall of 1856, a New York Times writer named Henry Chadwick happened upon a baseball 
game being played at the Knickerbocker club fields in Hoboken, NJ (Schiff, 2008). Inspired by 
what he saw on the field that day, the English-born health enthusiast recognized an opportunity 
to blend American’s growing penchant for sport with their new-found enthusiasm for media into 
the first seminal moment of sport media, sports journalism (Smith & Blackman, 1978).  
 Henry Chadwick. The first sporting journal in the United States was the Spirit of the 
Times, which dedicated coverage to sports like horse racing and cricket. Newspapers became 
cognizant of the successes their magazine and periodical counterparts were having with 
increased circulations, so they soon followed measure. In 1853, sports coverage began appearing 
sporadically in newspapers and in 1862 Chadwick began covering baseball regularly for the New 
York Herald (Smith & Blackman, 1978). This marked the first time in media history that a 
newspaper had devoted news coverage specifically to a sport. It would not be until years later 
that a newspaper would dedicate an entire section to the topic, but Chadwick would be 
instrumental in shaping the profession of sports reporter from that point forward.  
 Although Chadwick is referred to as the first sports reporter (Schiff, 2008), his most 
notable contribution to both journalism and baseball was his implementation of the box score 
(Tygiel, 1995). The baseball box score was a derivative of the cricket statistical measures that 
Chadwick was familiar with. Although cricket was originally his preferred sport, Chadwick fell 
in love with the game of baseball. He said of his role in the game, “From the first time I first 
became an admirer of base ball, I have devoted myself to improving and fostering the game in 
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every way” (Tygiel, 1995, p. 204). The invention of the box score accomplished his objective in 
two important ways. First, the box score reformed the way statistics were kept, which have 
ultimately become the centerpiece of accomplishments in the sport to this day. Secondly, it 
changed the way that games were reported on with statistics augmenting the storytelling of 
journalists. This truly marked the onset of the symbiotic relationship between sport and media. 
Seymour (1960) wrote, “All sides now recognize that their interests are identical. The reporters 
have found in the game a thing of beauty and a source of actual employment. The game has 
found in the reporters its best ally and most powerful supporter” (p. 351).  
 Chadwick was instrumental in shaping sports reporting, emphasizing statistics in the 
games, and bringing the games to the masses through written word. Magazines, journals, and 
newspapers as a whole were vastly popular through the remainder of the 19th century and had 
little competition from other mediums. The industry would be enriched at the turn of the century, 
however, with the invention of film. Thomas Edison, Robert Paul, the Lumière brothers, and 
other inventors brought sporting events to life through creating moving images on film during 
the 1890s (Boyle & Haynes, 2009). Of course, this predates live broadcasts and instantaneous 
viewership, but by the start of the 20th century it was possible for the people to view the heroic 
exploits of athletes while not having to attend the match. Film provided two major components 
that print media lacked: (a) a realness to both the sport and the athletes that could only be 
produced by one’s imagination previously, and (b) an opportunity for people to self-assess 
sporting events without solely relying on sport journalists. One of the first filmed sporting events 
was Edison filming a boxing match featuring Billy Edwards in 1895 in New York (Boyle & 
Haynes, 2009). Boxing was a popular sport for this medium because of its impactful nature and 
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the centralized location of the boxing ring, which did not necessitate much movement of the 
camera. The infusion of modern technology began to impact sport media.  
 Golden Age of Sport. Media had aided sport to an unprecedented level of growth and 
technology had continued to aid media in its ability to farther reach the American public. Nearly 
every newspaper across the country published news of the day in sports by the end of World War 
I. Improvements made to communication, transportation, and social mobility procured a 
nationalization of sport that set the tone for sport’s ascension into “its modern position as a 
cornerstone in American culture (McChesney, 1989, p. 55). The environment was plush for what 
would become known as the “Golden Age of Sport in America,” which spanned from 1914 to 
1930 (Smith & Blackman, 1978). Hardin and Zuegner (2003) noted that the 1920s “will always 
be the Golden Age to sports fans because the sports world produced perhaps the greatest 
collection of athletes of any decade before or since” (p. 83). Two major media sport 
breakthroughs occurred during this era that significantly influenced the popularity of sport and 
the perception of the era’s legendary athletes. First, Grantland Rice, who was perhaps the most 
famous sportswriter during this period, pioneered the emergence of the sports journalist, and 
second, radio entered into the lexicon of sports broadcasting with a series of monumental events 
heard over the airwaves. 
 While Henry Chadwick is often referred to as the dean of baseball, Grantland Rice was 
known as the dean of versifiers, which was a reference to his unparalleled ability to write in 
poetic verse (Rader, 1984). Rice’s role in the symbiotic relationship between sport and media is 
exceedingly important because, like Chadwick, he was trailblazer for both entities. He loved 
baseball and was a renowned sports journalist at the same time. Inabinett (1994) discussed four 
factors that separated Rice’s work from other writers and made him such an influence in the 
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sport venue over his career: “the perceived authenticity of his stories, the weight history has 
given his judgments, the suitability of his style for his audience, and his exposure and fame” (p. 
5). Rice wrote about immensely popular athletes like Jack Dempsey, Babe Ruth, and Bobby 
Jones, all of whom he had intimate access to. That endeared him to readers, in part, because 
Rice’s articles were viewed as authentic (Inabinett, 1994). He also had a profound way of writing 
in grandiose fashion and with a diligent preference of focusing the subject of each story on the 
positive aspects rather than the negative. One of Rice’s common protagonists was Jones, with 
whom he shared both a personal relationship and a love of the game of golf. Hardin (2004) noted 
the regal context that Rice presented Jones in and included this excerpt as an example of Rice’s 
typical style of writing: “Jones was the ‘master of wood and iron [who] romped over the historic 
battlefield with . . . skill, power and sure- nes’ during the 1922 U.S. Amateur” (Hardin, 2004, p. 
521). Rice’s writing style was a departure from the statistic-laden writing from the Chadwick era 
and emphasized the heroes on the playing fields. He was pivotal in elevating both the stature of 
star athletes and the popularity of the sports that they played (Hardin & Zuegner, 2003).      
 Radio. Major newspapers grew in popularity and circulation increased by 25% during the 
1920s. Advertising, which had accounted for 50% of newspaper revenue at the turn of the 
century, was up to 75% by 1929 and was beginning to carry over into other facets of broadcast 
media (McChesney, 1989). In the early part of the decade, however, radio stations were not 
aware of this revenue stream and, like newspapers with subscriptions, stations aimed to sell new 
radio sets in order to drive in revenue rather than advertisements. According to Spalding (1963-
64), one of every 400 homes had a radio in 1922. By 1929, that ratio increased to one out of 
every three homes. The first sport broadcast that changed the landscape of sports on the radio 
was the heavyweight title fight between Georges Carpentier and Jack Dempsey, fought in Jersey 
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City, NJ. Tex Rickard, a marketing pioneer in his own right, was integral in staging the fight and 
having it carried over the airwaves to a national audience. Historians estimated that as many as 
200,000 people simultaneously heard the fight that night (Rader, 1984). The significance of that 
event was listeners could hear the broadcast in a remote location and do it concurrently, which 
was unlike any other sporting experience before. Prior to radio, one had to go to the event in 
person in order to experience it live. Goldust (2004) said of the emergence of radio in the 1920s, 
“The electronic media of radio, and later television, proved to be far more suitable than film for 
the secondary transmission of sport to the mass public” (p. 43). Not only was radio a 
groundbreaking way to consume sports, it was an extraordinary complement to the newspaper 
coverage that remained strong during the same period, continually driving interest in sport 
higher. 
 Radio broadcasts remained constant through the ‘20s, but only the most significant events 
were transmitted, with boxing headlining most of those major broadcasting events. In 1923, two 
million fans heard Luis Firpo knock out Jess Willard in the 8 round of a fight in Jersey City. In 
1927, an estimated 50 million listeners heard “the long count fight” between Jack Dempsey and 
Gene Tunny, which was a dramatic heavyweight championship bout marred with controversy 
(Rader, 1984). Over a decade later, nearly two-thirds of Americans listened to Joe Louis knock 
out German boxer Max Schmeling in the first round, a radio broadcast believed to hold the 
largest audience in radio history (Rader, 1984). Sport fans were enthralled with their newfound 
capability of hearing a broadcast, as it was happening, in a place far away. Sport was as much a 
factor in the growth of radio as the medium was in the growth of sport (Goldust, 2004). Oriard 
(2001) noted that boxing and baseball’s World Series were the centerpieces of radio 
broadcasting, “but radio nonetheless was a major factor in football’s tremendous growth in the 
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1920s and 1930s, and football a factor in the growth of radio” (p. 41). The convergence, and 
symbiosis, of media and sport in the 1920s catapulted both institutions into prosperity 
exclusively and lucrative potential collectively.    
 Radio’s growth continued through the 1930s and 1940s and, despite those who predicted 
its negative impact on newspapers, complemented its media counterpart in the coverage of sport. 
As Woodward (1949) assessed, radio did not diminish sports journalism and neither would 
television. The two media were “too fleeting to serve as final authorities for settling bets and 
arguments” (p. 207). Each medium served a completely different purpose for the consuming 
public. Newspapers offered a calculated, almost poetic, reenactment of the matches from the day 
prior. Radio was an instantaneous and more colorful experience for sport enthusiasts. Woodward 
(1949) added of this dynamic, “The real sports fan listens to radio. That’s where he gets the 
result quickly. But he also reads the newspaper” (p. 207). Newspapers and radio shared a 
reliance on the mediated message supplied by the sport journalist and the audience’s 
imagination. Whether it was written word or verbal depiction, those who consumed sport in this 
manner were at the mercy of their broadcasting medium. That was until the emergence of the 
television onto the sport broadcasting scene.  
 Television. The first televised sporting event was a college baseball game between 
Columbia University and Princeton University, played on May 17, 1939. NBC used a single 
camera to broadcast the game over their experimental affiliate station W2XBS (Rader, 1984). 
The one camera perspective made the game difficult to follow and, because it was estimated that 
there were fewer than 400 television sets in use at the time, few people were actually able to 
watch the broadcast. However, it was a remarkable advancement for sport media because for the 
first time an audience could actually see a sporting event live without being in attendance. It was 
38 
 
a medium that occupied all of the audience’s senses, which print and radio previously could not 
(Woodward, 1949).   
 The advent of television, and subsequent expansive growth of the medium, was in no 
small part aided by sport programming. However, technology was cumbersome in the early 
years, which thrust non-traditional sports into the fray of normal broadcasting schedules. Roller 
derby and professional wrestling were the most televised sporting events, often appearing in 
primetime programming (McChesney, 1989). Boxing, unlike baseball or football, was the only 
prominent sport able to align itself with television broadcasts. Throughout the 1950s, roller 
derby, wrestling, and boxing were fixtures of regular programming and beneficiaries of increased 
exposure derived from television (Rader, 1984). These sports were conducive to one or two 
camera shoots, were dramatically more action-filled, and embraced the medium as a method to 
drum up interest. While baseball and football were resistant to television, administrators in the 
other sports thought that television hyped the live gate. This helped keep boxing in the forefront 
throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s (Rader, 1984). The significance of that initial broadcast 
of the Columbia and Princeton baseball game was immeasurable. Television would become the 
most influential media to impact the growth of sport and this symbiotic relationship.  
 The 1950s and 1960s were transformative years for television and were integral in 
shaping what McChesney (1989) called the “sports-television revolution.” Three major 
breakthroughs changed the landscape of the medium. First, major technological advances once 
again shifted the capabilities of broadcasts. Color television, videotape, instant replay, satellite 
dishes, and portable and multiple camera-ready broadcasts all changed how sports were 
produced and viewed (McChesney, 1989). Second, the NFL, which was increasingly gaining 
popularity due to its ideal translation onto television, introduced the television timeout, a break in 
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play that allowed sponsors more time to advertise their products (Powers, 1984). Third, the 
Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 allowed professional franchises to equally share revenues from 
nationally televised broadcasts (Bellamy, 1998). The culmination of all three led to unique sport 
consumption opportunities that rivaled attending games, enormous revenue streams for televised 
sports, and unprecedented growth in media.  
 Howard Cosell. Through the growth phases of print, radio, and television, the role of the 
sport broadcaster had remained relatively pedestrian. The influences of Chadwick and Rice had 
sustained through the years and most journalists simply passed the torch as storytellers. 
However, by the late 1950s, a World War II veteran and Manhattan lawyer named Howard 
Cosell was starting to make a name for himself as both a radio and television personality. Cosell 
hosted various shows on the ABC Radio airwaves and was the sports director for WABC-TV in 
New York (Ribowski, 2012). Like Chadwick (baseball) and Rice (golf) before him, Cosell was 
an advocate for his favorite sport; boxing. Unlike Chadwick and Rice, Cosell was abrasive and 
critical of the people and organizations that he covered. In Ribowski’s (2012) biography, the 
author wrote of Cosell, “he wasn’t a lawyer intoning sports; he was an entertainer, with properly 
manic mood swings and softened inflections, lengthening out his shtick, the chutzpah, the self-
effacing humor that can only work with a wink and a nudge” (p. 109). His polarizing persona 
was a departure from his predecessors’ amicable, hero-building approaches, but he became a 
revolutionary in the industry. 
 Cosell’s other distinct similarity with his predecessors, specifically Rice, was his 
relationships with influential people in the sport industry. One relationship of interest during his 
early years as a broadcaster was with newly hired NFL commissioner, Pete Rozelle. Cosell 
would later call Rozelle “without doubt the most effective commissioner ever to govern any 
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league in any sport” (Cosell, 1985, p. 83). Rozelle was savvy and bold as commissioner, which 
helped the league profit exponentially. The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 allowed revenue-
sharing for television broadcast rights by permitting the league to negotiate collectively instead 
of each team negotiating individually. Because of this legislation, Rozelle was able to negotiate a 
record $4.5 million contract with CBS in 1962, a record quickly broken in 1964 with a renewed 
CBS deal worth $14 million (Rader, 1984). During Rozelle’s term as commissioner, the NFL 
grew from 14 to 28 teams, increased ticket sales by 10 million tickets per year, raised the average 
worth of an NFL franchise from below $5 million to over $50 million, and a television rights 
contract worth $400 million (Cosell, 1985). Cosell and Rozelle’s relationship was wrought with 
contempt (Ribowski, 2012), but the two men had respected one another and both men were 
instrumental in professional football’s growth.  
 The most famous relationship Cosell had with a sports figure was his association with 
boxer Cassius Clay, later known as Muhammad Ali. Cosell was the antagonist to the Grantland 
Rice style of journalist, much like Ali was to the Bobby Jones style of athlete. Similar to Rozelle, 
Cosell and Ali were contentious at times and friendly at others (Ribowski, 2012). The two, 
however, worked seamlessly in elevating each other’s celebrity. In 1964, Ali famously 
renounced the name “Cassius Clay” and declared he was converting to the Black Muslim faith 
(Rader, 1984). Cosell, the adamant boxing supporter, defended Ali in his pursuits, becoming one 
of the first journalists to refer to the boxer as Muhammad Ali. Cosell would again come to Ali’s 
defense when the heavyweight champion refused to be drafted into the United States Armed 
Services for duty in Vietnam (Ribowski, 2012). The impact on media caused by both events was 
immense and it would change the landscape of sports broadcasting.  
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American Broadcasting Company. ABC had lost its bid for the television rights for the 
AFL and the NFL, as well as a contract with Major league Baseball. At this point CBS and NBC 
were the dominant first and second place networks, with ABC lagging far behind. That was until 
a Columbia University graduate named Roone Arledge transformed the culture of the company. 
Without any professional league contracts, ABC began its rise by cleverly winning the broadcast 
rights for NCAA football in 1960-61. During that time, ABC also launched a sport 
entertainment-based program called “Wide World of Sports,” which would be a magazine style 
show that covered a variety of sports after the event had taken place (Rader, 1984). Wide World 
won numerous awards for its coverage and helped elevate ABC to the top of the three networks. 
It was also a platform for Cosell to air his support of Ali, which Arledge astutely knew would 
drive ratings because of the polarizing nature of the actors and the topic (Rader, 1984). It was a 
complete success for the network, Cosell, and even Ali to a degree. The two men were linked in 
the American sport lexicon and ABC became a major player in the sport broadcasting game. The 
Arledge and Cosell tandem worked well and the two would collaborate on two more seminal 
moments in sport broadcasting.  
The first was the inception of Monday Night Football. By the end of the 1960s, 
Commissioner Rozelle believed that the Sunday double-header had reached its saturation point 
with the American public. Rozelle had orchestrated the merger of the AFL and NFL in 1966 and 
he felt that the newly expanded NFL was ready for prime time (Cosell, 1985). In the spring of 
1970, ABC paid $8 million for the right to broadcast 13 Monday night games starting that fall 
(Rader, 1984). The expansion was the brainchild of Rozelle, but the format that would make the 
enterprise a success was Arledge. The ABC executive promptly selected Cosell, along with 
former NFL stars Don Meredith and Frank Gifford, as the on-air personalities and the two set out 
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to change the dynamic of the traditional football game broadcast paradigm (Ribowski, 2012). 
Their goal was to turn each game into a “spectacle,” focusing on the entertainment value of the 
program and the broadcasters in the booth (Cosell, 1985; Rader, 1984). The dynamic worked and 
eventually propelled Monday Night Football into “one of the most important family rituals” 
(Rader, 1984, p. 115). It was another unmitigated success by broadcasting standards and has 
remained a staple in the NFL schedule.  
Two years prior to the first Monday Night Football game, ABC won the television 
contract for both the 1968 Winter (Grenoble) and Summer (Mexico City) Olympic Games. Once 
again Arledge and Cosell were at the forefront of television coverage, specifically during the 
Mexico City games. ABC showed John Carlos and Tommie Smith’s famously defiant gesture on 
the medal podium in protest of racism in the United States. Cosell even interviewed the two 
Black athletes after the incident (Rader, 1984). It was the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, 
Germany, however, that incited change in the way sports were broadcast.  
The 20th Olympiad was given the name the “Happy Games” in a show of reconciliation 
by the Germans for their injustices of World War II. The games upheld their moniker until an 
Arab terrorist group called “Black September” invaded the Olympic Village, taking 11 Israeli 
team members hostage. Iconic images of the Olympic compound and a gun-toting terrorist with a 
stocking cap over his head were captured by ABC cameras positioned near the village. On 
September 5, 1972, ABC Sports quickly transitioned from a primetime sport network into an 
around-the-clock news network (Rader, 1984). Arledge dutifully and masterfully captured the 
tragedy through employment of Cosell, Peter Jennings, and Jim McKay. Jennings, a veteran of 
news and combat coverage in Beirut, was sent out with Cosell to report on the developing 
situation from the field. McKay was the cool-handed anchor that described the continually 
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developing situation in an objective and professional manner, which he was later lauded for. 
Cosell complemented the two with his ability to report off-the-cuff and his desire to get the story. 
The men were on the air for more than 14 hours and the first broadcast of international terrorism 
to millions of Americans thousands of miles away (Ribowski, 2012). The tragedy ended with all 
11 Israeli team members, a German police officer, and several terrorists dying in a botched 
ambush attempt at a German airfield. The calamity, the first of its kind, had come at a sporting 
event. ABC had broadcasted the Olympic events during prime time prior to that day. The attack 
pushed the broadcast into a full-day event, the entirety of which unfolded right before the eyes of 
television viewers everywhere. It was a profound moment.  
Howard Cosell’s work in broadcasting, both in radio and television, revolutionized the 
profession of sports journalists. He was opinionated and subsequently polarizing, but also 
intellectually engaging and well-versed in his craft. He became a personality and a reason that 
people turned on their radios and televisions to partake in a sportscast (Ribowski, 2012). Cosell’s 
view of sport became jaded as he grew older. He wrote in the prologue of I Never Played the 
Game: 
I am writing this book because I am convinced that sports are out of whack in American 
society; that the emphasis placed upon sports distorts the real values of life and often 
produces mass behavior patterns that are downright frightening; and that the frequently 
touted uplifting benefits of sports have become a murky blur in the morass of hypocrisy 
and contradiction that I call the Sports Syndrome (Cosell, 1985, p. 13).  
This passage is evidence that Cosell viewed the symbiotic relationship of sport and media as 
both influential and worrisome. As a pundit, he made significant contributions to both.  
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 Television revolution. The remainder of the 1970s was filled with monumental 
technological achievements, including the first communications satellite in 1974 and the end of 
legal complications preventing the growth of cable television in 1977 (Rader, 1984). The 
emergence of cable TV opened the door for a new network called the Entertainment and Sports 
Programming Network (ESPN) in 1979. ESPN’s platform was to become the first 24 hour sports 
news network, using 625 cable television systems and a single satellite’s transmissions (Rader, 
1984). Prior to 1979, sports fans were relegated to obtaining sports information through radio 
talk shows, newspapers, or short blurbs in a local nightly newscast (Smith & Hollihan, 2009). 
The idea for a network that broadcast sports 24/7 was that of Bill Rasmussen, who was a sort of 
sport professional vagabond. His idea was to televise sports that were happening throughout New 
England, specifically in Connecticut, that had previously not been regularly shown through this 
medium. After a windfall of financial backing from Getty Oil and Budweiser, ESPN went on the 
air at 7 p.m. on September 7, 1979 (Smith & Hollihan, 2009).  
 The early years were filled with trial-and-error, some colossal failures and others 
unmitigated successes. Similar to the early years of television, ESPN relied on non-traditional 
sporting events to carry its nightly programming lineup. Some of the sports that were aired 
included: slow-pitch softball, hurling, Australian Rules Football, and wrestling. It was a slow but 
steady growth for the emerging cable company and in 1983 ESPN bought the television rights to 
a new rival to the NFL, the United States Football League (Rader, 1984). One year later, ABC 
bought the majority of shares from Getty Oil and became the parent company for ESPN. It was 
during this time that two anchors, Dan Patrick and Keith Olbermann, who hosted a show called 
“SportsCenter,” began to draw the attention of viewers across the country. SportsCenter, was a 
show formatted like a news broadcast except the content was entirely sports-related. Freeman 
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(2000) noted of Patrick and Olbermann that they “made SportsCenter, which combined shtick, 
superb writing, and great reporting, a must-see for the athlete and fan alike” (p. 3). ESPN was on 
its way to becoming a multibillion dollar operation and the most influential sport news vehicle in 
all of media (Freeman, 2000).  
SportsCenter and other ESPN programs were relatively low budgeted productions that 
had the ease and ability to fill countless hours of television programming. Other networks were 
expending considerable amounts of money to fill their daily programming, while ESPN was able 
to remain cost-effective with filling their schedules with in-studio broadcasts. Similarly, TBS and 
WGN-TV found that broadcasting Atlanta Braves and Chicago Cubs baseball games was an 
effective way to fill multiple hours of programming with a much less expensive production cost 
than that of syndicated television shows. These networks were able to run live programming for 
hours at a much lower cost than their counterparts who were forced to provide content on their 
airwaves around-the-clock.  
ESPN has since become the “most powerful and prominent name in sports media” (Smith 
& Hollihan, 2009, p. XIV). Based out of Bristol, CT, ESPN is broadcast in more than 200 
countries, to more than 97 million subscribers, using more than 27 satellites, across five different 
platforms (ESPN, ESPN 2, ESPNews, ESPNU, ESPN Deportes, and ESPN Classic). In addition, 
ESPN the Magazine, ESPN the store, ESPN Radio, ESPN.com and variety of other subsidiaries 
have blossomed from the once lowly 24/7 sports cable company (Smith & Hollihan, 2009). 
ESPN’s role in advancing the symbiotic relationship of sport and media was possibly the most 
influential of all the seminal moments discussed previously. Through innovation, access, and 
diligence, an unlimited amount of sports coverage was given to audiences across the world. 
46 
 
Sports fans were given entrée to sports information through a plethora of mediums and they were 
willing to pay for it too (Freeman, 2000).  
Broadcasting rights. While ESPN was still in its infancy, important litigation 
concerning television broadcasts of college football games was heard in the Supreme Court. In 
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (1984), several NCAA member 
schools argued that the NCAA’s television plan violated conditions of the Sherman and Clayton 
Antitrust Acts (Scully, 1984). Prior to 1984, the NCAA strictly enforced a television broadcast 
policy that restricted the number of games that were broadcast during a weekend and limited the 
number of appearances a team could make on television during the season (Meyers & Horowitz, 
1995). The NCAA instituted stringent guidelines in an effort to ensure live attendance would not 
be affected by games being televised, while also controlling all contracts involving television 
rights. Schools began to recognize the benefits of having games televised and in 1979 some of 
the larger football schools organized to form the CFA, whose primary purpose was to fight the 
NCAA television policy (Scully, 1984). The NCAA threatened sanctions against the CFA, which 
incited the University of Georgia and the University of Oklahoma to file an injunction under the 
Clayton Act and a lawsuit claiming price gouging and output reduction under the Sherman Act 
against the NCAA (Scully, 1984).  
The United State District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and The United States Supreme Court all ruled in favor 
of the plaintiffs, citing that the NCAA’s television policy was invalid due to price fixing and 
horizontal market restraints (Scully, 1984). The courts deemed that the NCAA was a “classic 
cartel” that inhibited market growth and a competitive environment for schools. The schools’ 
victory opened the possibility for more games to be shown on more networks for substantially 
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more money. Before the lawsuit ABC had been the only network with the rights to televise 
college football games. After the decision, NBC, WTBS, and CBS all vied for the market share, 
which was not only a victory for the schools, but a win for the sports fan (Meyers & Horowitz, 
1995). Oriard (2001) noted that college football fans were now privy to hundreds, if not, 
thousands of games each week.  
 The emergence of television, specifically cable television, altered the landscape of sports 
journalism and the nature in which each medium operated. Football, both college and 
professional, was a television darling and the television rights continually grew. The increase 
demand created an increase in advertising costs for companies that wanted to promote their 
products during broadcasts. Radio remained viable in the market and was a cheaper alternative 
for companies to market through, which helped its sustainability. Newspapers also persisted by 
departing from detailed game recaps and moving toward in-depth, sometimes opinionated, 
analyses (McChesney, 1989). The sport consumer dictated high demand for content and each 
media was able to identify and deliver a niche product. Television was the industry leader and 
the 1990s would see significant changes, including the surfacing of a major player in News 
Corporation’s new network, Fox.  
 The proliferation of cable networks in the early 1990s hurt the major networks, including 
their sport broadcasting partnerships. CBS claimed losses of over $500 million between 1990 
and 1993 in their $1.1 billion contract with Major League Baseball. The network also balked at 
renewing its contract with the NFL, forfeiting the rights to Fox (Bellamy, 1998). The move was 
proven to be shortsighted as CBS’s financials and market shares plummeted. Fox, conversely, 
acquired the rights to both MLB and the NFL for $400 million and $1.6 billion respectively. 
These deals, and the subsequent revenue they would generate, helped make Fox a legitimate 
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competitor among the major networks (Cave & Crandall, 2001). It was also an indication of how 
networks valued sport broadcasting rights. The NBA inked a deal with NBC for $750 million 
over seven years in 1993 (Nidetz, 1993). Three years after CBS lost the rights to the NFL, they 
signed a $4 billion contract over eight years to reacquire the rights in 1998 (Bellamy, 1998). A 
year later, CBS and the NCAA agreed to an 11-year, $6 billion dollar contract that awarded the 
television rights to the NCAA men’s college basketball tournament (Frankel, 1999).  
 Internet. The turn of the century brought about the emergence of another medium that 
has changed the way that sports are consumed; the internet. More than 100 years after Henry 
Chadwick’s implementation of the box score in baseball games, fantasy sport helped drive this 
medium to prominence in the sport media realm (Ruihley & Hardin, 2011). Fantasy sport is a 
role-playing interface that allows participants to compete against other members in a 
predesignated format similar to that of the actual sport. For instance, the fantasy player in a 
fantasy baseball league would act as a “general manager,” selecting players for his or her team. 
Stats would then be compiled over the course of a season with point designations given to each 
stat. The team that earns the most points wins the league. Fantasy sport did predate the internet 
by several decades, but the medium was integral in streamlining the fantasy system, which 
invited more participants to play (Ruihley & Hardin, 2011). The ease and enjoyment the internet 
offered fantasy players was instrumental in both driving traffic to fantasy sites as well as 
encouraging people to participate. 
The internet’s convergence with sport created a portal for sport to crossover in both reach 
and interactivity. Fantasy sports connected fans interactively with different sports, live games 
became available via the computer, and sport was once again infused into a different medium. 
Like television, and radio before it, the internet provided the sports consumer with constant sport 
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content with different strengths. The internet’s strongest quality was it could allow entities to 
target specific audiences. Like magazines, content was mostly driven by a niche in the market 
and those interested could visit a certain website to meet that demand. Instead of television’s 
reliance on consumers paying for a package that included channels that were unnecessary, the 
internet met the needs of the consumer and did so instantaneously. It also provided a platform for 
journalists to inject their influence. Blogs, podcasts, Facebook, and Twitter accounts have 
become the norm for pundits that have access and know-how. This increases the journalists’ 
exposure and gives the audience unprecedented access to information.  
The symbiosis of sport and media was undeniable by the time 9/11 occurred. Both social 
institutions were immeasurably impacted by the events of that day and would collectively 
respond in a variety of ways. The ceremonies performed at games, the government officials that 
would make appearances, and the patriotic demonstrations by athletes were all displayed through 
media. The convergence is an important distinction in the ability for both mediums to work 
collaboratively in both disseminating a message and also coordinating an expansive reach. Of 
course, other societal institutions were impacted as well.    
News Gathering Routines 
 This dissertation focused on newspaper content and the decision to do so was principally 
based on the manner in which print media impacts news gathering. The 24-hour news cycle that 
transpired after 9/11 gave contrast to the differences between various forms of media, which 
became important when determining a medium to examine. As mentioned previously, morning 
television shows were on the air when the Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World 
Trade Center. The commotion in lower Manhattan and the billowing smoke coming out of the 
North Tower drew the attention of news organizations worldwide, fixating cameras and 
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programming on the developing situation. As television anchors and reporters were attempting to 
describe the developing situation at the WTC, Flight 175 appeared from the southwest and hit the 
South Tower on live television in front of millions of viewers. The visual component of the 
medium was immensely powerful. Not only were viewers exposed to a tragic attack in real-time, 
they were also given a discernible understanding of this event through sight and sound. 
Television rendered reaction in its immediacy and, as programming shifted to nearly four 
consecutive days of coverage, journalists were charged with filling airtime with relevant content.  
 Radio was similarly positioned to give constant, up-to-the-minute content in the 
aftermath of 9/11. As a medium, personalities generally gave first-person accounts of their 
experiences or speculative deductions of transpiring events. Newspapers, conversely, were 
naturally allowed to be more calculated. Although special editions were published and content 
needed to but as current as possible, journalists still had time to gather and more thoroughly 
produce their articles.  
 Newspapers. News gathering routines are described as the common practice employed in 
disseminating pertinent information within the constraints of the medium. For newspapers, those 
constraints include physical space the story can be displayed, the deadlines to produce the article, 
and the topic the article covers. Unlike electronic media, print media is conducive to more 
detailed, contextual accounts of the issue written about (Pederson, Miloch & Laucella, 2007). 
Although television and radio was constantly providing information once the planes hit their 
destinations, newspapers were able to give a more detailed and thorough accounts of developing 
stories.  
News routines were shifted significantly among radio and television outlets the hours and 
days following 9/11. The immediacy of the news gathering process and the continuity of the 
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coverage dictated a constant need for information. Content had universally focused on the 
terrorist attacks, regardless of medium, but the newspaper routines remained relatively 
unchanged in comparison to its counterparts (Reynolds & Barnett, 2003). Shoemaker and Reese 
(1996) described news routines as an efficient delivery of news content within an allotted space, 
timely manner, and contextually relevant topic. Television and radio went to a continuous 
schedule, thus shifting from the traditional routines. Newspapers, conversely, maintained 
consistent deadlines, column space, and, of course, topic relevancy with a dedicated focus to the 
tragedies.  
Sociological Impact of 9/11 
Terrorism, especially to the degree that was experienced on 9/11, was not a part of the 
cognitive fray for most Americans prior to the attacks of 9/11 (McArdle, Rosoff, & John, 2012). 
Media outlets of all forms broadcast the devastation throughout the world as the events of 
September 11 unfolded, allowing images of death and destruction to be seen in all corners of the 
globe (McDonald, 2005). As tragedy was depicted on television sets and the pages of 
newspapers in the United States, Americans began to process the enormity of the events. 
Fredrickson et al. (2003) noted that a compilation of previous research found 70% of Americans 
had cried, 52-70% felt depressed, 33-62% had trouble sleeping, and 66% had difficulty 
concentrating during the days following and in response to 9/11. Fear, anxiety, hostility, and 
even PTSD became commonplace among Americans. Alcohol consumption and cigarette 
smoking were amplified (Richman et al., 2009), obesity increased (Bailey, 2010), and major 
behavioral patterns were modified or blatantly changed (McArdle, Rosoff, & John, 2012) as a 
result of September 11. The impact of that day was resoundingly immense from a sociological 
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perspective. Social institutions like religion, economics, politics, media, and sport were at the 
forefront of widespread change.  
 Religion. Words like al Queda, Islamic-extremists, and Osama bin Laden were not part 
of the American vernacular prior to 9/11. Arab-Americans, specifically those of Islamic faith, 
had lived in the United States for a substantial period of time before that fateful Tuesday 
(Cimino, 2005). It was not until 9/11, however, that Americans began to take notice of the 
Muslims inhabiting this country. The day after the attacks the largest Arab mosque in Chicago, 
IL. was surrounded by an angry mob of White Americans who were yelling, “kill the Arabs.” By 
the end of the week approximately 645 incidents of hate crimes or acts of violence against people 
of distinguishable Arab decent were reported across the country (Crainkar, 2002). Fifty five 
percent of Muslim-Americans said that living in the United States was made more difficult 
because of 9/11 (Pew Research Center, 2011).  
The retaliation that Arab-Americans faced was largely due to the public’s lack of 
understanding of Islam and an overgeneralization of who the enemy was. The terrorists who 
orchestrated 9/11 were radical Islamists. They were members of a small subculture of a much 
larger and generally more peaceful religious sect. As Ahmad (2002) explained, “It [was] a 
common misinterpretation and stereotype to classify the terrorists as all Arabs thus dramatically 
increasing Anti-Arab sentiments. Middle Easterners as a whole in the United States, especially 
Arabic people, suffered mistreatment and stereotyping on a daily basis” (p. 101). There was a 
perpetuity and fundamental lack of context and comprehension of Islam in the United States 
following the attacks (Karim, 2002), which ultimately grouped peaceful Arab-Americans with 
vengeful extremists. The implication was the juxtaposition of a country founded on 
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predominantly Judeo-Christian beliefs and an Islamic faction that was hostile toward both 
country and religion.  
Islamophobia was a term introduced 10 years prior to September 11 and described “a 
dread or hatred of Islam and therefore a fear or dislike of Muslims” (Sheridan, 2006, p. 317). In 
fact, just days prior to 9/11 the UN formally recognized Islamophobia and acknowledged that the 
anti-Islamic phenomenon should be combated on a global scale (Allen, 2004). Fueling this 
Islamophobia in the United States, however, were evangelical Christian leaders like Franklin 
Graham, Pat Robertson, and Jerry Falwell who told Protestant and Southern Baptist clergies that 
Islam was a religion sympathetic to terrorism (Cimino, 2005). Of course this rhetoric represented 
the extremist counterpart in this country, but the sentiment is a representation of the swell of 
misgivings between the Eastern and Western religions. The tension, essentially, revolved around 
religious affiliations and, at its core, centered around membership in a misunderstood faith by 
misinformed opponents.  
Economics. September 11 had economic implications throughout the world as well. 
Solberg and Preuss’s (2007) examination of tourism and major sporting events noted the 
trepidation and subsequent decline in tourists following the terrorist attacks. Both international 
tourism inbound to the United States and travel outbound declined after 9/11, which was later 
deemed the “September 11 Effect” (Solberg & Preuss, 2007). The decline in tourism was as 
evidentiary of a suddenly apprehensive economy as it was of a shift in allocation of resources. 
Safety became a priority of the U.S. government and precautionary measures were injected in 
widespread industry. Specifically, the airlines, insurance companies, and public finances were 
thrust into the forefront of economic priority (Makinen, 2002). While Makinen (2002) argued 
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that 9/11 may not have been the cause of an economic downturn in the United States, it is clear 
that a financial reprioritization impacted many industries throughout the country. 
The resistance to traveling via public transportation, specifically on airlines, and tourism 
as a whole was measured at a loss of approximately $110 billion. This was by far the largest 
portion of the aggregate losses in GDP, accounting for 80% of the business interrupted (BI) 
measure (Rose & Blomberg, 2010). Osama bin Laden’s primary objective for 9/11 was to ruin 
the U.S. economy by carrying out a plan for massive destruction, disrupting the business 
infrastructure in this country. The estimated economic loss, however, measured by scholars since 
the tragic events had an economic impact projected as a meager 0.2% to 2.4% (Rose & 
Blomberg, 2010). The economic recession that ensued was more likely a response to the Federal 
Reserve tightening credit in 1999 and a subsequent rise in unemployment in 2000 than 9/11 
(Makinen, 2002). While the downturn of the airline industry certainly had an economic impact, 
the relative loss of financial stability was never realized.  
The important delineation of the impact 9/11 had on the U.S. economy is two-fold. First, 
the short-lived recession in 2001 was concurrent with September 11 while otherwise thought to 
be an effect of the attacks. Secondly, the economic impact of 9/11 was seen at a greater extent 
when examining the shift in fiscal prioritization rather than the loss of U.S. dollars. Operation 
Enduring Freedom, Operation Noble Eagle, and Operation Iraqi Freedom were all military 
efforts deployed by the U.S. government in the wake of 9/11. According to a congressional 
report in 2006, “the cumulative total appropriated from 9/11 for those war operations, diplomatic 
operations, and medical care for Iraq and Afghan war veterans is $1.283 trillion” (Belasco, 2006, 
p. 1). This dissertation is not intended to speculate to the cause(s) of the 2001 recession, nor 
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determine the role 9/11 played. However, it does contest that September 11 caused a major shift 
in the appropriation of funds rather than an economic downturn.   
Politics. An entire generation (those born after September 11, 2001) has only known the 
United States to be a nation engaged in a “War on Terror,” with the threat of another terrorist 
attack of an equal or greater magnitude a legitimate possibility. Bader-Saye et al. (2011) 
appropriately summarized the uniqueness of this tension as Americans wrestled with the reality 
that, though the United States was a global super power, it was still vulnerable.  
The most significant change that occurred on 9/11 was that America became a victim, 
and since that day we have faced the moral hazards of negotiating that status. The 
situation is particularly complex because America is not a powerless, voiceless or 
marginalized victim. We were (and are) the most powerful military force in the world. 
Thus it is not surprising that we quickly gave in to the temptation to mix a lethal cocktail 
of righteous anger and unbending power (p. 10).  
President George W. Bush acted swiftly and resolutely to address the country’s safety 
concerns and assure the nation that there would be a strong American response to the attacks. His 
rhetoric included powerful words like “evildoers” and “cowards” when referring to those who 
were aiding and abetting terrorists. He also identified Osama bin Laden as the mastermind 
behind 9/11 and gave a once faceless enemy some comprehensible context (Bostdorff, 2003). 
The firmness in which President Bush continually reassured the American people was vital in 
garnering support for military response and consequently shaping the political landscape for 
more than a decade to come. The work of Landau et al. (2004) posited that terror management 
theory (TMT) was, at least in part, fundamental in the American public’s acquiescence of the 
Bush Administration’s assertion that military response was necessary. The pretense of TMT 
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stated that a populous’ overarching fear of death would insight support for political leaders who 
enacted the ability to lead the majority out of adversity. Essentially, President Bush demonstrated 
a “perceived ability to both literally and symbolically deliver the people from illness, calamity, 
chaos, and death as well as to demonstrate the supremacy of the worldview” (Landau et al., 
2004, p. 1138).  
Sport in Society 
 Sport was also impacted by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and is a social institution 
intertwined with the cultural and societal disciplines of religion, economics, politics, and media 
(Coakley, 2009). Sport sociology was once a neglected discipline among scholars, which 
retained a void of relevant research dedicated to its societal implications of this institution 
(Washington & Karen, 2001). In the last decade, however, researchers have contributed to the 
advancement of sociological scholarship related to sport (Brown, 2004; Coakley, 2009; Dzikus, 
Hardin & Waller, 2012; Silk & Falcous, 2005). These scholars helped shape this dissertation’s 
alignment with the aforementioned concepts, which were all affected by September 11. This 
section will discuss the relationship sport has with other societal entities such as religion, 
economics, and politics.  
 Religion. The collective moment of silence that has become commonplace at sporting 
events and in stadiums worldwide was rooted in early 20th century England. A nationwide 
minute of silence was held in 1910 in the United Kingdom out of respect for the death of King 
Edward VII (Foster & Woodthorpe, 2012). Since then the moment of silence has evolved into a 
prompted moment of reflection and thought, which was often impelled by an event such as loss 
or death. A moment of silence has also been associated to prayer, which in part was a result of 
public schools seeking a daily moment of silence at the beginning of the school day to 
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accommodate students who wished to pray before school (Kaminer, 2002). The moment of 
silence is one of several parallels drawn between sport and religion that has prompted 
comparisons between the two. Coakley (2009) analogized sport and religion as places for 
communal assembly, emphasized perfection of mind, body, and spirit, shared values that are 
demonstrated and often celebrated, and a commonplace for heroes and heroic accomplishments. 
He also noted that “both can be used to distract attention from issues and thereby become 
‘opiates’ of the masses” (Coakley, 2009, p. 533). These similarities have provoked debate among 
scholars to whether sport could be considered a religion. 
Sullivan (2010) contended that sport could not be viewed as a religion and the mere 
proposition was simply “ludicrous” (p. 10). However, he later conceded that observing a filled-
to-capacity football stadium on a Sunday afternoon was sufficient evidence that many have 
substituted sport for religion. This argument is an extension of Higgs’ (1995) staunch belief that 
sport and religion are socially and individually grounded, but not equal. He wrote, “They are not 
the same activities; they have different purposes and are carried out in different ways and usually 
at different times” (p. 1). Scholars like Bain-Selbo (2009) disagreed and argued that a sport like 
college football is a religion for many people in the South. The argument of sport as a religion or 
as a substitute for religion has little value on this scholarship other than it brought to light one 
inalienable truth; there is a necessity for spiritual fulfillment in society. The coexistence of sport 
and religion, whether interchangeable or supplemental, has linked the two establishments 
together. Perhaps this explains the preponderance of prayer before and after sporting events, 
religious gestures by athletes while playing a sport, and the emersion of sport chaplains in 
athletic departments across the country (Dzikus, Hardin & Waller, 2012).  
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 Economics. The economics of sport have reached a high-water mark and continue to 
grow with each passing year. It is one of the fastest growing industries in the United States 
(Coakley, 2009). The most visible facet of sport economics is the financial impact of major 
sporting events on cities. For example, Indianapolis’ estimated profit from hosting Super Bowl 
XLVI was anywhere from $100-$450 million (Sportbusinessdaily.com, 2012). However, the city 
of Indianapolis was said to lose $1.5 million after not collecting enough in taxes generated by the 
surge of out-of-town visitors. The economic impact from food sales, hotel and car rentals, and 
overall publicity was said to be worth approximately $155 million (Eaglecountryonline.com, 
2012). The ambiguity in profits and loss suffered by the city was indicative of how inexact the 
economics of sport can be. Rough estimates have the industry worth over $400 billion 
(Masteralexis, Barr & Hums, 2011), and as noted before, growing each year. Much of these 
approximations are justified by the alleged benefit of hosting large sporting events. Increased 
exposure, along with tourism, induced spending, marketing, improvements to infrastructure, and 
other additives are seen as both long-term and short-term benefits to hosting sporting events.  
 An unavoidable conversation in the discourse of sport economics is the salaries paid to 
coaches and players. The truth is there are an elite group of owners, coaches, and players that 
make an exceptionally high salary because of their involvement in sport. Conversely, there is 
also a population of owners, coaches, and players that make considerably less money. The 
perception, however, generally groups all stakeholders into the higher tier through association 
(Coakley, 2009). At the collegiate level the contrast is much more distinct and has also been 
widely discussed. Coaches like Nick Saban, who was paid $5 million annually to be the head 
football coach at the University of Alabama, a higher salary than his previous coaching position 
with the NFL’s Miami Dolphins, are coaching student-athletes that do not get paid at all. The 
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contention mainly stems from the idea that coaches like Saban are put into a position to be 
compensated at such a high level through the output of student-athletes that are not compensated 
at all (Farmer & Pecorino, 2010). At the root of this discussion is the dollar amounts associated 
with each argument. A conversation about contracts worth millions of dollars is difficult to 
conceptualize for typical fans, especially when you are talking about sport or entertainment.  
 Politics. Government involvement in sport is demonstrated in a variety of capacities 
ranging from allocating resources for sport municipalities to sponsoring national teams to 
mediating policy. Politics include a unilateral administration of policies that make it a 
cornerstone of sport at the local, national, and international levels (Coakley, 2009). For the 
purposes of this dissertation, politics refers to the integration of the law making bodies on sport 
organizations and leagues rather than the political jousting that typically occurs in corporate 
settings. Despite the enormity of the topic, Coakley (2009) succinctly denoted the seven integral 
forms of government involvement in his book Sport in Society. They include: safeguarding 
public order; maintaining the health and fitness of citizens; promoting the prestige and power of 
a group, community, or nation; promoting a nationalized identity, unity, and belonging; 
reproducing the values of a community; increasing support for government; and producing 
economic development. Sport can essentially be a vehicle for governments to display and 
promote ideals or it can be a standard-setting medium through which governance necessitates 
political involvement.  
 Major League Baseball famously sought out government leadership to help rid the game 
of an epidemic of PED use in the spring of 2006. Senator George Mitchell led an 18-month 
investigation into MLB players’ use of PEDs and on December 13, 2007 produced a 409-page 
document, referred to as “The Mitchell Report,” implicating 89 current and former Major League 
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Baseball players of using PEDs. It was this report that led MLB to establishing some of the most 
stringent PED regulations in professional sports (Schmotzer, Kilgo & Switchenko, 2009). In 
2009, Congress and the Justice Department similarly interjected with an inquiry into the 
NCAA’s relationship with the BCS in determining a national champion each year in college 
football played at the Division I FBS (formerly Division IA) level. A judiciary subcommittee 
investigated whether the BCS violated provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act dealing 
with antitrust laws. This investigation was intended to spur the NCAA into establishing a playoff 
system in college football (McCann, 2011). Olympic Games have been a venue for governments 
to tout nationalism, as well as embrace political messages. The 2002 Winter Olympics held in 
Salt Lake City were a platform for the United States to demonstrate its resilience to terrorism and 
exhibit a sense of national unity shortly after 9/11 (Silk & Falcous, 2005). Similarly, historians 
have long described the political impact of Jesse Owens winning four gold medals in the 1936 
Summer Olympics in Berlin, Germany (Young, 2008). The significance of political integration 
into sport, and the reciprocal, is indicative of the importance the two social institutions play in 
society. The duality is not without conflict or contention, but there is often a necessity in the 
roles each play in their relationship. 
How Things Changed 
As was the case during other days that shook the nation, like December 7, 1941, (Pearl 
Harbor) and November 22, 1963, (Kennedy Assassination), league commissioners, university 
presidents, team owners, and other decision-makers were faced with the choice of playing 
through tragedy or postponing games out of respect for the deceased and safety concerns. Unlike 
the attack on Pearl Harbor or the assassination of President Kennedy, virtually every scheduled 
event was suspended while the country mourned the 9/11 attacks ("How the sports," 2001). 
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Major League Baseball and the National Football League, the two prominent professional 
leagues that were in-season, publicly vacillated but eventually conceded that playing would not 
be appropriate (Chass, 2001; Freeman, 2001a). Other leagues modeled their decisions from their 
industry counterparts. These decisions impacted the content on the sports pages of the New York 
Times. Barry Bonds chasing Mark McGwire’s home run record, the National League playoff 
race, or the NFL’s opening weekend suddenly seemed trivial, especially to those who still had 
loved ones unaccounted for at any of the sites. For example, former New York Mets’ pitcher 
John Franco told a reporter the story of his son’s Little League coach who was missing at 
Ground Zero (Kepner, 2001a) and former New York Jets’ quarterback Vinny Testaverde was 
adamant about not playing their Week 2 game against Oakland as rescue workers searched for 
missing friends and family (Battista, 2001). Franco and Testaverde happened to be native New 
Yorkers and were repeatedly interviewed by the New York Times following the attacks. In the 
wake of 9/11, the first rescheduled professional game was not played until September 17 (Mets 
vs. Pittsburgh Pirates; Kepner, 2001b) and it would not be until September 21 (Mets vs. Atlanta 
Braves; Vecsey, 2001) that a major sporting event would be held in New York City.  
Keep playing. The majority of owners in the NFL wanted to play the scheduled games 
the weekend following 9/11. The decision not to play by commissioner Tagliabue was a contrast 
to the decisions made by Commissioners Landis (Pearl Harbor) and Rozelle (Kennedy 
Assassination). Brown (2004) surmised that Tagliabue made the decision for three reasons: 
safety concerns of a continued terror threat, Rozelle’s public regret from playing after the 
Kennedy assassination, and NFL players’ contention with playing. The absence of sport was 
certainly justified and it could be argued that the resumption of baseball on September 17 was 
more powerful because of the layoff. President Bush’s sentiment to Commissioner Tagliabue 
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echoed that of Roosevelt’s to Commissioner Landis in that playing would “show that terrorists 
can’t alter the way we go about our lives” (Brown, 2004, p. 119). Society was able to start to 
grasp the events of 9/11 and begin to compartmentalize the effects. The impact of sport resuming 
seemed almost needed. It was a resounding affirmation of President Bush’s statement, especially 
because there was appropriate time to mourn.  
Remembrance. James Earl Jones’ character Terrance Mann said of baseball in the movie 
Field of Dreams:  
The one constant through all the years, Ray, has been baseball. America has rolled by like 
an army of steamrollers. It has been erased like a blackboard, rebuilt and erased again. 
But baseball has marked the time. This field, this game: it's a part of our past, Ray. It 
reminds of us of all that once was good and it could be again (Frankish & Robinson, 
1989). 
Mann’s speech is indicative of how baseball is intertwined with American culture. Baseball itself 
is a game based on history and record. Players are measured by statistics and comparable past 
accomplishments. The end goal for most is enshrinement into the Baseball Hall of Fame, which 
essentially acts as a hall of records for those who want to remember the past. It becomes a stage 
for which greatness is measured, people and events are immortalized, and historical context to 
the past is given. This venue is a centerpiece to a great game that can sometimes act as a mile-
marker for American history.  
 The process of remembrance in baseball and many other sports began almost 
instantaneously. Less than two months after the terrorist attacks, the World Series was filled with 
ceremonial tributes to the tragedies of 9/11. Symbolically hanging from a flagpole in centerfield 
at Yankee Stadium during the Series was the American flag that was once on top of the World 
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Trade Center and was recovered from the rubble at Ground Zero (Freeman, 2009). Football’s 
biggest stage, the Super Bowl, also made every effort to incorporate moments of remembrance 
into the event. The cornerstone tribute was the halftime performance by musical band U-2. The 
band played their song “Where the Streets Have No Names” on a large stage in the middle of the 
Louisiana Superdome in front of a backdrop of a screen displaying the name of each person that 
died on 9/11 (Brown, 2004). 
 The visibility and proximity of the World Series, especially because the Yankees were 
participants, and the Super Bowl were ideal platforms for acts of remembrance. There is 
neutrality that is inherently part of the World Series and Super Bowl. Many, if not the majority, 
of people watch these events regardless of rooting interest because they are sporting spectacles. 
These massive media events have the attention of a vast audience and that is conducive to 
projecting a loud, singular voice (Hundley & Billings, 2010). There were no rooting interests in 
the pre-game and halftime ceremonies other than a nationalistic pride and moments of 
remembrance.  
Honor. Similar to remembering the falling heroes, sport also acts as a venue to honor 
those heroes that are still alive and potentially still fighting. Ten years prior to the September 11 
attacks, the New York Giants and Buffalo Bills played in Super Bowl XXV in Tampa, Fla. 
Security concerns were high as the United States drew threats from terrorist attacks because of 
its involvement in the Persian Gulf War (Kooijman, 2004). Frank Gifford introduced Grammy 
Award-winning singer Whitney Houston to the crowd at Tampa Stadium and homes throughout 
the United States. Gifford, a former NFL player himself, read to the audience, “And now to 
honor America, especially the brave men and women serving our nation in the Persian Gulf and 
throughout the world, please join in the singing of our national anthem” (Goodrich, television 
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broadcast, January 27, 1991). Houston went on to give one of the most moving renditions of the 
song in Super Bowl history, but from Gifford’s introduction to the four F-16’s flying over the 
stadium at the end, there was an overwhelming link between the game and the Gulf War 
(Kooijman, 2004). Mariah Carey’s rendition of the song in the 2002 Super Bowl was also 
moving and had a similar patriotic backdrop. Carey sang the song with the accompaniment of a 
number of New York City police and fire fighters, a New Orleans police officer who signed the 
Anthem, and a U.S. Navy color guard (Brown, 2004). Honoring military professionals, law 
enforcement, or other heroic figures in this way has become commonplace in American sport.  
Healing. Sport, in the context of this research, should be viewed simply as the playing of 
games and is inherently tied with the joy and entertainment of people who consume it. During 
times of crises, as stated previously, the role of sport has entered the fray of recovery by acting as 
a method of healing. Sport has emerged when given the opportunity to act as a vehicle for 
healing by embracing its role as a response to tragedy. The games, as evidenced earlier, are not a 
complete escape from the reality. The ceremonies held at stadiums are reminders of the events 
people come to escape from. Sporting events have craftily and usually tastefully integrated these 
ceremonial moments to acknowledge the event or events that have occurred. Leagues and owners 
introduced the singing of the national anthem before games during WWII, the NFL staged 
moments of silence after President Kennedy’s assassination, flags were waved at half-staff after 
the terrorist attacks in Munich, and patriotic songs were sung at countless sporting events after 
9/11 (Brown, 2004). It is clear from these examples that sport is not an escape at all. It could be 
argued, conversely, that the contrast between ceremonially addressing the grief associated with 
tragedy and playing a relatively meaningless game is precisely the role sport is intended to play 
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in society. Sport heals by allowing fans to gather, show their emotions with people in similar 
states, and cheer and laugh while watching a game.  
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLGY 
Framing Analysis 
A tenant of media studies has long been the paradigmatic examination of objectivity and 
bias in journalism, often regarded as adversarial tension fundamentally regarded as right versus 
wrong. Prudence for understanding media effects and an ideological shift in scholarship, 
however, created an insurgence of a concept referred to as framing, which allowed academics to 
delve deeper into implicative studies of media (Tankard, 2001). The concept of framing can be 
rudimentarily described as perspective, both constructed and consumed, to which a greater 
understanding is obtained. Entman (2007) described framing as “the process of culling a few 
elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them 
to promote a particular interpretation” (p. 164). The immediate actors in providing fodder for 
information gatherers are journalists, who are often gatekeepers for content as well as 
instruments of projection for media entities that pervade a particular medium.  
A journalist, regardless of medium, provides a lens through which the consuming public 
was able to obtain information. Anecdotally, if a photographer were attempting to capture the 
essence of a mountain range with his or her camera, they would try to encapsulate everything 
that projected the aforementioned essence. If the photographer focused too tightly, the 
perspective or magnitude may be lost. Conversely, if the photographer focused too broadly, the 
detail and relevance could be compromised. The most important facet of this scenario, however, 
is that context will truly determine the essence. For instance, a city dweller may have no 
appreciation for the outdoors and would most likely not enjoy the picture, while a well-traveled 
person may love the picturesque nature that the photographer captured. The interplay of both the 
parameters of the picture and the cultural influences apply to the framing of the mountain range. 
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Kuypers (2002) related this process to that of news framing in that it “involves the relationship 
between qualitative aspects of news coverage – contextual cues – and how the public interprets 
the news” (p. 7). The mountains were substantively real. The interpretive understood reality, 
though, was constructed through the projection of the photographer and the predisposition of the 
viewer. 
Theoretical Framework: Framing 
 The use of framing studies has grown exponentially in communication research, which is 
evidenced by the constant presence of scholarly work at professional conferences and studies 
published in communication research journals (D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010). Decades of growth 
have allowed scholars to continually contribute new ideologies to the concept. This expansion 
and the subsequent infusion of theoretical debate have led to differing approaches to framing 
analyses. Tuchman’s (1978) application of framing to media implied that the concept of frames 
was integral to journalism and that framing existed with each story a journalist published. That 
assertion spoke to the prevalence of the theory and provided verification to Entman’s (1993) 
argument that the framing paradigm was fractured. D’Angelo (2002), however, refuted Entman’s 
appeal for a single framing paradigm, stating that a singular paradigm would not appropriately 
advance the body of knowledge through framing, but a program with three paradigmatic 
outlooks (critical, cognitive, constructionist) would be more appropriate. Reese (2007) agreed 
with D’Angelo’s contention of a unified paradigm, but further questioned the application of 
paradigmatic allegiances among researchers employing a framing method. The end result has 
been a profusion of framing studies with little agreement on the appropriate methods among 
scholars (Reese, 2001).   
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 Critical paradigm. To better understand some of the basic differences between framing 
approaches, it is important to delineate the three paradigmatic outlooks of framing outlined by 
D’Angelo (2002). Rosengren (1989), a scholar of which D’Angelo became a contemporary, 
referred to the critical paradigm as research carried out on behalf of a group or an entity absent of 
power. Reese (2010) expanded on that definition of critical framing research stating, “I see 
frames as expressions and outcomes of power, unequally distributed with public opinion 
dominated and enlisted accordingly” (p. 19). Entman’s work falls under this classification and 
has had a resounding impact on the landscape of framing scholarship. For example, Entman 
(2007) examined the integration of framing, priming, and agenda-setting used as “tools of 
power” in an effort of news organizations to slant and bias their reporting. This critical 
investigation sought to present insight into the manipulative authority media possess in regards 
to distribution of power. In this case, Entman’s critique of media elites would provide an 
argumentative disposition on behalf of media consumers.  
 Critical framing analyses are inalienably tied to power and are not exclusive to media 
studies. For instance, there was an outpouring of framing research done on the war on terror 
following the attacks of September 11 (Chidester, 2009; Entman, 2003; Lakoff, 2006; Reese, 
2010; Reese & Lewis, 2009). Scholars argued that the Bush Administration had incited the use 
of the phrase “war on terror” as a frame purposefully and deliberately. Lakoff (2006) and Reese 
(2010) noted that “war” is a critical term, which insinuates a need for a military response. The 
term “terror” was also a buzzword suggesting vulnerability. Using this frame, the administration 
was able to evoke patriotism and unbridled support for a military response, with those opposing 
the war falling into a category of un-American (Lakoff, 2006). Chidester (2009) merged the 
political frames of war and terror with the medium of sport. Instead of examining media as the 
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platform for deploying the frame, Chidester argued that the Bush Administration used sport as a 
forum to induce those same feelings of patriotism and support for military action. Each study 
maintained that the Bush Administration was the actor with power and the critical nature 
examining framing scrutinized the use of that power.  
 Framing research in sport has become a viable discipline as the industry continues to 
grow exponentially. Topics such as hegemonic masculinity (Hardin & Dodd, 2006; Hardin & 
Whiteside, 2010a), sexual identity (Wachs & Dworkin, 1997), gender issues (Spencer, 2000), 
criminal cases (Duke Rape Case; Turnage, 2009), and even hero/myth building (Hardin, 2004; 
Zaharopoulos, 2007) have emerged in scholarship. From a critical perspective, tackling issues 
like hegemonic masculinity and sexual identity are more conducive to this paradigm. Hardin and 
Dodd’s (2006) chapter on “women’s-only” rhetoric in a popular running magazine emphasized 
the dichotomy between male-defined competition and the female psyche represented through 
articles published in a specified “Women’s Running” column. Hardin and Whiteside’s (2010a) 
examination of print media’s coverage of the Rene Portland lawsuit tied together stereotypes of 
sexuality among female athletes and reinforced principles of hegemonic masculinity. In both 
studies, the critical paradigm demarcated the parties in power (men, media, Whites), the 
oppressed (women, homosexuals, racial minorities), and the theoretical conceptualization 
(hegemonic masculinity, homophobia, racism). In Hardin and Dodd (2006), the magazine was 
notably deficient of hegemonic values noting that “the rejection of male-defined competition is 
welcome under a radical feminist analysis of sport” (p. 115). The Rene Portland case, 
conversely, demonstrated a failure among media pundits to address the issues of homophobia, 
stereotyping, and racism and stated those actors actually reinforced many of the hegemonic 
values seen in sport (Hardin & Whiteside, 2010).  
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 Cognitive paradigm. A cognitivist approach essentially removes media effects from the 
framing process, positing that content is a given and framing simply relies on the interaction of 
frames and experiences of the consumer (Hardin & Whiteside, 2010b). Cognitivist studies 
position the journalist as a receptor to information who then creates “meaningfully different 
frames” regarding an event over the course of a story or stories (D’Angelo, 2002, p. 876). The 
end result of this approach is a learned knowledge of a reality that is stored to memory for 
applied use during similar circumstances later on. Cultural influence and context pervade when 
examining frames and cognitivist studies are designed to detect “activated knowledge” that 
evoke understanding among individuals (D’Angelo, 2002).  
 Zaharopoulos’s (2007) framing analysis of the New York Times’ coverage of the 2004 
Olympic Games paradigmatically aligned with a cognitivist viewpoint in many ways. Although 
Zaharopoulos broadly outlines the concept of framing incorporating facets of the critical, 
cognitive, and constructionist paradigms, there are guiding principles that demonstrate the 
cognitive paradigm was the most influential. First, the Olympics, which Zaharopoulos refers to 
as a “mega event,” were the primary focus of the article, more so than the media, which in this 
study was the New York Times. Secondly, he alluded to the framing process performed by 
journalists perhaps occurring subconsciously, further indicating a removal of mediation by the 
journalist. Lastly, Zaharopoulos cited Price, Tewksbury, and Powers’ (1997) assertion that the 
frames displayed in the New York Times emphasized facts, values, and relevant details, which 
allowed readers the opportunity to gain an understanding of an event, in this case the Olympic 
Games. Ultimately, security and readiness emerged as frames in the news coverage, which after 
the terrorist attacks of September 11 was a common discourse surrounding major events 
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(Zaharopoulos, 2007). The application of these findings applied to the individual, which as 
D’Angelo (2002) noted, is a key component of the cognitivist paradigm.  
Constructionist paradigm. D’Angelo (2002) stated, “cognitivists are interested in how 
an individual’s encounter with a news frame becomes an interpretation that is stored in memory 
and activated in future encounters with similar frames” (p. 878). Contrarily, constructionists are 
interested in the co-optation process, which presumes an integrative process merging the event, 
the consumer, and the journalist. The infusion of the journalists’ perspective into the equation 
diverts this paradigm back from cognitivist to critical, but falls short of including media as an 
“elitist mechanism.” Hardin and Whiteside (2010b) clarified this dynamic stating, “because 
journalists work as part of the same cultural system as the public, they rely on frames that 
resonate with themselves and with the media consumers” (p. 315). A journalist, rather than an 
actor beseeching an agenda (critical paradigm), is taken as an active member of society who is 
subject to the same cultural influences and norms as their viewer.  
For example, Bobby Jones was perhaps the most famous and influential golfer of the 20th 
century and part of his stature was due, in no small part, to sportswriter Grantland Rice (Hardin, 
2004). Rice, himself considered one of the most famous sportswriters of the 1920s, was integral 
in placing athletes like Jones, Babe Ruth, and Jack Dempsey into the American lexicon 
(Inabinett, 1994). Hardin (2004) analyzed Rice’s framing of Jones throughout his career and 
noted the heroic depiction that was common in Rice’s writings of Jones. Hardin noted that, like 
his readers, Rice was a fan and advocate of the game of golf. He shared an appreciation for the 
sport and saw Jones as a hero that could elevate the game. Hardin’s constructionist approach 
allowed for Rice (media) to align with a social group (sport/golf fans) to construct and 
understanding of an event, or in this case a person participating in events (Jones). The 
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culmination of this process led to a societal conceptualization of Bobby Jones. Absent from this 
analysis was discourse about power and critical theory, but the presence of the journalist aided in 
the formulation of frames (Hardin, 2004).   
Similarly, Turnage (2009) examined the Duke University lacrosse scandal and its 
aftermath in an analysis of the “tragic” frame that was depicted as this case unfolded. Like 
Hardin (2004), Turnage positioned the media as a societal actor that was working to disseminate 
information about the case involving a Black exotic dancer and three White lacrosse players. The 
complexities of the case and subsequently Turnage’s article are too lengthy to summarize here. 
However, the findings of this study noted an alternative frame, the comic frame, was more 
suitable for this incident, meaning there was an extended and widespread process of 
scapegoating for the fallout that occurred in the community. The media was positioned as an 
actor disseminating information between the prosecution (District Attorney, Duke University, 
accuser) and defense (players, defense lawyers, community) leading to a fractured disposition 
among all stakeholders. The media was not recused from blame, but was seen as an equal and as 
a medium through which frames could be analyzed (Turnage, 2009). The frames in this analysis 
were constructed through cultural understanding and co-optation.  
Construction and Containment of Frames 
 Paradigms are influential on how the researcher perceives and interprets framing, but 
there is a necessary focus on the construction and containment of frames that dictates the 
parameters of this method of research. The foremost consideration is the directive with which the 
examiner chooses to analyze frames. A dichotomy exists between news consumption (audience) 
and news construction (gatekeepers) that separates framing analyses. Scheufele’s (1999) 
interactive model of framing defined the dynamic of news consumption framing analysis by 
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designating three dimensions of news processing (active processing, reflective integrators, and 
selective scanners). Each designation distinguishes the level of consumption based on the level 
of involvement by the audience. Reflective integrators continually ponder the information they 
have gathered, but generally rely on fewer sources than the active processor. Lastly, the selective 
scanners collect news only relevant to them (Scheufele, 1999). Conversely, Eagleman (2011) 
noted that framing theory applied to news construction is an interpretive measure of journalists’ 
projection of a series of events. The journalist who produced a good story must have employed a 
structured and effective frame. The presentation of the story guides a readers’ understanding of 
the information and subsequently forms an opinion about the topic (Berinksy & Kinder, 2006). 
This research project is concerned with the latter that involves the emergence of frames through 
text produced by journalists.  
 Reese (2010) provided further context to the interpretation of framing theory related to 
this research by delineating the “what” versus the “how” of news framing analysis. The 
distinction provides a crossroads of analysis with pronounced differences separating the end 
result of the research. “The what perspective is more frame-centric; it is concerned with frame 
building and involves the dissection of the content of the frame, specifically the network of 
concepts and the unique narrative and myths that make it work” (Reese, 2010, p. 19). The how 
perspective, conversely, is “process-centric” with frames acting as calculated building blocks 
working toward a greater predetermined outcome (Reese, 2010). The benefit of distinguishing 
the alignment of this work and applying it to the research was two-fold: (a) there was a working 
standard that establishes the utility of both what and how analyses, and (b) the researcher had a 
basis to guide the analysis of the framing process. The application of this method, in this case a 
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research orientation, was integral in ascertaining an understanding of the construction and 
containment of frames.  
 Construction of frames. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) used the term “package” to 
describe the organization of interpretations and meanings for an event, which included elements 
such as “metaphors, catchphrases, visual images, moral appeals, and other symbolic devices that 
characterize this discourse” (p. 2). They suggested that at the core of every package is a frame, or 
a “centralized organizing idea,” that provided parameters to the presentation of an issue. Wachs 
and Dworkin’s (1997) analysis of media framing of two athletes infected with the HIV/AIDS 
virus, Magic Johnson and Greg Louganis, noted that media framed Johnson as a “hero with a 
stigmatized disease” and Louganis as a “carrier who was morally responsible for alerting the 
heterosexual community to this risk” (p. 332). The packages were constructed over a period of 
time on the pages of the Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, and the New York Times, the 
three newspapers the researchers chose to examine (Wachs & Dworkin, 1997). The frames, 
however, were underlying ideas that guided the discourse of the topic.  
 The construction of frames can also be a deliberate attempt by an authoritative party to 
influence perception or support. Under these circumstances, framing entails a collective 
underscoring of an issue, while drawing parallels to a desired course of action that incites 
justification (Entman, 2003). The war on terror exemplified the United States’ government’s 
deployment of this construction process following September 11 (Entman, 2003; Lakoff, 2006; 
Reese & Lewis, 2009). The backdrop of 9/11 created a frenzied media alignment with the Bush 
Administration’s insistence that “forces of evil” and “cowards” were the genesis of the attack 
and a substantiated counter should ensue. In retrospect, media has been highly critical of the 
Bush Administration’s involvement in both the Iraq War and military presence in Afghanistan, 
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but that was not the position initially taken when the White House first established the war on 
terror frame (Reese & Lewis, 2009). The construction of the frame stemmed from an 
authoritative party using a culture-impacting event to incite support for a politically motivated 
action. It was a unique interplay of vulnerability and power that allowed such a frame to emerge.  
 Entman (1993) outlined four functions of frames that occur in the construction of frames 
and ultimately materialize in framing analyses: “define problems,” “diagnose,” “make moral 
judgments,” and “suggest remedies” (p. 52). He affirmed that these functions are vital in 
framing, but are not necessarily all included in a particular frame. The key ingredient across each 
function is the interaction between the causal agent and cultural values. Entman suggested that 
defining problems uses cultural values to measure costs and benefits of a causal agent. The 
diagnosing function declares the principles in play while making judgments estimates causal 
agents’ impact on the issue. Lastly, offering remedies incorporates suggesting appropriate 
treatments or forecasting effect both on and by the causal agents (Entman, 1993). For instance, 
Hardin and Whiteside (2010a) found that homophobia was a frame in their analysis of the Rene 
Portland case. Each facet of Entman’s (1993) function model of frames applied to constructing 
homophobia frame. The problem was the perception of female athletes as homosexuals and 
Portland’s overall intolerance of gays and lesbians. The diagnosis was homophobia no longer 
had relevance in society and was largely rejected in the United States. To this affect, media 
played a significant role as a causal agent referencing issues like civil rights, gay rights, and 
equality. Finally, the researchers noted that most of the articles were critical of sexuality-based 
discrimination and that there was a reinforcement of the “ideology of liberal pluralism [that] 
incorporates the ideals of equality, fairness, and individual rights as essential in U.S. culture” 
(Hardin & Whiteside, 2010a, p. 31).  
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 Constructing frames occurs through interaction between causal agents and an audience. 
As seen in the prior examples, the agents are not always easily identifiable and can develop from 
a variety of sources. While it has been noted throughout this dissertation that there are differing 
theories on the ways framing could be viewed, it is a constant that a party will transmit a 
message through varying mediums in order for an audience to gain perspective. The learned 
values and norms of a society, better described as culture, will impact how those frames are 
consumed and applied. The construction process, at least from a constructionist and critical 
paradigm, begins with the journalists’ interpretation of an event and the subsequent presentation 
of that elucidation. While construction deals with the assembly of frames, the containment of 
frames entails the appropriateness and definition of frames.  
 Containment of frames. Frames are powerful tools in shaping the way a society 
perceives an event or an issue. A journalist’s omission to a story or dedicated highlight to 
another aspect adds to the perspective of a reality based on that journalist’s interpretation. The 
containment of frames addresses the suitability of the ideas guiding the story. In other words, the 
frame is the underlying theme behind an ideology that shapes the nature of the discussion. It is 
important to note at this stage that frames are not developed and identified in one story, but 
emerge over the course of a complete dialogue (Levin, 2005). Kuypers (2010) demonstrated this 
concept anecdotally with his analysis of President Bush’s address to the nation following 9/11 
and the aftermath of that speech as the United States embarked on the war on terror. Initially, 
themes that emerged were “good versus evil,” “patience,” and “the economy” (p. 302). However, 
over the course of time, the frames that actually emerged were the “nature of the enemy” and 
“safety” in the weeks that followed (Kuypers, 2010). The containment of these two frames was a 
longitudinal surfacing of core elements that the Bush Administration and the media portrayed. 
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Rather than declare the former themes as frames, the researcher allowed the discourse to develop 
and the actual frames appeared. 
Cultural Context of Framing 
Cultural context has been referred to extensively in framing research and throughout this 
dissertation. According to Entman (1993), culture is a staple in the four locations that frames 
exist in during the communication process, the others being communicator, text, and receiver. 
Although Entman does not specifically define culture in a societal realm, he does offer a 
definition of culture’s implication on framing. “The culture is the stock of commonly invoked 
frames; in fact, culture might be defined as the empirically demonstrable set of common frames 
exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping” (p. 53). Gamson and 
Modigliani (1989) had previously acknowledged the concept of issue culture, which they defined 
as the prominence or obscurity of the aforementioned packages employed in news content. As 
society marches along, ground swells of pertinent subjects come to light. For instance, political 
frames often emerge due to a “resonance of current events” with relation to the framing party’s 
desired outcome paired with political opportunity (Levin, 2005, p. 104). Ultimately, the frames 
available for the source agent or media pundit are generally preexisting in a culture, which 
metaphorically could be seen as a “stock” of frames. Van Gorp (2010) explained, “Journalists, 
along with their sources and audiences, draw upon the stock of frames that culture provides for 
them” (p. 88).  
Culture provides the building blocks for frames while context affords positionality in the 
communication process. Context juxtaposes the known and the alternatives so that the 
community can interpret a message’s or speaker’s meaning (Kuypers, 2002). Context acts as the 
backdrop to which culture can be applied. Meaning that a cultural ideology that pervades societal 
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ontology will impact the way a frame is received. Schoemaker and Reese (1996) noted the 
prevalence of individualism in U.S. society, which causes the public majority to look 
unfavorably on those that are dependent on government-aided assistance such as welfare. 
Culturally, a journalist from the United States would frame the discourse regarding a new public 
assistance program differently than a journalist from a socialist country. Context would exist 
among both journalists’ accounts of the issue, but would vary by the disposition. Therefore, the 
interplay of culture and context is relevant for comprehending the issue, but also recognizing the 
bigger picture in framing the event.  
Hardin and Whiteside’s (2010a) analysis of the Portland lawsuit was wrought with 
elements of cultural context, specifically the idea of cultural hegemony. The researchers defined 
hegemony as “the reinforcement of certain norms and ideas that ultimately benefit the most 
powerful groups in a culture” (p. 19). The implications of a hegemonic landscape on this study 
stemmed from a culture of homophobia, racism, and hegemonic masculinity, better referred to as 
the idea that sport is inherently a masculine pursuit. Hardin and Whiteside used U.S. 
publications, the New York Times, USA Today, and Sports Illustrated, to analyze as the medium 
through which the abovementioned context could pervade. The cultural context of frames 
depicted a cross-section of traditional beliefs that over time have evolved into a necessary 
eradication, specifically in the sphere of sport (Hardin & Whiteside, 2010a). The basis, 
particularly from a feminist lens, was fundamental to this critical research.  
The aforementioned studies are examples of why this type of analysis was essential. Most 
framing analyses give critical perspectives of how the role of media and the power of sport 
intersect to influence societal ideologies. The range of methods and topics are expansive, but the 
impact is pivotal in sport management scholarship because these analyses deal with the 
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conversation inspired by sport. As was discussed previously, media contributes to the general 
understanding and this conversation. Therefore, it is important to add a critical scrutinization of 
how topics like hegemonic masculinity, racial discrimination, and prejudice based on sexuality 
are portrayed through media.  
The overview of framing theory provided in the pages of this dissertation outline the 
understanding of this theology by the researcher. The differing approaches of framing analysis 
allowed for an alignment with the constructionist paradigm, while the scholarship regarding the 
construction and containment of frames provided a foundation of understanding frames as a 
vehicle. The insistent infusion of culture, finally, offered the comprehensiveness of this type of 
methodology. The integration of each allowed for a clear statement of the researcher’s 
epistemology, which was aimed, in part, to clarify how this research situated in the schema of 
debate on how framing analysis is effectively performed.  
Epistemology 
Schwandt (2000) asserted that, “we are all constructivists if we believe that the mind is 
active in the construction of knowledge” (p. 305). The conceptual scheme of a constructivist is 
formulated by a standard of stated multiple truths, norms, or realities that inform a theoretical 
framework relative to the paradigm (Bernstein, 1983). Context, a necessary consideration in 
examining theoretical paradigms, was an essential component of the constructivist approach and 
a fundamental element in interpreting individual realities. Scholars have demarcated a variety of 
paradigms describing qualitative research. Feminist, poststructuralist (Hatch, 2002), 
advocacy/participatory, pragmatist (Creswell, 2006), interpretative, and functionalist (Morgan & 
Smircich, 1980) have been studied by and, to an extent, accepted among scholars (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1998). Of course these scholars have completed notable, and oft referenced, work in 
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general qualitative scholarship. These works can be measured as the standard through which 
qualitative research should be conducted and symbolize an umbrella in which framing analysis 
may fall under. The scope of this research not only aligned with the core values stated by these 
qualitative researchers, but coincided with the principles of the constructionist/constructivist 
paradigms.  
 Constructivists, through dedicated involvement and tireless investigation, employ 
naturalistic methodologies for data collection. The researcher and participant communally 
engage in a subjective co-construction of reality, which is admittedly one of many possible 
realities (Hatch, 2002). As Guba and Lincoln (1998) noted, “any given paradigm represents 
simply the most informed and sophisticated view that its proponents have been able to devise” 
(p. 202). The function of the researcher is inherently important in this belief system. In this 
capacity, the researcher’s interpretations are the primary conduit of data collection, where as in 
quantitative research, the researcher is relatively inconsequential at this stage. Further, the 
context in which the researcher conducts a study is subjective (Mills, Bonner & Francis, 2006), 
which enriches the interpretations or “lens” of the researcher. The interplay of interpretation and 
context allows for a highly authentic measure of a potential reality. It also encourages differing 
viewpoints, varying by lens, which augment the scholarly scope of a particular theoretical 
framework. It, therefore, cannot be overstated that the researcher’s role in the inquiry process is 
of the utmost importance (Charmaz, 2006). 
 Framing analyses allow researchers to either examine the construction or the 
consumption of frames (Zaharopoulos, 2007). The purpose of this study was to analyze the 
construction of frames by the journalists of the New York Times’ sport staff immediately 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11. In order to perform this empirical research, a 
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textual analysis was conducted of every article that appeared in the sports section of the New 
York Times from Wednesday, September 12, 2001,  to Monday, December 31, 2001, the same 
period of time that the newspaper published a special section dedicated to the reactions of 9/11 
called “A Nation Challenged.” There were many advantages to employing textual analysis for 
this type of research. The principle benefit is the documents were accessible and the newspapers 
themselves were relevant accounts of the events (Yin, 2009). Additionally, the articles were 
consistently written by the same journalists, which presented a common voice to analyze. 
Finally, newspapers are rich with context and this print medium allowed for a prolific account of 
historical occurrences through which the author could give a detailed illustration using 
descriptive analysis in the written form (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). As Entman (1993) suggested, 
framing theory provided the theoretical parameters through which textual analysis will be 
applied.  
 The researcher plays an important role in all qualitative studies and that was true of this 
examination as well. Merriam (2009) suggested that every investigator, as actors in what she 
called the “human as instrument,” state their position as investigator or their “reflexivity” (p. 
219). September 11 impacted an entire generation of people who witnessed the events unfold. 
Similarly, sport as a social institution has had a profound influence on society. The intersection 
of the two created a unique circumstance that demonstrated to this researcher that sport was an 
anchor in allowing a nation to recover from a crisis. Sport media was a medium through which 
sport was able to circulate in that role. This self-reflection was important when examining how 
the frames were generated in this examination. The exposure to 9/11 and its aftermath, along 
with immersion in sport media scholarship by the researcher rendered an emic, or culturally 
entwined, approach. This created an opportunity for the analyst to collaborate with the 
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documents to produce frames. The individual researcher acting as part of the production process 
allowed for an identification of frames corroboratively, but it is acknowledged that frames do 
persist outside of this analysis.   
 The generation of frames through textual analysis occurred with the acknowledgement 
that the cultural impact of experiencing 9/11 influenced the researcher’s perception. The gold 
standard, of course, was complete objectivity and unbiased investigating. However, it is 
noteworthy to state that the potential for interpreting the material may have been influenced by 
the mere exposure to it. Merriam (2009) recognized that an emphasis on diligence and an 
awareness of potential bias in working toward objectivity is more effective than safeguarding the 
analysis process. In other words, realizing that the potential for bias and trying to avoid its 
influence is more important than denying its possibility and assuming predetermined protections 
will prevent it.  
The New York Times 
The New York Times has been regarded as the preeminent newspaper in the United States 
and its proximity to Ground Zero after 9/11 elevated the publication’s relevance to this topic 
(Lule, 2002). Several framing studies referenced in this dissertation examined the pages of the 
New York Times as the subject for analysis (Chidester, 2009; Entman, 2003; Hardin & 
Whiteside, 2010a; Lule, 2002; Zaharopoulos, 2007). According to these publications, the New 
York Times was one of the few national elite newspapers in the country (Entman, 2003), was 
noted for its influence both nationally and internationally (Lule, 2002), and was known for 
participating in and often guiding national debate regarding news of the day (Chidester, 2009). 
Zaharopoulos (2007) chose the New York Times simply because of its reputation and readership, 
while Hardin and Whiteside (2010a) similarly selected the publication “because of the 
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prominence, both in circulation and status, and the idea that such publications often set the 
national news agenda for news and sports” (p. 23). The New York Times was the most circulated 
newspaper in one of the most media saturated cities in the world, which also happened to reside 
in one of the focal locations during and after 9/11. 
New York City was home to seven professional organizations in major sports (Yankees, 
Mets, Giants, Jets, Rangers, Islanders, Knicks) and other less salient professional and college 
teams, which all garnered coverage from the New York Times. The days following 9/11, sporting 
events were placed on hiatus while the country mourned the lives lost that day. In response to the 
attacks, there was not a major sporting event held within the city limits of New York from 
September 12 to September 21. However, the Times printed a sports section in each newspaper it 
published despite the lack of games. Additionally, the newspaper printed a supplemental section 
called “A Nation Challenged” beginning on September 12 and continued to do so until the last 
day of the year. The campaign dedicated coverage exclusively to the aftermath of September 11. 
For their efforts, the New York Times won seven Pulitzer Prizes for journalism for their coverage 
of the terrorist attacks, including the award for public service for “A Nation Challenged” 
(Barringer, 2002). The New York Times was selected for this study because of its proximity to 
the attack on the World Trade Center in lower Manhattan, its paramount coverage following 
9/11, and its standing as the nation’s leading daily publication.   
Textual Analysis 
 Textual analysis was chosen for this dissertation because of its inherent ties to the 
interactions between media, culture and society (Bainbridge, Goc & Tynan, 2011). The 
following definition provided by McKee (2003) offered a functional definition of textual analysis 
that guided this research:  
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Textual analysis is a way for researchers to gather information about how other human 
beings make sense of the world. It is a methodology – a data-gathering process – for 
those researchers who want to understand the ways in which members of various cultures 
and subcultures make sense of who they are, and of how they fit into the world in which 
they live (McKee, 2003, p. 3). 
The constructionist outlook to framing highlighted earlier in this chapter employed many 
of the same principles delineated in this definition of textual analysis in that both incorporate 
integration and collaborative understanding. McKee’s work asserted that textual analysis was 
devoid of a universal interpretation because of the meaning-making approach to analyzing text. 
The tie-in to the constructionist outlook, aside from the influence of culture, was that the articles 
created a link between the journalist and the reader, forming an understanding.  
In their recommendations for the appropriate application of textual analysis, Bainbridge, 
Goc, and Tynan (2011) noted that this methodology was especially useful because of its 
devotion to the media texts as substantive data, while incorporating or testing theory. In this 
case, the use of framing theory guided the employment of the methodology. In fact, the authors 
specifically described the functionality textual analysis could have in framing analyses, 
particularly by integrating exnomination and commutation (Bainbridge, Goc & Tynan, 2011). 
Essentially, the textual analysis would examine the documents in search of journalists’ meaning 
by the way the material is presented.  
Other methodological approaches were considered in this study, but textual analysis was 
most conducive for this framing analysis for three primary reasons: (a) the collaborative 
acknowledgement of media, culture, and society was parallel to the constructionist outlook 
used, (b) the textual analysis described by the aforementioned scholars linked theory, 
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specifically framing, to its use, and (c) the information gathered from interviews could act as a 
supplement because of textual analysis’ reliance on primary text. The suggestion of content 
analysis and other methods did not meet the standards that were set forth for this qualitative 
measure. 
In order to address any methodological concerns from incorporating this supplemental 
approach, three established practices guided the analysis process. First, the researcher adhered to 
Baptiste’s (2001) guide for thematically coding texts. Secondly, semi-structured interviews with 
journalists that worked at the New York Times during and immediately following 9/11 
supplemented the data following the model set forth by Reese and Lewis (2009). Finally, after 
organizing thematic clusters from both the textual analysis and the interview transcripts, a 
follow-up with the journalists allowed for member checking to triangulate the findings, 
substantiating reliability (Creswell, 2006).  
Interviews  
Semi-structured interviews provided insight directly from the journalists that produced 
the frames used in response to September 11. In interviews of this nature, each participant was 
selected because of their access to information, deeming them an informant. Each informant was 
asked a set of similar questions by the researcher based on the basis of knowledge accumulated 
over the course of the research project (Bernard & Ryan, 2009). Lindlof and Taylor (2002) 
highlighted the value of interviews recognizing their ability to “understand their perspectives on 
a scene, to retrieve experiences from the past, to gain expert insight or information, to obtain 
descriptions of events or scenes that are normally unavailable for observation…or to analyze 
certain kinds of discourse” (p. 5). Those outcomes were precisely the desired effects the 
researcher hoped to accomplish with this data collection process.  
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An additional benefit of conducting semi-structured interviews was the flexibility this 
method allowed the researcher by not predesignating the order of the questions. This 
arrangement was conducive for free-flowing, conversational interactions with the participants 
(Bernard & Ryan, 2009). A preconceived strategic directive of questions and objectives was 
formulated by the interviewer in order to organize the course of the conversation. Four of the 
contributing journalists that were on the New York Times’ staff at the time of September 11, 
2001, were interviewed for this project. Each interview focused on the perception of using 
frames in journalism, how they were able to incorporate those frames into the articles following 
9/11, and the challenges they faced under the circumstances of crisis. This mixed methods 
approach allowed for a significant amount of data indicating how an industry leading newspaper 
framed a response to crisis.  
Member checking. Member checking was considered critical to ensuring credibility to 
qualitative inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The process of member checking involved 
reengaging participants with the data, specifically the researcher’s interpretations, analysis, and 
conclusions, so they may critique both the credibility and accuracy of the account (Creswell, 
2006). This element of the research design was especially important in addressing Matthes and 
Kohring’s (2008) concerns about the unreliability in hermeneutic approaches. Specifically, they 
referenced the preponderance of researchers finding frames “they are consciously or 
unconsciously looking for” (p. 259). Member checking, as the third phase of triangulation, 
allowed for a constructive cross-checking between the researcher and the participants that 
actually employed the frames. This interaction was critical for two reasons: (a) it gave the 
researcher the opportunity to further interact with the participants to ensure accuracy, and (b) it 
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permitted the opportunity for both parties to collaboratively crosscheck the interpretations of the 
frames.  
Procedure 
 The entire sports section of every Times newspaper was downloaded from the New York 
Times ProQuest Database from September 12, 2001, to December 31, 2001. Each section was 
numerically recorded into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet with a listing of each article that 
appeared in that day’s section. A total of 1,853 articles were examined, 239 of which referred to 
9/11 and helped decipher the framing of the tragedy. The columns of the spreadsheet 
incorporated the elements Zaharopoulos (2007) used in his analysis of the New York Times, 
which included: date, source, size, type (news item or column, no letters to the editor were 
included), frame, topic (the crux of the article), headline focus, and symbol or the main proper 
noun in the article. Also like Zaharopoulos, each article was considered a single unit of analysis. 
Every article was read initially, with the aforementioned information entered into the spreadsheet 
upon the completion of the first reading. In accordance with Baptiste’s (2001) approach, the 
researcher labeled segments with codes which described the content of the article. A second 
reading of each article allowed the researcher to evaluate the initial codes, amend any of those 
designations, and group the coded content into categories. Finally, the researcher dissected the 
categories further into frames, which completed the textual analysis of the documents.  
 Interviews with participants from the New York Times’ sports staff were the next phase of 
the data collection procedure. As mentioned previously, semi-structured interviews with four 
journalists was conducted at a minimum of 45 minutes per interview. Each interview occurred 
via telephone with a recording device used to chronicle the conversation. Carr and Worth (2001) 
noted that there was little difference substantively in data gathered in face-to-face or telephone 
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interviews, thus the conduit of telephoning the participants was sufficient for this study. The 
interviewer had an interview protocol to inform the conversation and keep the questions similar 
for each interviewee (Bernard & Ryan, 2009). Once the interviews were completed, the 
researcher transcribed the conversation onto a Microsoft Word file with any distinguishing 
information describing the participants’ identity kept confidential. The same analysis process 
highlighted by Baptiste (2001) was used to analyze these data as well. The initial reading of the 
transcripts was labeled and tagged with codes from the text. A second reading allowed for further 
delineation and grouping codes into larger categories. Finally, those categories were examined 
again through a theoretical lens and given thematic designations.  
Once the frames of the articles and themes from the interviews were siphoned out, the 
researcher compared the results and designated five frames as part of the findings. Those 
findings were documented in a rough draft and sent to each of the participants of the study. Each 
interview participant was given the draft of the findings and asked to highlight notable 
declarations that they disagreed with or make note of any omissions they felt were necessary. 
This process of member checking offered a final method of triangulation that helped to ensure 
accuracy and credibility. None of the participants chose to amend their responses to the 
manuscript and declared the findings suitable.  
The textual analysis and semi-structured interviews produced five frames: diminished 
significance of sport, sport as a distraction, united community symbolically moving onward, 
logistical understanding, and loss of innocence. In addition, the participants added a perspective 
of their roles as journalists and how they specifically viewed the collective response of the New 
York Times to 9/11. The presentation of the findings is given through anecdotal accounts from 
the interviewees and excerpts taken from the documents examined. The participants were given 
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pseudonyms chosen by the researcher in order to protect their anonymity. The pseudonyms that 
were chosen were “Jamie,” “Gerard,” “Lee,” and “Charles.” The introduction of data collected 
from the interview participants was accompanied by the pseudonym assigned and regular 
quotations. Excerpts from the documents were introduced using the journalists’ real names, 
followed by an American Psychological Association (6th edition) citation. A reference list of the 
citations can be found in Appendix B. 
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CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS 
Prior to 9/11, some of the parking lots at Giants Stadium were used during the work week 
by people that took the commuter trains into New York City. Jamie, a reporter for the New York 
Times (hereafter the Times), recalled a story that John Mara, then New York Giants’ executive 
vice president and chief operating officer, had told. “I remember John Mara having this gut-
wrenching experience because the parking lots were also used for the commuter trains. 
Commuters would park there and catch the train into the city,” Jamie recollected. “I remember 
him saying that he realized after a few days that those cars hadn’t moved. Those people were not 
coming back for their cars. I just remember thinking, ‘Oh God.’”  
 Jamie, who covered the NFL when the events of 9/11 occurred, lived in Manhattan and, 
because Tuesdays are normally an off-day in the NFL, was in the city that morning. Charles and 
Gerard, columnists for the Times who had also been working on separate book projects, were at 
their respective homes in neighboring towns to New York when Flight 11 hit the North Tower of 
the World Trade Center. Lee, an editor at the paper, was driving into work when the first crash 
happened. Like their colleagues at the Times, some were from New York, others from various 
parts of the country and world, but each inherently tied to the Times’ response to 9/11 because of 
their roles as journalists.  
 The preceding anecdote is an example of the participants’ experience and contribution to 
this scholarship. Throughout this chapter similar passages will exemplify the frames that were 
distinguished in the analysis. Additionally, excerpts taken directly from the Times’ sports section 
will appear providing a framework for the findings. Responses from the participants will be 
noted by an introduction to the participant and quotation marks. The excerpts will also have 
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quotation marks, but will be followed by a citation. A reference list for each of the articles used 
can be found in Appendix B.  
 The findings of this study revealed five frames that emerged from the textual analysis: 
diminished significance of sport, sport as a distraction, united community symbolically moving 
onward, logistical understanding, and loss of innocence. Within each frame were some 
contributing themes that helped structure the larger frame. For instance, the journalists’ portrayal 
of a revised definition of heroism was a contributory theme that aided in the definition of the 
diminished significance of sport frame. This frame emerged as society’s self-assessment of 
priorities following the attacks and the subsequent placement of sport within that revised 
outlook, which was ultimately viewed as a less important aspect of life. Sport as a distraction 
was complementary to the diminished significance of sport frame in that it helped distinguish 
sport as a brief removal or diversion from the tragedies rather than the assertion that it functioned 
as a healer. The united community symbolically moving onward frame was an understanding 
derived from the use of symbols, specifically during moments of ceremony and tribute, which 
portrayed a larger message, in most cases, a unifying idea. Logistical understanding described 
the processes (and challenges) of the day-to-day operations of sport with regards to postponing, 
scheduling and rescheduling events, changes in security and other semantic issues related to 
playing the games. Finally, the loss of innocence frame depicted a removal from the pre-9/11 
ideals to the post-9/11 reality with references to the former’s alignment with purity. 
Additionally, the interviews provided insight and context into how the tragic events 
impacted the reporting by journalists at the Times. The findings from the interviews offered 
circumstance to these findings and suggest bearing to how and why these frames were so 
prevalent in the 111 days, following these tragedies. In order to avoid confusion, the introduction 
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to interviewee anecdotes and responses will use only the participants’ pseudonyms, which were a 
single name. The pseudonyms were Jamie, who was referenced in the initial paragraph, as well 
as Gerard, Charles, and Lee. Sportswriters conversely will be referred to by their actual first and 
last name.  
Diminished Significance of Sport 
 In 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated much of the Gulf Coast, especially in areas of 
Louisiana and Mississippi. That fall, Charles went down to New Orleans and covered the impact 
of the hurricane for the Times. He recalled visiting a town 40 miles south of New Orleans called 
Port Sulphur. The town was actually made up of three oil and fishing villages with a total 
population of less than 2,000. It had suffered immeasurable losses due to the storm, he explained, 
but despite the town’s hardships, the community began to rebuild. Part of the restoring process 
was consolidating three schools into one high school, which was housed in a small temporary 
building. A football coach from one of the decimated schools remained in the community and 
was determined to assemble a championship-winning football team at this high school. Charles 
recalled how the school and the coach realized their goal by winning the state championship in 
both 2007 and 2008, and making it to the championship game in 2009; accomplishments that 
provided a boost in morale for the town. 
Charles cautioned that sport can often be exaggerated in its role during recovery from 
tragedy, but he did think, especially in this particular case, that it did have a function in society. 
“I think it can help. I think it is often overstated in sports, but in this case it actually was true.” 
He continued, “In the end, I’m actually convinced that it gave people the idea that, ‘it’s okay. 
Life goes on. We can go home. The football team can be successful, so we can be successful.’”  
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  The parameters of this frame were defined by a resounding measure of scope and 
context. The diminished significance of sport was a consistent measure of the importance, or lack 
thereof, of sports in relation to other facets of life. This frame gave understanding to sport’s 
positionality in society and was reinforced by themes of redefining heroism, debating the 
appropriateness of playing, and characterizing an increasingly popular term at that time, 
“normalcy.” People around the world watched men and women jump from burning skyscrapers 
and focused on a fiery blaze at an American institution symbolic of the United States’ militaristic 
strength. They also saw a smoldering crater in the middle of a field in Western Pennsylvania; the 
only certainty of which was that it was somehow involved in these events. The furthest concern 
was whether the New York Mets were going to play a baseball game against the Pittsburgh 
Pirates that night. Times’ journalist Jere Longman assessed the positionality of athletes and 
sports: 
In the aftermath of last week’s terrorist attacks, a transforming moment apparently 
occurred. Athletes were generous with their time and money, genuine in their hurt, 
humble in their willingness to step aside. The intoxication of idolatry and celebrity was 
replaced by the sobriety of worth, by a solemn reassessment of sport's place in the 
culture. The self-important language of games was devalued as insipid, egotistical. Had it 
ever been more clear that courage meant running into a burning building, not running 
through massive defensive linemen? Saving lives, not saving games from a bullpen 
(Longman, 2001, p. D1)? 
 That excerpt delineates two important aspects of the diminished significance of sport 
frame. First, the contrast between athletes and first responders entering the World Trade Center 
provided an important distinction about heroism. Dave Anderson wrote a story about the 
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Andruzzi family from Staten Island. He described how Joey Andruzzi, one of three brothers, 
played for the New England Patriots in the NFL. Joey’s dad, Bill, a retired New York City police 
detective and his three brothers, Jimmy, Billy, and Marc, each firefighters, had thought of Joey 
as the family hero. “Until that Tuesday morning, 26-year old Joey Andruzzi was the hero in the 
family,” Anderson wrote.  
All three firefighting Andruzzis had responded to the call on 9/11 and were at the World 
Trade Center when it collapsed. The brothers survived and Bill was quoted saying, “They’re still 
going to fight the fires. They’re still going to go where the disaster is.” Anderson’s final line, 
“Where the real heroes go,” summarized the reassessed definition of hero (Anderson, 2001b, p. 
D4).  
 The second implication, derived from the passage’s introspective tone, which implied a 
re-evaluative process by society placing its priorities with the realities of life rather than sport, 
was the question of whether, and eventually when, it was appropriate to play again. Natural 
tension existed between those who thought sport should resume immediately and those who 
preferred to sustain the focus of attention on the victims of 9/11, rather than something menial as 
sport. Players from the New York Jets and Giants were especially outspoken in their resistance to 
playing even though, as William C. Rhoden reported, “national and local leaders called on 
football players to play their games and effectively resume their roles as ‘diversions’” (Rhoden, 
2001a, p. C13).  
Jets’ quarterback Vinny Testaverde, running back Curtis Martin, and head coach Herman 
Edwards adamantly opposed flying to Oakland to play their game against the Raiders on 
September 16, just five days after the attacks. Rhoden wrote, “Testaverde, Martin and Edwards 
grew quite a bit in my eyes on Thursday even though my own viewpoint was different. I felt the 
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teams should play on Sunday, though my decision was made as a journalist” (Rhoden, 2001a, p. 
C13).  
 The idea that games would provide a distraction from the horrific events of 9/11 was a 
frame in its own right. However, an assertion that sport provided an outlet of normalcy for 
people became a prevalent aspect of the diminished significance of sport frame. The thematic 
contribution to this larger frame was an effect of journalists referring to sport as a facet of 
society, but as the previous evidence has established, a subsequently less important, mostly 
entertaining function of the culture. As Ira Berkow stated:  
I want to miss ‘Take Me Out to the Ball Game.’ I want to miss the inanity of it, of the 
peanuts and the Cracker Jack and not caring if I never get back. And I indeed miss the 
time, a lifetime ago, a hundred thousand years ago, it seems, in a world now so utterly 
unrecognizable, so relatively benign, that we could indeed forget our problems for three 
hours at a ballpark (Berkow, 2001, p. S4). 
 Heroism. Hyperbole was a byproduct of covering sport with sport’s intrinsic ties to 
emotion and extravagance. Following 9/11, a distinction was made between the heroic efforts of 
players and coaches and rescue personnel, which was a contributory theme to the diminished 
significance of sport frame. In October of 2001, Gerard traveled to Oakland to cover the 
American League Divisional Series between the Oakland Athletics and New York Yankees. In 
Game 3 of the series, Yankee shortstop Derek Jeter made a game saving play where he gathered 
a throw from the outfield and tossed the ball using his backhand to catcher Jorge Posada in time 
to tag the Oakland base-runner, Jeremy Giambi, out at home plate. Gerard described how the 
backdrop of tragedy influenced the way he wrote about the play. “In Game 3 came Derek Jeter’s 
famous ‘flip play.’ I recall sitting in the press box of the Oakland Coliseum and thinking that I 
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needed to be careful about how I write and how you glorify an athlete.” He added, “We had to be 
careful about the way we glorified athletes for their acts of courage at a time that people were 
still reeling and mourning firemen that climbed up that Trade Center and wound up sacrificing 
their lives.” 
 Interactions between local coaches and athletes and the police, firemen, and rescue 
workers further accentuated the dichotomy of the term hero. Members of the Giants, Jets, 
Yankees, and Mets made trips to Ground Zero to see the devastation and offer support for the 
rescue workers. Many visited with volunteer workers and some even assisted in the relief efforts. 
The journalists at the Times recognized the differences immediately and routinely offered 
anecdotes or comments from coaches or athletes to reinforce the respect that those same coaches 
and athletes had for the workers. An example of that dynamic is seen below in a quote Bill 
Pennington used from Giants head coach Jim Fassel regarding his visit to Ground Zero: 
‘I was hesitant about going down there because I’m just a football coach, but I was 
convinced by some other people that it would help. I went alone, and what I saw amazed 
me. I saw rescue workers writing their names and birth dates on their forearms as they 
got ready to climb into the wreckage just in case everything caved in and they were lost, 
too. I saw the most incredible, tireless effort and sacrifice’ (Pennington, 2001b, p. D4).   
 Reporter Judy Battista wrote a story about the Jets traveling to the Salvation Army to 
assist some of the volunteers. She included a telling quote from head coach Herman Edwards: 
At the Salvation Army, Coach Herman Edwards stood at the head of a line staffed by 
dozens of his players, coaches and other volunteers, they passed cases of water and soup 
down a stairway to the street, where [Terry] Broadway and [John] Hall stacked them on a 
truck.  
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Many of the players did not want to be interviewed by reporters because they did not 
want to receive any credit for being here. ‘It hits even closer,’ Edwards said after the trip. 
‘It doesn’t really describe the looks in people’s faces who have been down here. I visited 
one police officer in Long Island, a big Jets fan. He had worked 40 hours in a row. That 
goes to show you what the human mind and human body can do. I take my hat off to all 
of them’ (Battista, 2001, p. D3).  
 The separation between sport figures and heroes was clear, but some crossover occurred 
among certain members of both sides. Mets’ manager Bobby Valentine and New York Mayor 
Rudy Giuliani were two public figures that transcended their roles as baseball coach and 
politician in the wake of tragedy. Tyler Kepner, Mets beat writer, wrote of Valentine helping 
volunteers outside of Shea Stadium, “The thing that distinguished Valentine from dozens of 
other volunteers was the way people looked to him for direction. Where should we go? What 
should we do? Where should we put these boxes? Valentine – shouting, pointing, clapping, 
helping – had answers (Kepner, 2001a, p. C18). Similarly, journalist Rafael Hermoso wrote a 
story about Giuliani, a noted Yankee fan, bringing a group of 25 people, all family members of 
9/11 victims, to the final two games of the 2001 World Series in Arizona (Hermoso, 2001b).  
 Most people wanted to do something to help relieve the agony weighing on the shoulders 
of so many. Jamie remembered players wanting to contribute to the relief effort too, which in 
part simply meant playing the games they had always played. “I don’t think [the players] thought 
they were being courageous, I think they wanted to feel like they could help people. I think most 
of them recognized that there wasn’t a whole lot they could do to help people.”  
The result of the juxtaposition of players and rescue personnel, as well as a consistent 
acknowledgment of the courageous efforts the latter made, reinforced the hero theme as part of 
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the diminished significance of sport frame. The writing demonstrated cautious tone in 
overstating athletic achievement, the players recognized the efforts of the volunteers, and the 
participants each noted an effort to focus on the true designation of the term, hero. 
Appropriateness of Playing. Gerard had written a book about a phenomenon he 
stumbled upon about middle-aged women taking up recreational sport in their community. 
Interest in this book was growing and by the first week of September 2001, he received word that 
on September 14 he was going to be a guest on ABC’s morning television show, “Good Morning 
America.” As he put it, he was both “astounded and excited” for the opportunity. Of course, after 
9/11, television programming changed dramatically and the appearance was canceled. Gerard 
recounted his feelings during that time, “I went from this sense of personal euphoria to feeling, 
not only disappointment, but some shame that I’m even allowing myself to feel disappointment 
given the horror that struck the city and Washington, D.C. and the country at large.”  
This personal insight exemplified society’s conflicted sense of how and when to continue 
after tragedy. Gerard said he wondered how he could be so selfish after such a horrifying event, 
but realized that “it did create somewhat of a dilemma in the ensuing days, and weeks after 9/11, 
which was, is it appropriate to begin to pursue a normal way of life.” That became the critical 
question that directly impacted the leadership of professional and collegiate sport deciding if and 
when it was appropriate to play. This theme was integral in demonstrating that sport was a 
consideration, but would not be a priority in society following the attacks.  
 On September 13, Mike Freeman wrote, “National Football League Commissioner Paul 
Tagliabue said yesterday he had no choice but to call off this weekend’s games, citing the 
inappropriateness of playing Week 2 so soon after Tuesday’s terrorist attacks” (Freeman, 2001b, 
p. C13). Commissioners from major sport leagues ultimately decided that it was in the best 
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interests of the country that games be postponed due to the tragedy. The decision to postpone the 
games was not universal and, for some, it took longer to reach a conclusion than others. For 
instance, the presidents and athletic directors at Fordham and Columbia University, schools both 
located in New York City, were adamant about playing their football game on Saturday, 
September 15. They were among the last to call off their event, despite most of their counterparts 
having done so earlier in the week. The following summarized the perception: 
So, what were the folks at Fordham and Columbia thinking when they awoke [Friday] 
intent on playing a game? The same thing the rest of us were thinking while being choked 
mute by the images on television and dabbing tears from the corners of our eyes: What is 
the right thing to do (Drape, 2001, p. C7)? 
 Some played their games as scheduled, meeting varied responses from patrons and 
alumna: 
Just before the telephone rang, Dr. William Steinbrecher of Valparaiso sent an email 
reply to what he called a disgruntled alumna who did not think the football team should 
play today. So he was prepared to defend in a conversation his school’s decision to play 
Wisconsin-Eau Claire (LaPointe, 2001, C7).  
 The debate over appropriateness naturally encapsulated sport’s role in society, outlining 
the diminished significance of sport frame as a whole. Some people, including a portion of the 
journalists, were in favor of playing the games as scheduled whether it was to bring a sense of 
normalcy, a distraction, or to signify defiance to terrorism. The opposition seemed to feel that 
sport was a menial, almost insignificant, function of life and it would be inappropriate to 
continue immediately after 9/11. Jamie’s response was, “I remember lots of people saying at the 
time, when they come back it will help the country heal. I remember, maybe because I lived [in 
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New York] really hating that sentiment, thinking, ‘you’ve got to be kidding?’” Adding, “People 
lost loved ones in the World Trade Center; a baseball game is not going to help heal anyone.” 
 Once the decisions had been made to postpone the games, sport also had to make the 
choice of when to return to action and almost as importantly how to proceed once it did return. 
Baseball was the first to resume play, with games commencing on September 17. The Mets were 
among the teams to play on that first day back, resuming a series against the Pirates. Attendance 
was low at Pittsburgh’s PNC Park, security was heightened, but fans were ready to carry on. 
Reporter Jack Curry wrote: 
There were American flags on the backs of uniform jerseys, flags on baseball caps and 
batting helmets, and flags fluttering throughout the stands. There were moments of 
silence and renditions of ‘God Bless America.’ There were tears, there was relief, there 
were unexplainable feelings and, once again, there was baseball (Curry, 2001a, p. C15).  
 The overall feeling portrayed by the Times was that the six day postponement of sport 
was appropriate. The tone had shifted from questioning whether to play to almost universally 
agreeing that the right decision had been made by canceling the games, to the country being 
ready for the games again. Robert Lipsyte summarized that evolution: 
Despite the brief flagellation (maybe we’ll cover the Police Olympics now), Sports 
World handled itself appropriately these past two weeks, postponing and returning in 
timely fashion. There was a wavering line to be walked between what some saw as the 
intermittently unseen irrelevancy of the toy department and the renewed importance of 
sports as a continuum in American life, a sustaining narrative and a comforting normality 
(Lipsyte, 2001, p. SP10) 
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 Normalcy. The idea that sport would provide a window of normalcy was a consistent 
theme throughout the period of analysis. Scheduling and various other areas of sport were 
impacted logistically and games, as events, were littered with tributes and ceremonies. But the 
actual day-to-day operation of sport was mostly unaffected by 9/11. Sporting events were seen as 
a facet of the pre-9/11 lifestyle that, because procedurally they remain unchanged, could 
essentially bridge society’s attempt to rediscover those activities that were deemed “normal.” As 
Lipsyte noted, sport’s ability to provide normality was not clear. “It is hard to be sure whether 
these games are best thought of as reminders of normality or distractions from what normality 
has become” (Lipsyte, 2001, p. SP13). 
 The newly established post-9/11 era was wrought with uncertainty. There was no 
blueprint for how to react and there was an unknowing if or when another attack was coming. 
The reaction to insecurity was predominantly to attempt to go back to the everyday routines of 
life, but as columnist George Vecsey cautioned, lessons could pervade in this new reality: 
Could we learn to live with less bravado? You bet. But let’s not act as if running and 
throwing and hitting are lesser forms of life than producing cigarettes or jacking up the 
price on gasoline. If the stock market is open, if the schools are open, if the strip joints 
and coffee bars and movie theaters and tattoo parlors are open – all the diverse pursuits in 
our complicated, brawling, cacophonous, layered, fascinating democracy – then sports 
have the right to open their doors for business, too (Vecsey, 2001a, p. 50).  
 Federal, state, and local politicians and other officials were at the forefront of 
encouraging people to try to return to normal behaviors. Mayor Giuliani was strongly in favor of 
returning to regular schedules, as was President Bush.  
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Cedrick Dempsey, president of the NCAA, got a call from Karl Rove, a senior adviser to 
President Bush, on Wednesday, said Jane Janowski, a spokeswoman for the NCAA. Rove 
said that the federal government planned to hold a day of remembrance on Friday, and 
that it wanted the country to return to normalcy (Wong, 2001a, p. 47).  
  Gerard recalled a particular moment that he realized that a return to normalcy was 
something desirable and sport, in a way, could help provide an outlet for that. He had been asked 
to cover a game between the Mets and the Atlanta Braves on September 21, which happened to 
be the first professional sporting event held in New York City after 9/11. The game was notable 
for a variety of reasons, including the emotional ceremonies held at Shea Stadium during 
pregame. The Mets players also decided to wear “FDNY” and “NYPD” hats and Mike Piazza hit 
a dramatic, eventual game-winning 2-run home run in the bottom of the eighth inning. The home 
run was a poignant moment for people who saw it and it, of course, was the headline for most 
that wrote about the game. Gerard, however, did not focus on the home run as the crux of his 
story. He instead chose to highlight the leadoff walk earned by Mets’ second baseman Edgardo 
Alfonzo, who was the first run of the 2-run home run. “The gist of the column started off with 
Alfonso working out this walk.” He continued, “I made the point that in these days of reflection 
and fear, that some of the more simplistic parts of life are really something as normal as going 
for a walk in the park.”  
Thematically, the portrayal of heroism, the debate over the appropriateness of playing, 
and the recollection of normalcy illuminated the diminished significance of sport frame. The 
heroic acts of volunteers and rescue workers underscored the reality of courage and sacrifice. 
The difference of which provided perspective, not only of sport, but how sport figures had been 
projected. The appropriateness debate prioritized sport. Regardless of which side of the 
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argument, sport was relegated to what several people referred to in the Times as the “toy 
department of life.” Finally, the normalcy theme placed sport amongst the routines of life, no 
different than going to work or the grocery store.  
Sport as a Distraction 
 Gerard’s son was in college during the 2012-13 academic year, attending Penn State 
University. Penn State’s football program was one season removed from a child sex abuse 
scandal that had deeply affected the State College community. Gerard remembered having his 
son home over Thanksgiving break and they both watched the football game between Penn State 
and the Wisconsin Badgers. His interpretation of the game as a journalist drew parallels to the 
findings of the diminished significance of sport frame. He enjoyed watching Penn State play that 
season because of the story lines, but did not want to overemphasize the impact football had in 
dealing with that ordeal. He also thought of the greater role Penn State football had in people’s 
lives. “Over 100,000 people are piling into Beaver Stadium at Penn State even in the wake of a 
horrible story and trauma. It must have some meaning to people’s lives.” He continued, “They’re 
willing to spend time and money and emotions; well then who are we to say that it’s utterly 
meaningless compared to the other events going on in the world.” 
 Sport as a distraction dealt with the placement and eventual impact the games could have 
on society, primarily as a way to step away from the tragedies. Suggestions toward sport acting 
as a healer were debatable and the distinction between that and a diversion helped illuminate the 
parameters of this frame. The choice to distinguish the frame as distraction and the contributing 
theme as diversion rather than the opposite was two-fold: (a) the term distraction seemed to be a 
more prevalent term in the articles and the participants’ responses, and (b) distraction implied a 
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temporary separation from the events (the desired outcome), while diversion implied a turning 
away from the events (the more likely occurrence).  
The impact sport had was debatable as seen with Jamie’s contention of the idea that sport 
returning after 9/11 would help people heal. Some of the articles did allude to sport’s ability to 
aid in healing the country. Perhaps that assertion was part of the larger healing process and 
sport’s contributions to that were relatively small. Another explanation, which was probably 
more feasible, was sport functioned as a diversion. The overwhelming presence of symbols and 
ceremony certainly inhibited the possibility of removing tragedy from the cognitive fray 
altogether, but the games themselves were minutes and hours away from the horrific realities that 
had been bestowed upon the country. The presentation of the distraction frame will be delivered 
with examples of articles and participant narratives that discuss sport as a source of healing and 
diversion. The aggregate was a frame that provided an understanding of how sport could fill a 
void in a grieving society and how those who were dealing with the tragedy were distracted by 
its impact.  
 Sport as a Healer. The aftereffects of 9/11 clearly demonstrated a grieving and 
distraught society, especially in places like New York and Washington, D.C. Athletes and their 
respective sport organizations seemed to grasp the severity of the situation and embrace a role in 
trying to help the country recover. For instance, when the NFL returned from its hiatus, the 
league projected a sense that it could help mend the nation: 
Football returns today, and fans as well as those who have never seen an N.F.L. game 
will watch to see how the leagues and its players respond. And the N.F.L.’s mantra seems 
to be ‘we will try to be part of the country’s healing process’ (Freeman, 2001c, p. SP1).  
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 The perception presented by the writers was sport’s role in the “healing process” was 
calculated, but not overwhelmingly influential either way. The presence of the theme was 
primarily an acknowledgment that there was a need for healing and an offering of a small outlet 
to do that. “It’s time for healing in New York,” Tyler Kepner wrote. “And the Mets believe that 
for three hours each day they are performing a small service” (Kepner, 2001d, p. SP1).  
 Jack Curry similarly wrote, “After a dramatic victory in an emotional atmosphere on 
Friday and another triumph on Saturday, the Mets probably felt that they were supposed to win. 
Continue winning and, in some way, they would help the healing process in a wounded city” 
(Curry, 2001c, p. D1). 
 As mentioned before, athletes seemed to accept the responsibility of contributing to the 
process. Frank Litsky wrote a story about Giants’ middle linebacker Michael Barrow and his 
ascension into a leadership role on the team. Litsky used the following quote from Barrow about 
his interpretations of the Giants’ role in assisting the healing process:  
The healing process has started, but this will continue to live in our hearts. Our children 
and grandchildren are going to ask us, ‘Where were you when the World Trade Center 
was hit?’ We’re going to have to play well to put a smile on people’s faces (Litsky, 2001, 
p. D13). 
Jamie’s initial discontent with the idea that sport would altogether heal the country 
seemed to echo through the writing in the paper. Although the word healing was used in the 
aforementioned quotes, it was never explicitly stated that by watching the Jets win on Sunday or 
the Mets make a run at the division championship that people would actually be healed. The 
previous passages, more accurately, summarized Jamie’s declaration of sport’s function. “I think 
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the role of sports is a little bit of an escape and that’s great, but let’s not overstate its role on 
society. It’s not healing anything.” 
Diversion. Harvey Araton affirmed Jamie’s point in a column printed just two days after 
9/11, headlined, “In Time, Games Can Offer Escape.” In the article, Araton described the need 
for diversion. “We are all going to need diversions, personal and professional, in the coming 
days and weeks in order to take the first steps of moving on.” He also outlined the backdrop of 
sport throughout history as society coped with tragedy before. “In the grand scheme, sports 
hardly matter at all, but be it personal stress or national crisis the case once championed by 
F.D.R., that sports provide significant diversionary relief, still resonates.” He concluded the 
article by writing, “The games will go on, though, and if we are lucky, they will bring a few 
hours of escape from the brutal reality that befell us on Tuesday. That’s all they ever should be” 
(Araton, 2001, p. C9). 
The climax of this theme, much like that of tribute, seemed to center around the dramatic 
World Series that was played between the Yankees and Diamondbacks. The World Series, the 
pinnacle of Major League Baseball, drew a magnified attention to the city in a polar opposite 
way than 9/11 had. In three consecutive days, the Yankees won each game by one run a piece, 
including Game 4 and Game 5 in improbable fashion. The cumulative feeling was that for three 
to four hours a night, those two teams gave people a small escape from the realities they faced:  
Whether it has any relevance to the worldwide tensions that erupted on Sept. 11 is open 
for debate. Did a need for diversion create this Punch-and-Judy show between two 
baseball teams taking turns whacking each other with their best shot? Would this World 
Series have seemed just as interesting in the forget-about-government, let-the-good-time-
roll ambience before Sept. 11? Who knows? 
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A quick, curt World Series with no final trip for the sixth and seventh games – and the 
Yankees had won three straight of those – would not have sufficed. We desperately 
needed an extension of this silly little contest to keep our jellied minds off, well, you 
know (Vecsey, 2001e, p. S1).  
 Charles offered an explanation to why sport functioned so appropriately as a distraction 
following 9/11. He explained that sport was a common denominator. He referred to it as a 
“starting point” that, for people who engaged in the discussion, allowed for conversation and 
celebration. He thought that after 9/11 it played a viable role in offering some familiarity in an 
unfamiliar moment and gave way to providing a great distraction. “That fall, especially with a 
team like the Yankees, just helped people get going a little bit. They moved forward and I guess 
people got on with their lives.” He added, “Not that they wouldn’t have gotten on with their 
lives, but at least there was something, a common ground, a shared interest that could help a little 
bit.”  
United Community Symbolically Moving Onward 
Lee went to work at the New York Times in 1990 as an editor. An accomplished 
journalist, Lee described the perception of the Times prior to 9/11 as a “monolithic, grey lady.” It 
was a newspaper so vastly involved with news of the world and stubborn in its analytical 
methods that it could sometimes dehumanize situations. Following 9/11, that perception changed 
significantly. Part of the change was a consequence of the Times becoming a local newspaper 
due to the tragedies occurring in lower Manhattan. The other part stemmed from efforts made by 
the editorial staff to humanize the tragedy. Included in that effort was the extensive coverage 
dedicated through the “A Nation Challenged” campaign, the publication of a visual history book 
of 9/11 with the same name, and their efforts to tell the story of each person that fell victim to 
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these tragedies in a book called “Portraits.” Lee said of the book, “If you look, there are pictures 
and four or five paragraph articles in the profiles of every person that was a casualty of 9/11. It 
sits in my living room in a special place.”  
Lee’s anecdote denoted the parameters of the united community symbolically moving 
onward frame, which culminated from journalists’ projection of acts representative of the 
feelings of New Yorkers and, to a greater extent, Americans. This frame was unique in that the 
Times extensively used symbolism in its writing, but also described sport’s inherent ties to 
symbols as well. The findings of this frame described how symbolism was used in sport in 
response to 9/11. Themes of ceremony and tribute, as well as, unity contributed to how 
symbolism represented ideas and feelings of the stakeholders involved with this tragedy. 
Symbolism in the sports section predominantly signified acts or feelings toward the 
recovery from 9/11. For instance, Mets and Yankees players wore hats with the New York fire 
and police departments’ insignias on them throughout the remainder of the regular season. 
Officials halted, and eventually cancelled a preseason hockey game between the Philadelphia 
Flyers and the New York Rangers in lieu of a national television address that President Bush 
gave during the third period of the game. Mayor Giuliani, players, and coaches referenced the 
symbolism of games continuing as a demonstration that terrorism had not changed America’s 
way of life. There was even evidence of discrimination against Muslim-Americans, which was 
symbolic of the tensions that existed throughout the country. Themes of ceremony and unity 
guided this frame’s structure. 
Ceremony and Tribute. The ceremony and tribute theme contributed to the structure of 
the united community symbolically moving onward frame by giving a composition of the use of 
symbols used during those acts of remembrance. For example, Giants Stadium and Shea Stadium 
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served as staging areas for the rescue efforts the days after 9/11. Once the games returned to 
those venues, they served as cathedrals for memorial services. Baseball incorporated a league-
wide policy to have “God Bless America” sung during the seventh-inning-stretch. The NFL held 
a moment of silence in every stadium the first Sunday back, which was followed by a rendition 
of “Taps” played by a member of the armed services. Members of the New York fire and police 
departments, as well as, the Port Authority police were recognized in pregame ceremonies. Even 
when there were no games, venues like Yankee stadium served the public’s interest in 
congregated prayer. “You could not watch sports for pure diversion this weekend. Every game, 
appropriately, had overtones of World War II bond rallies and religious services. Most 
appropriately, America's cathedral of sport, Yankee Stadium, was the site of a stirring prayer 
meeting yesterday” (Sandomir, 2001b, p. D5).  
The emotional observances were not lost on either the players or the journalists. Players 
had visited Ground Zero and had experienced the anguish of people that were involved in this 
tragedy. They subsequently were outspoken and respectful when it came time to pay tribute to 
the victims. Murray Chass quoted Yankee pitcher Roger Clemens: 
‘I’m just proud to be part of the situation today,’ [Clemens] said, referring to the pregame 
ceremonies honoring the victims and the heroes of the World Trade Center. This was the 
Yankees’ first game at home since the Sept. 11 attack. ‘It was special. There was a lot of 
electricity when I was throwing my long distance in front of the bullpen’ (Chass, 2001d, 
p. D11).  
The ceremonies were commonplace at sporting events and so too were the tributes. On 
opening night for the Rangers, New York captain Mark Messier, wearing a “FDNY” hardhat, 
addressed the crowd and declared the team would tribute their season to the victims. “The 
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pregame ceremony, which included a short speech by Messier in which he dedicated the season 
to victims of Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and all the rescue workers, was especially poignant” 
(Diamos, 2001, p. S2). 
Honoring the victims was not exclusive to New York athletes either. Jack Curry told the 
story of Kenny Marino, a New York City firefighter who went missing on 9/11. Kenny’s wife, 
Katrina, feverishly searched for her husband, Kenny, to no avail. As she began to accept the 
passing of Kenny, she reached out to the Cincinnati Reds organization in hopes that she could 
pass along a message to husband’s favorite baseball player, Ken Griffey Jr. 
Kenny adored Ken Griffey Jr., so much Katrina sent an e-mail message to the Cincinnati 
Reds and asked them if Griffey could hit ‘an extra homer’ for Kenny because he would 
be ‘looking down with a big grin.’ The Reds showed it to Griffey before Tuesday night's 
game and he homered in his second at-bat in the Reds' 8-1 victory over the Phillies in 
Philadelphia (Curry, 2001d, p. D10).  
 Loved ones of the victims turned to sport in a variety of ways to help honor those they 
had lost. Like Katrina, many reached out to athletes to ask if they would keep the victims in mind 
when they played. Others, like Joanna Glick, actually had the opportunity to pay tribute to their 
loved ones through sport. Joanna’s brother, Jeremy, was on Flight 93, which crashed in 
Shanksville, Pa., on September 11. Joanna was a figure-skater and was given the opportunity to 
skate in an event held to honor the 1961 national team who had also suffered from a tragic plane 
crash. Amy Rosewater, who wrote the story of Joanna’s tribute, quoted the young skater’s coach, 
Mary Lynn Gelderman. “‘[Joanna] told me very clearly that this is her gift,’ said Gelderman, 
who coached Joanna for five years. ‘This is what she can do for Jeremy and this is what she can 
do for her mother and father’” (Rosewater, 2001, p. D12). 
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 Individual tributes like that of Ken Griffey Jr. and Joanna Glick were frequently seen in 
the weeks and months following 9/11. The grandest tribute seen on the sports pages, however, 
was one that was actually inferred by some of the journalists at the Times. Unlike the Mets, the 
Yankees had made the Major League Baseball playoffs. They defeated the Oakland Athletics in 
the American League Divisional Series, coming back dramatically to win after trailing two 
games to none. Then they defeated the Seattle Mariners, a team that had won an American 
League record 116 games during the regular season, in five games to advance to the World 
Series. Some journalists implied that the Yankees winning was almost an homage to the city and 
the victims. George Vecsey wrote after the Yankees clinched the American League Pennant. 
“Nobody has called for the Yankees to win for the city because that would be a burden the 
players do not need, but there is definitely a link between the performers and their audience” 
(Vecsey, 2001c, p. S1). 
 The reaction to what the Yankees were doing was measured. There were no articles that 
explicitly drew parallels to the successes they were having on the baseball field to the progress of 
New Yorkers dealing with tragedy. However, there was a tone in the writing and a feeling among 
the participants that the Yankees did provide something to the relief efforts by their play. “I do 
think the Yankees, David Letterman, Saturday Night Live did sort of show people it was ok to 
move forward,” Charles remembered. “I think we should be careful giving too much credit to 
this, but it was clear at that moment that [New Yorkers] did move forward and I guess the 
Yankees sort of moved forward, too.”  
 Unity. Charles was asked to cover Flight 93’s crash in Shanksville for the Times. He 
arrived in the small town in western Pennsylvania, about 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, and 
saw the field that became the crash site for the downed aircraft. As Charles recalled this 
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experience, he remembered an odd thing happening. As a journalist, he noted, there was 
normally a tension or, in his words, “a natural opposition,” between police and media in most 
circumstances. That day, however, he noticed a feeling of mutuality and unity between both 
parties. He said, “That day, I’ll never forget it, there was a moment where there was a sense 
where we’re all in this together so let’s just sort of get through this together the best that we can 
and there was actually a lot of cooperation.” 
His experiences covering Flight 93 and the sense of unity carried over into stadiums in 
New York and throughout the country. The feeling that emerged was that stadiums provided a 
meeting place that fans could congregate and support a common cause, specifically rooting for 
their favorite teams; a place to showcase the American spirit. The athletes seemed to feel that 
way as well. Tyler Kepner quoted Mets’ first baseman, Mark Johnson, “All sports teams in New 
York are playing for something a little bit higher now.” Kepner added a quote in that same article 
from third baseman Todd Zeile. “We’re all sort of feeling united in this fateful effort to try and 
pull this thing together, even in just the slightest bit, by making this a real race and giving some 
distraction by finishing strong’” (Kepner, 2001c, p. D2).  
Journalists noted changes in many aspects of games as people in stadiums adjusted to the 
realities occurring in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania. Some articles highlighted fear, 
resolute attitudes, and even sadness. Sport was an underlying presence that allowed attendees to 
navigate those feelings together. Edward Wong described the scene in Yankee Stadium in late 
September: 
It was a sentiment that was voiced yesterday by the flag-waving fans throughout Yankee 
Stadium in the hour before the game. Sure, they had come for the spiritual succor. They 
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had come for the sense of community. But deep, deep in their hearts, they had come with 
hopes of seeing their home team trounce the Tampa Bay Rays (Wong, 2001c, p. D11).  
 Testimonies of people across the nation almost adopting themselves as New Yorkers also 
became a unifying theme. Players like Vinny Testaverde, Wayne Chrebet, John Franco, Al 
Leiter, and others who were from the city were often recognized by that in articles. For instance, 
Tyler Kepner noted that detail of Mets’ pitcher Al Leiter by including his hometown in the 
subject description, “Al Leiter, the Mets’ starter and a native of Toms River, N.J. was not excited 
to be pitching. He did well, allowing one run on four hits in seven innings, but his mind and 
passion were elsewhere” (Kepner, 2001b, p. C17).  
Jack Curry similarly described Atlanta Braves’ pitchers Steve Karsay and Jason Marquis, 
who were from Flushing and Staten Island respectively. Of Karsay, he wrote, “Karsay was born 
in Flushing and remembers crossing the 59th Street Bridge or the Williamsburg Bridge hundreds 
of times to enter Manhattan, always noticing the World trade Center first.” He added of Marquis, 
“Pitcher Jason Marquis, who is from Staten Island, spent the frantic minutes after the attacks 
trying to find out if his sister, fiancé and best friend, who all work within two blocks of the 
World Trade Center, were safe” (Curry, 2001b, p. D3).  
Roger Clemens, who was in the midst of a record breaking season starting with a 20-1 
record, was famously from the state of Texas. After winning his 20th game, Buster Olney wrote 
of the messages he received from people: 
The phone calls from family and friends began at noon and came to Roger Clemens in 
rapid succession, good luck, best wishes. But no one mentioned how Clemens had the 
chance to become the first pitcher to win 20 of his first 21 decisions. They just kept 
reminding Clemens that he was a representative of New York (Olney, 2001, p. D1).  
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Along with feeling pride about associations with New York, unification over nationalism 
and patriotism increased, especially with an increased presence of patriotic ceremony. Parallels 
were made more accessible due to America’s inherent ties to baseball as its pastime. George 
Vecsey summarized that association in a column following the first game back between the Mets 
and Pirates. “[Fans] stood during the somber blessing and national anthem. It was not a night for 
raucous cheers. It was a night for watching the old American game and the old American river 
flowing onward” (Vecsey, 2001b, p. C15).  
The metaphor of a united community symbolically moving onward was not lost among 
the writers and athletes in response to the nationalistic groundswell. Sport continuing its 
operations was symbolic of America’s resolve. It represented a collective proclamation that the 
objectives of the terrorists were not realized. An article about Mark Grace, Arizona 
Diamondback first baseman, highlighted that feeling: 
Grace took the walk Monday and again last night. He was bustling with energy, and he 
refused to let the attack of Sept. 11 make him quiver in a public place. ‘This will 
probably be the safest place in America with the security,’ Grace said. ‘Also, a lesson that 
we learned after the 11th was we are not going to live our lives in fear, no way. We 
haven’t’ (Vecsey, 2001d, p. S2).  
Grace’s deliberate use of the word “we” was symbolic of the unified feeling that struck 
the country after 9/11, which was wrought with tones of nationalism. Coinciding with 
nationalism, the first exposure athletes had to symbols of patriotism wielded similar feelings as 
was exhibited by this quote from Jets’ wide receiver Wayne Chrebet, who incidentally lost a 
close friend in the terrorist attacks: 
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‘The hair was standing up on my arms,’ Chrebet said. ‘I was getting chills. I don’t think 
I’ve ever been prouder to be an American in my life. I feel guilty that I’ve never thought 
that way before. I’ll promise you I’ll never take it for granted again’ (Hermoso, 2001a, p. 
D4).  
The demonstrations of unity were strongest with stories of nationalism and patriotism, 
bolstering this themes contribution to the frame of a united community symbolically moving 
onward. The preeminent demonstration of patriotic and nationalistic symbolism was President 
George W. Bush throwing out the ceremonial first pitch prior to Game 3 of the World Series. 
Bush, along with Mayor Giuliani, was a figurehead in America’s emotional and militaristic 
response to terror. On MLB’s biggest stage, only miles from Ground Zero, Bush took the mound 
at Yankee Stadium. “Security was ratcheted up another 100 percent for the visit by President 
Bush, who showed his personal moxie by sauntering out to the mound and throwing the 
ceremonial first pitch” (Vecsey, 2001d, p. S2).  
Symbolism was a natural frame because of journalism and sport’s innate ties to imagery. 
Ceremony and tribute, subtly different but acting as one theme, provided an outlet for 
emblematic outpourings and the portrayal of unity, which gave scope to the impact those 
gestures could have. Whether it was a metaphor used in a story, like Gerard’s take on Edgardo 
Alfonzo’s walk, or the placement of the American flag on jerseys in all sports, symbolism was a 
prevalent frame throughout the coverage of 9/11. 
Logistical Understanding 
 Lee was uniquely positioned to deal with the New York Times’ response to 9/11. Not only 
was he part of the editorial staff, directing the tone of the content, but he also had first-hand 
experience dealing with crisis in the past. Lee was in Munich in 1972 and covered the Black 
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September massacre during the Olympic Games that resulted in the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes. 
Many aspects of that event stayed with him during his career as a journalist, including how sport 
responded during crisis. “The question of whether sports should continue in the peak of tragedy, 
in some ways, there’s an attempt to go overboard and say, ‘we’re not going to let the terrorists 
affect what we do.’” He added, “The other extreme is everything comes to a screeching halt. 
That’s a tough dance, but there are ways that I think you can solve it and you can satisfy both 
parties.” 
 The logistical understanding frame was constructed by the preponderance of articles that 
discussed the mechanics of, first, canceling sporting events and then, subsequently, the return of 
sport. The sport section was predominantly filled with logistical issues created by 9/11 in the 
days immediately following. Major League Baseball had a full schedule of games beginning as 
early as 1 p.m. on September 11, which called for an urgent response. The NFL and college 
football were in the midst of their regular seasons and only had a few days to make a decision. 
Other events like the PGA’s Ryder Cup and the New York City Marathon were also scheduled 
shortly after 9/11. While a widespread stoppage of major sporting events was irregular, the 
newspaper did provide a historical backdrop to give context to the decisions that were being 
made. Ultimately, sport returned and some aspects of the games that were previously 
afterthoughts became focal points; specifically, safety and security.  
Historical Context. Although the impact of September 11 was unprecedented in terms of 
national crises, natural parallels were drawn to events like Pearl Harbor and President Kennedy’s 
assassination. “Tuesday’s terrorist assaults are compared, as attacks on American soil or 
interests, to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the bombing of the federal building in 
Oklahoma City” (Sandomir, 2001a, p. C11). 
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The backdrop of previous tragedies gave perspective to the seriousness of 9/11 and 
familiarized readers with protocol that had been followed in response to those aforementioned 
tragedies. Dave Anderson wrote a story about the Giants and their co-owner Wellington Mara, 
who had been drafted into the Navy after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Anderson drew 
parallels to the events: 
The Giants went through this twice before in somewhat similar fashion – in 1941, when 
Pearl Harbor was attacked, and in 1963 when President John F. Kennedy was 
assassinated. Not the current Giants coaches and players, of course, but the franchise, in 
particular their co-owner Wellington Mara, now 85 years old (Anderson, 2001a, p SP3). 
The article discussed how the Giants continued to play after both events and how doing 
so had put a strain on both players and fans alike. Anderson concluded the article with, “‘Those 
twin towers were so close, they were almost part of the stadium.’ And almost a part of the Giants 
franchise that had endured the emotions of two other similar situations.”  
Major League Baseball and the NFL had not been forced to postpone regular season 
games in that manner for more than 80 years. Reporters put the severity of the circumstances into 
context by providing the history of decisions like that. For instance, it was noted several times 
that baseball had only postponed its schedule for more than one day three times in its history due 
to warlike actions. Passages such as the following summarized the tone: “Aside from work 
stoppages from labor disputes, this marks the first time that three consecutive days of regular-
season games have been called off since the 1918 season was shortened by a month during 
World War I” (Chass, 2001b, p. C9). 
The comparisons used in the sports pages to the Kennedy assassination, Oklahoma City 
bombing, Munich and others provided context and guided readers in interpreting these events. 
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Those that covered the NFL took a similar approach to synopsize the situation. “A number of 
issues concerned Tagliabue, who agonized for two days whether to halt the season for the first 
time in the history of the league for nonlabor reasons” (Freeman, 2001b, p. C13).  
On September 16th, the Times ran a story about the terrorist invasion on the 1972 Munich 
Olympic Games. Journalist Neil Amdur wrote the article that reflected on the reaction to that 
tragedy and related that experience to the one that was occurring on 9/11. He used a quote from 
Olympian Willye White, “‘It’s bringing back a whole lot of unkind memories’ White, the five-
time Olympian, said from her home in Chicago as she saw footage of the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon.” Amdur added of his own personal experience, “The wholesale 
decisions by pro football and baseball leagues, college conferences, Nascar (sic) and other sports 
organizations to skip this weekend’s games underscore the depth of current feelings. This shift is 
not lost on those who have followed the Munich timeline.” He concluded the article with a quote 
from an author, Simon Reeve, who wrote a book about the Munich attacks: 
‘There are obvious emotional parallels with what’s happened in the last few days and 
what happened in Munich,’ Reeve said by phone from London on Friday. ‘You had 
hundreds of millions watch as this took place in Munich, and there’s certainly that same 
sense of shock that’s spreading around the world. I don’t think Americans realize how 
this is affecting counties far away. People are now thinking this could be us’ (Amdur, 
2001, p. SP3). 
 Decision-Making. On November 22, 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated in 
Dallas. It was a Friday morning. The NFL, led by Commissioner Pete Rozelle, had to quickly 
decide whether or not to play the scheduled games that Sunday. Rozelle’s decision was to go 
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ahead with the games, which was a controversial decision. Gerard gave his interpretations of that 
choice: 
I was a young boy when President Kennedy was assassinated and the NFL decided to go 
ahead and play those games. That decision was made by Pete Rozelle, the commissioner, 
and for years and decades people have referred to that as probably the leading example of 
what not to do in the face of national tragedy. 
 The Rozelle decision was written about extensively when the journalists described the 
difficult decisions league commissioners and university presidents had to make about cancelling 
the games. Rozelle had publicly said reflecting back on his tenure as commissioner that his 
biggest regret was playing those games after President Kennedy was assassinated. An excerpt 
from an article Mike Freeman wrote encapsulated that message: 
The N.F.L.’s decision will be watched more closely because of the decision the league 
made after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963. The former 
commissioner, Pete Rozelle, decided that the games should be played and was severely 
criticized. Rozelle would later admit playing those games was a mistake (Freeman, 
2001a, p. C9).  
 As was mentioned in the diminished significance of sport frame, debate over the 
appropriateness of playing the games following 9/11 was the driving factor in the decision-
making process. The decisions themselves and the subsequent coverage, however, helped form 
the logistical understanding frame. Simply, journalists had a responsibility to report whether or 
not the games were going to be played. The lead article in the sports section written on 
September 12th titled, “Selig, in a Sense of Mourning, Cancels Baseball Games” provided a 
framework for this theme. “In the wake of yesterday’s terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
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Center towers and the Pentagon, Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig called off last night’s full 
schedule of 15 games and said he would make subsequent decisions on future games” (Chass, 
2001a, p. C15).  
 NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue’s decision was described similarly, “And, so, the 
games were called off yesterday by Paul Tagliabue, the N.F.L. Commissioner. In the words of 
Art Modell, the Baltimore Ravens’ owner, it was ‘Tagliabue’s finest hour as commissioner.’ 
That was absolutely true” (George, 2001a, p, C14). 
 Security. Super Bowl XXXVI was played in the Louisiana Superdome in New Orleans. 
One of the logistical impacts of 9/11 was that the postponement of Week 2 shifted the entire 
schedule ahead one week. The game was rescheduled and played February 3, 2002, making it the 
first Super Bowl to be played in the month of February. Another logistical implication occurred 
during the event. The Department of Homeland Security designated the game a National Special 
Security Event, mandating extreme precautions in the security measures employed around the 
events of the game. The Super Bowl occurred after the analysis period of this study, but Jamie 
covered the game for the Times that year and remembered the heightened sense of nervousness 
surrounding the event. “I remember us talking about if something happens in the Super Bowl, 
what do we do? What’s the plan here?” Jamie remembered the extra attention given to security 
measures. “Every year at the Super Bowl the NFL does a press conference with their security 
director and they talk about the logistics of securing the Super Bowl. That year it was over the 
top; very prevalent and very obvious.”  
The added consideration to security was commonly addressed in the Times, especially 
once the games did resume. It seemed viable to be weary of attending games in fear of another 
attack. Stadiums with upwards of 100,000 people would presumably make good targets for 
121 
 
terrorists looking to wreak more havoc on the country. Some organizations, like the PGA and the 
USTA, canceled or withdrew from major events. The Ryder Cup, one of the PGA’s most visible 
events, was canceled in lieu of the attacks. The USTA team, defending Fed Cup champions, 
cited security concerns and uneasiness of traveling abroad as reasons to pull out of the 
competition in Madrid, Spain. 
 The NFL and MLB were also aggressive in establishing amplified security procedures. 
Reporters wrote of expected longer lines to get into stadiums and a significantly increased 
presence of police and security details. “Fans attending N.F.L. games on Sunday will find 
parking moved farther away from Stadiums, longer lines because of inspections for weapons and 
security increased in both ‘visible and not-so-visible ways’” (George, 2001b, p. C18).  
Murray Chass wrote, “Major League Baseball, demonstrating serious concern for the 
security of fans and players in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on Tuesday, adopted a series 
of stringent security measures yesterday that will be implemented when the season resumes on 
Monday” (Chass, 2001c, p. C8) 
Edward Wong quipped about the security presence that was expected at Giants Stadium 
for their first game back in New York, “The football stadium sits across the Hudson River from 
the smoking debris of the World Trade Center. There will be more people with guns and 
uniforms there this weekend than at some minimum security prisons” (Wong, 2001d, p. D8). 
 The logistical response of sport, in canceling and resuming the games, was a priority for 
the New York Times. The most newsworthy aspect of sport during that time was the canceling of 
games, the decision-making process behind postponement, and the environment surrounding 
sport once it returned. The logistical understanding frame was especially prevalent in the early 
editions following 9/11, but the aftereffects were longstanding. 
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Loss of Innocence 
Gerard, as he had done many times in the past, visited a small coffee shop near his home 
just across the river from Manhattan the morning of 9/11. By the time he arrived the first plane 
had already hit the North Tower and patrons had taken note of the developing situation on the 
lone television in the place. A friend of Gerard’s, who was a freelance photographer, suggested 
that the two go back to the man’s apartment because he had a clear view of the New York City 
skyline. Once at the apartment, the photographer naturally took out his camera and began taking 
pictures of the scene at the World Trade Center, when suddenly there was another explosion. The 
men, of course, would later find out that it was Flight 175 crashing into the South Tower that 
created the second ball of flames. Realizing that he had captured something with his camera, 
Gerard’s friend quickly developed the pictures and showed them to Gerard. His response, “Oh 
my God!” Over the years since September 11, Gerard has reflected on that photograph, thinking, 
“You know, this photo is incredible because you realized at that moment what you were 
witnessing in the photo that he got was the last American moment of innocence.” 
The reality that this country was vulnerable to a large-scale attack like this was a harsh 
truth for Americans. As Gerard pointed out, there was a distinct change in society the moment 
those planes met their fateful destinations. The loss of innocence frame was dynamic in that its 
presence was sometimes implied and other times explicitly stated. The frame was defined as a 
gained perspective on the terrorist attacks that created a divide between a period before 9/11 and 
after 9/11 that was marred with lost and longing. The parameters of the frame were easily 
identified in that the reporters simply alluded to a change in routine from pre- to post-9/11 and 
that there was a loss associated to those alterations. The simplicity and prevalence of the frame 
negated the presence of many contributing themes, although stories of the fragility of New York, 
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lack of normalcy, and grief did have an influence on this frame. An appropriate example is the 
following excerpt from William C. Rhoden: “This morning, the sports world begins putting the 
pieces of a fragile existence back together. We proceed cautiously with our lives, some fractured, 
some shattered, some touched only on the periphery by a neighbor's grief” (Rhoden, 2001b, p. 
C18). 
 The subtlety of the loss of innocence was often given in small anecdotal forms. For 
instance, when the Giants returned to practice and their coach, Jim Fassel, performed a routine 
action, like blowing a whistle, there was a defined habitual difference. “Usually, when the 
stretching period is scheduled to end, Fassel must blow his whistle two or three times to interrupt 
the jocularity surrounding him. Today, Fassel's whistle startled the quiet. And he blew into it 
once” (Pennington, 2001a, p. C18). 
The traditional game-day experiences of fans were altered in the face of change, as is 
seen in the following passage: 
This was Day 1 of a new season, the first day of our new sports lives…The ritual of 
batting practice was changed as well. Fans were not allowed to gather in the rows near 
the field during batting practice, but instead were asked to go directly to their seats 
(Rhoden, 2001c, p. D1). 
There were also explicit references to the change in sport that occurred after 9/11 as well. 
George Vecsey summarized the feeling in the year-end edition of the sports section, “This past 
year will always be divided - Before and After. How simple life was back then. But we kept on 
because, because Mayor Giuliani told us to. In its own shallow way, sport helped the bad hours 
to pass” (Vecsey, 2001f, p. SP10). 
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 As the Mets prepared to play the Braves in the first professional sporting event to be held 
in the city post-9/11, it was stated, “Baseball returned to New York last night, but it came back to 
a city changed. Thousands of bodies were still amid the rubble of the World Trade Center” 
(Wong, 2001b, p. D3). 
 Jamie’s experience covering the Jets post-9/11 was similar to the story Bill Pennington 
wrote about the eerie quite at Giants practice. Jamie remembered being at practice in those early 
days and noticed the oddity of having no cars on the roads or planes in the air. The routines, 
which were a staple of most professional teams, had been completely disturbed. “I do remember 
at one point at that time they were flying fighter jets over New York,” Jamie said. “One went by, 
I remember everybody, players and the reporters stopped and looked up and you’re just like, you 
have no idea what’s going on at this point.” 
 The idea that there was a loss of innocence applied to all facets of life. Sport happened to 
be an outlet that society could visibly notice those changes. The terrorist attacks disrupted the 
country’s perception of safety and freedom, not just routine. The effect of that, however, was 
seen in the perspective through which society viewed all aspects of their everyday lives, 
including sport. 
Chapter Summary 
 Lee’s interpretation of how the Times responded to this tragedy was that it upheld the 
highest standards of journalistic integrity. Collectively, the respondents each gave considered 
and contextual importance to the writing performed in the sports section of the New York Times 
after 9/11. Lee went as far as to say, “Sometimes sports writing can be such a flowery exercise 
and often times refer to hyperbolic extremes, and I think there was a much more measured 
response to things that were going on.” His assessment of the quality of reporting done was that 
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it met the standards of one of America’s preeminent newspapers, which, of course, were high. 
“During that period, there was a certain amount of commutable responsibility that came with 
working there and a lot of good things that you had there were writers and reporters that were in-
tune with the content of stories.” 
 Charles echoed that sentiment, noting that the New York Times is a global publication that 
has covered wars and tragedies since its inception. “This was certainly a type of story that we’ve 
never seen before, at least to that extent, but it’s the kind of story that the New York Times 
tackles every day.” He remembered there being little talk about procedure or very few directives 
given to reporters by managing editors. “I don’t remember specific memos being sent out or 
anything like that. I just think it was like, I’m fortunate enough to work for a great newspaper 
that stepped up to the plate like it normally does.” 
 If there were directives from the sport editors, they were minimal but had consistent tones 
that were indicative of the aforementioned frames. “The sports editors were really just sort of 
like, let’s take a back seat. We don’t want these stories about, ‘Where were you when you 
heard?’ or ‘Did you know someone?’” Jamie recalled. “They didn’t want that kind of stuff. If 
you have something relevant to contribute; great. But we’re not writing stand-alone stories about 
what the Jets are doing.”  
 Gerard’s background as a reporter was that of a tabloid writer, which had a different 
dynamic than what was common practice at the Times. He explained that at a tabloid, the idea 
was to write every story like it was going to appear on the back page, overtly trying to grab the 
reader’s attention. “There are some incredibly talented people that [write] at the tabloids and I 
have great respect for them, but the Times is a little more sober and sedate about the way we 
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approach sports,” Gerard posited. “It’s a turnoff to a lot of rabid sports fans. It’s the more 
acceptable and impressive way of doing it.”   
 The Times’ sport section had transformed over the decade preceding 9/11 to be in a 
position to produce high quality sporting news. When Lee joined the paper in 1990, the sports 
section was attached to a variety of other sections, essentially existing as a supplemental 
segment. He explained how it was his goal to make the Times’ sports section competitive against 
its counterparts like the Daily News, the New York Post, and Newsday. In order to do that, he 
said, he hired some of the best writers he could recruit to add to the content of the paper. “I hired 
some of the best writers in the city. Harvey Araton from the Daily News, Filip Bondy from the 
Daily News, Bill Pennington from the Oregon Record, reporters from Newsday.” He continued, 
“The goal was to have them compete not only on terms of good writing, but on good reporting 
and good stories, too.”   
 In the fall of 2001, the staff of the New York Times’ sports department was comprised of 
sportswriters that were in the upper echelon of journalists, at least to the opinion of Lee. It had 
also been given its own section in the paper and resources were given to the production of 
quality sports news. Perhaps some of that ability stemmed from the journalists’ aptitude to 
remain consistent in performing their craft and to be self-aware of the importance of their work. 
Charles gave a stirring summation of his position regarding the role of a journalist in times of 
crisis. “This is what you’re trained for and you don’t need some horrible tragedy to reinforce the 
principles of good journalism. You hope that you do that all of the time and in the most prosaic 
moments.” 
 Jamie told the story of a colleague who had been stuck near Ground Zero because law 
enforcement officials were not letting people in and out of the designated zones. Jamie thought 
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the friend had slept in a Brooks Brother’s department store and diligently reported on the tragedy 
from his vantage point. “The reporting was just spectacular, especially when the conditions were 
awful. I just remember the Times just went on autopilot.” Jamie assessed the paper’s ability, 
while resigning that sports was not as important, “I just remember being blown away over the 
quality of the paper. Not in our department, but the overall reporting and how incredible it was. 
People just seemed to know what to do. That’s how amazing those news reporters are.”  
William C. Rhoden gave what he assessed as a journalist’s positionality in disseminating 
the news of the day in a column he wrote shortly after 9/11:  
As journalists, we record the first drafts of history; this is our fate, this is our curse, this is 
our passion. While others run from the flame, we move closer, not out of a sense of 
courage necessarily, but out of a sense of loyalty to the story that often overrides good 
judgment (Rhoden, 2001a, p. C13).  
 The participants in this study clearly saw that to be the case for those journalists that 
engaged in covering 9/11 from a news perspective. There was great respect and admiration given 
to those journalists that risked their personal safety and put themselves in harm’s way so they 
could report on the events. The participants lauded the effort that the Times’ dedicated to 
responding to this tragedy, but they also seemed to understand their role as sportswriters. They 
realized that sport was overwhelmingly trivial in comparison to other events in a time of crisis, 
but there was interest and a need for content. The stories that ensued were thus given due 
diligence by each of these journalists. 
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the coverage of the New York Times’ sports 
section following the tragedies that occurred on September 11, 2001. The Times was widely 
praised for its news coverage during that period (Entman, 2003; Lule, 2002), earning multiple 
Pulitzer Prizes for its “A Nation Challenged” campaign dedicated to the response efforts to 9/11 
(Barringer, 2002). The sports section, which was primarily included in the campaign merely 
because of its presence in the newspaper, provided a unique insight into both sport’s response 
and subsequently sport journalists’ response, to a national tragedy. The theoretical framework 
and methodology of this dissertation were influenced by the concept of framing, which provided 
a structure for how journalists impacted the understanding of events. In order to adequately 
demonstrate insight into this process, a mixed methodology study was performed. A textual 
analysis of the New York Times’ sports section from September 12, 2001 to December 31, 2001, 
as well as, semi-structured interviews with four journalists that contributed content to the Times, 
rendered five frames and immensely useful context to the generation of those frames. The frames 
that emerged were: diminished significance of sport, sport as a distraction, united community 
symbolically moving onward, logistical understanding, and loss of innocence.   
The review of literature highlighted the symbiotic relationship between sport and media, 
the sociological impact of 9/11, and the functional changes that were seen in society after the 
tragedy. The scholarship provided a vocabulary and a perspective derived from findings 
produced in related works. For instance, terms like diversion (Brown, 2004; Chidester, 2009), 
healing (Brown, 2004), symbolism (Butterworth, 2005; Kunreuther, 2002), historical context 
(Kraus, 2003), unity (Bain-Selbo, 2009; Kellner, 2004), and others had appeared in multiple 
publications examined for this dissertation. The presence of this active framework enabled 
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exploration through a studied landscape with the caveat that this particular study could 
potentially render different results due to the magnitude of the tragedy. In essence, some of the 
frames reaffirmed common findings among scholars, while some modified or completely 
diverted from those findings as well. In addition to an exploratory examination of framing of 
9/11, fascinating discoveries were made in employing this type of methodology. This chapter 
will discuss the interplay of the frames that emerged, methodological considerations derived 
from this study, limitations, and practical implications. 
Frames 
  In the 111 days of the “A Nation Challenged” campaign, the New York Times published 
111 sports sections, never missing a day after 9/11. There were 46 journalists that produced at 
least one story for the section and there were more than 1,800 articles published by those 
sportswriters during that period. Topics ranged from Japanese baseball to hunting and fishing in 
rural areas in the Northeast. Nearly 250 of those articles published in the fall of 2001, however, 
discussed, at least in some way, the affects of 9/11. The results of this analysis reflected the 
framing that emerged in those articles that referenced the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11. Additionally, commentary from four of the journalists added to the understanding 
that became a product of the writing.  
The frames individually gave distinction to the perceived realities depicted through the 
New York Times’ sports section that formed following 9/11. Cumulatively, the frames 
contributed to an overall framing, or understanding, of those events as it related to sport. The 
latter was the desired outcome of this dissertation and it ultimately provided a retrospective look 
at what the end-product was of a highly regarded newspapers’ response to crisis. The ensuing is 
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a discussion interpreting the meaning of the aforementioned findings and an attempt to elicit an 
overall understanding of how the interplay impacted perceptions of reality.  
Diminished significance of sport. This frame was among the most prevalent and 
impactful in terms of assessing the role of sport during such a tumultuous time. In many respects, 
the other frames were reliant on this particular frame because of the defined role it gave sport in 
the recovery process. Specifically, the perception of diminished significance of sport directly 
impacted how it could function as a distraction and the dissemination of logistical information. 
The perspective element of the frame was a societal self-reflection of priorities and an overall 
assessment of the importance sport had during a crisis. The overwhelming appraisal was that 
sport played a rather insignificant role when juxtaposed to other aspects of life. Interestingly, this 
was the most divergent frame from the preceding literature’s interpretation of sport in dealing 
with previous tragedies. Perhaps the deviation was complementary to the other noteworthy 
defection, which was that sport could act as a healer (Brown, 2004). Although the diminished 
significance of sport and healing were separate components of the findings, the two were related 
in that the interplay provided context. Meaning, sport could not function as a healer because the 
reality projected was that the magnitude of the tragedy was too severe to have something so 
menial actually heal an entire community. Similarly, a perspective of sport was given because of 
the discourse that persisted admonishing its ability to heal.    
 Another possible explanation for the lack of perspective themes prior to this examination 
was the element of time in terms of the points in history that the examined events occurred. The 
literature used in this dissertation that examined the attacks on Pearl Harbor (Bazer & 
Culbertson, 2001; Crepeau, 1982; Obermeyer, 2010) and the Kennedy Assassination (Chidester, 
2009; King, 1993; Zelizer, 1992), also the two events most frequently referred to comparatively 
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to 9/11 in the Times, were decades removed from the incidents happening. Perhaps the time that 
had elapsed either romanticized sport’s role, or more likely, the authors did not have a point of 
reference to address its role. It was at times difficult to have the journalists recall their feelings 
about 9/11 retrospectively and that time-span was much shorter.  
 The importance of this frame was its ability to add context and scope to the function of 
sport. Charles Young’s story about Port Sulphur, La. put into context the overall feeling of sport 
from the Times’ perspective in that it was easy to both trivialize and overemphasize its role in 
response to tragedy. Instead it was clear that the journalists took a measured approach in 
addressing the topic, while still attaching some meaning to the games that were played. For 
instance, Charles had mentioned in his anecdotes about football in Port Sulphur and the Yankees 
in the World Series that in both scenarios sport demonstrated that they could go on, which in part 
helped the community go on. He did not say they created a sense that everything was ok or that 
the games dissolved the tribulations of life, he just said that they helped. The diminished 
significance of sport frame was defined by this calculated approach and was highlighted by the 
portrayals of heroism, the debate over appropriateness of playing, and the idea of normalcy.  
 Hero. The loss of nearly 3,000 lives over the course of just a couple of hours was a stark 
reminder of how vulnerable America was to this type of attack. Separate investigations by Aust 
et al. (2002) and The 9/11 Commission (2004) revealed detailed accounts of what transpired that 
day, not only providing perspective of the timeline of the events, but also an account of many 
acts of courage and sacrifice. The reports disclosed the gallant efforts of the passengers of Flight 
93 who attempted to regain control of the hijacked flight that ultimately crashed in Pennsylvania. 
They also gave specific details of those first responders that rushed into two burning skyscrapers, 
only to have lost their lives in an attempt to save others. Similarly, the reports detailed the heroic 
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rescue efforts at the Pentagon in Washington. The outcome of these accounts and many others 
given over time were a clear portrayal of heroism. Hundreds of people, both professionals and 
volunteers, selflessly gave their lives in order to help save the lives of others, most of whom they 
did not know. That perspective gave contrast to the oft-referred heroic acts of athletes prior to 
9/11 that merely stemmed from tremendous athletic fetes. 
 Although media has evolved from the Golden Age of Sport when sportswriters like 
Grantland Rice would idealize athletes and athletic prowess (Hardin & Zuegner, 2003; Inabinett, 
1994), it was still commonplace to inflate accomplishments in sport. Part of that practice was a 
result of sport’s propensity for hyperbole. Another aspect, was the displaced importance given to 
sport in society. Anker (2005) described melodrama as a good versus evil storyline demonstrated 
in overdramatized and grandiose fashion. That definition certainly encapsulated sport prior to, 
and eventually after, 9/11. The important takeaway was not the change in practice with regards 
to journalists portraying athletes as heroes, it was the understanding that September 11 provided 
a definitive contrast to what the term means.  
 Gerard Steven’s introspective view of how to write his story about the Derek Jeter flip 
play in Oakland exemplifies this dynamic. That moment has become one of the most iconic plays 
in MLB playoff history. Gerard had a sense of its significance even when it happened and he had 
a feeling, if Jeter had not made that play, the course of the playoffs would have likely been much 
different for the Yankees. However, the backdrop of 512 first responders perishing in the worst 
attack on American soil since the American Civil War just a month prior put the tone of an 
article about a baseball game in perspective (Averill, 2005). As a sportswriter, that play and that 
distinction were notably important in delineating the definition of hero and ultimately providing 
a perspective of sport.  
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Chidester (2009) used the term re-heroicization to describe the newly adjusted 
positioning of sport heroes in society. The sport heroes, who were humanized by reacting to 
9/11, could use their status and stature to bring positive attention to the actual heroes of 
September 11, thus maintaining a heroic role in society. The findings of this study affirmed that 
athletes’ visibility could assist in many efforts dedicated to the recovery. However, the assertion 
that athletes maintained a status as heroes is debatable. The responses from the participants 
certainly render a contention that that was not the case. Not only did Jamie and Gerard assert that 
9/11 was not a sport story, they also acknowledged that glorifying athletes as heroes was not 
appropriate after experiencing what true heroism was. The effect of which ultimately has little to 
do with whether athletes should be considered heroes and more to do with where the priorities of 
sport should lie in society.  
Appropriateness of playing and normalcy. The interaction between these two themes 
provided and insightful depiction of the relevance of sport. September 11 was unique in that 
sport almost universally went on hiatus following the attacks. There was, however, vacillating 
and debate over whether that was the appropriate response. Some of the journalists wrote of 
subjects that wanted to play or of their own opinion that the games should go on. Other 
sportswriters disputed that sentiment in either an op-ed or through the protagonists in their 
articles. The conflict distinguished this particular reaction from those other events that 9/11 was 
often compared with. Previously it was thought that sport must go on even in defiance of 
conflict. Normalcy was a cornerstone in those decisions, because sport was a routine and a mode 
of distraction (Brown, 2004). The distinctiveness of 9/11 was that despite the collective feeling 
that sport would offer an outlet for normalcy, it was still inappropriate to play. That relationship 
highlighted the significance of this event. 
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Publishing the differences of opinion and eventual agreement over the decision to cancel 
being correct was indicative of the tone of the newspaper. As Woodward (1949) asserted about 
newspapers, it was a medium conducive to settling disputes. There was a finality to the 
appropriateness discussion once the leagues postponed the games. William C. Rhoden and others 
that had voiced their opinion that the games should be played did not write any articles disputing 
the decision that opposed their view. In fact, many journalists and athletes openly applauded the 
decision and called it appropriate. That finding speaks to the leadership that was present at the 
newspaper and the importance of a singular voice in a time of crisis.   
United community symbolically moving onward. It was argued that the Twin Towers 
and the Pentagon were American symbols of Westernization and imperialist power, ideals that 
the terrorist that executed the attacks despised (Anker, 2005). Sport’s response to these acts of 
violence, in many cases, incorporated acts of symbolism. The Mets and Yankees wearing hats 
with the “FDNY” and “NYPD” insignias for the remainder of the season, a patch of the 
American flag attached to MLB and NFL uniforms, patriotic songs and recognition during games 
were all symbols used in sport’s response. The Times commented on many of those gestures and 
even drew parallels through symbolism in their own right. For instance, Tyler Kepner’s story of 
the Mets uniting as a team for a final playoff push was symbolic of New Yorkers banding 
together to overcome tragedy. The literature supported the use of sport and sport venues as 
symbols of Westernization (Kunreuther, 2002), an outlet that was not lost on the sportswriters of 
the Times. 
Sport was conducive to symbolism simply because of its visual nature and its 
pervasiveness in society. Yankee Stadium became a cathedral filled with people that were not 
there for a baseball game, but a prayer service. Madison Square Garden halted a hockey game so 
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the patrons could watch President Bush address the country. The band U-2 sang in tribute to the 
victims of 9/11 on the floor of the Super Bowl. Sport inhabited some of the most visible and 
notable ceremonies in response to 9/11 (Butterworth, 2005). The parameters of this frame were 
the most closely aligned with the assertions made in many of the previous studies. The 
uniqueness and relative brevity of time removed from a historical event such as this allowed the 
practical portrayals of symbolism to shape an understanding of how the use of symbols 
contributed to the coverage of a crisis. The importance of this frame was not only the existence 
of symbolism but the prevalence, both subtle and explicit.  
The understated symbols were the things like Roger Clemens receiving phone calls 
reminding him that he represented New York or Lee Lipari keeping the book “Portraits” in a 
special place in his living room. For Lee, more than a decade later, the book still had great 
meaning to him and it was undoubtedly symbolic of those tragic events. The more grandiose 
symbols like playing “God Bless America” at the seventh-inning-stretch of every baseball game 
were also central to this frame. The song “God Bless America” was still played during every 
seventh inning at Yankee Stadium more than a decade later, just like the “Star-Spangled Banner” 
was played before games after World War II, moments of silence were held in games following 
the assassination of President Kennedy, and flags were flown half-staff in Munich in 1972 
(Brown, 2004).    
A byproduct of the aforementioned symbolism was a sense of unity that was fundamental 
to this frame. The overwhelming roles symbols assumed were derivatives of ceremonies and 
tributes performed at sporting events. The communal environment of thousands of people 
congregated together enhanced the impact of the symbols and provided powerful messages for 
those who engaged in the ceremonies. The story of Joanna Glick, the ice skater whose brother 
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had died on Flight 93, exemplified this exceedingly humanized moment. The illustration given 
by writer Amy Rosewater was that of a girl generating tremendous support from her peers and 
fans in tribute to her brother. This public display of support was symbolic of how sport could 
unite and, in this case, represent a gift from a daughter to her parents.   
Nationalism. Unity, as a theme contributing to the formation of the united community 
symbolically moving onward frame, was entrenched in the ideas that a large population of 
people would coalesce behind a central idea. One of the most prevalent topics that seemed to 
unite was nationalism. There was no more poignant demonstration of nationalism than President 
Bush throwing out the ceremonial first pitch during Game 3 of the World Series at Yankees 
Stadium. The discourse of the first sitting president to throw a first pitch in a World Series in 
almost 50 years was wrought with symbolism. Yankee Stadium, just miles from Ground Zero 
and the home of one of the most storied professional franchises in sport, was the centerpiece of 
that moment. The articles implied that it was safe to watch a baseball game or think about 
something other than tragedy; the terrorists had not defeated America’s spirit. The “moxie” and 
confidence with which President Bush “sauntered” out to the mound was precisely the message 
the government wanted to deliver. The pitch itself, a proclaimed strike, was emblematic of 
triumph and victory; staples of the government’s message once the United States engaged in war 
(Belasco, 2006). The chants of “USA! USA!” were evidence that the symbolism had worked.  
Butterworth (2005) and Chidester (2009) further investigated the presence and 
subsequent dynamic of infusing nationalism into an outlet like baseball. Both scholars argued 
that baseball, symbolic of purity as positioned in the lexicon of American culture, had acted as a 
venue for government to propagate and gain support for policy. The New York Times did not 
address any government directives specifically during this time other than sport potentially 
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assisting in healing the country. However, the summation of symbolic acts like President Bush 
throwing out the first pitch and Mayor Giuliani reassuring retribution for the attacks did seem to 
collectively elevate a sense of nationalism. The heightened sense of patriotism would reaffirm 
the notion that sport was a useful platform for garnering support for military action in the long-
term (Butterworth, 2005; Chidester, 2009). 
Nationalism was grouped under the symbolic frame and unity theme for two primary 
reasons. First, the understanding gained from the incorporation of nationalism was almost purely 
symbolic. The contributions to the frame were mostly references to the national anthem, armed 
service color guards, or  mentioning patriotic practices like singing “God Bless America” or 
“America the Beautiful.” Even Wayne Chrebet stating that he would never take being an 
American for granted was symbolic of the feelings people had about national pride. Secondly, 
the projection of nationalism was predominantly delivered with an underlying reliance on the 
unification of the country. For example, Mark Grace’s comments referred to the collective, or 
“we” voice when referring to America’s resolve.  
The understanding that resulted in the united community symbolically moving onward 
frame was that sport, or at least the symbols present at sporting events, generated a powerful 
response from the audience. Journalists, who were members of that audience, regularly included 
symbolism in their writing. Similar to the assertions that Nadelhaft (2004) made of sport and war 
during the Gulf War, metaphor and symbolism were naturally complements due to their visual 
nature. The consequence of this landscape was a reliance on symbolism to carry specific 
messages, not too dissimilar to those efforts originally made by the terrorists. The aim and 
message, however, were strikingly different.  
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Sport as a distraction. The diminished significance of sport frame prioritized and 
positioned sport’s role in society. Meaning, the Times’ highlighted the importance, or lack 
thereof, of sporting events in relation to the reality of tragedy. The sport as a distraction frame 
distinguished how sport should function given that it did in fact have a role. An examination of 
the contributing themes helped differentiate the two frames further, specifically normalcy and 
healing. The premise of sport recreating a setting of normalcy dealt with routines and functions 
of life that were relatively unaffected by 9/11. Healing, conversely, was a continual 
acknowledgement of the hurt that existed in society and sport’s attempt to repair that adversity. 
Furthermore, the diversion theme, which ultimately rendered a suitable description of distraction, 
was a treatment for the country. In other words, the diminished significance of sport frame 
diagnosed sport’s role and the distraction frame prescribed the proper response of sport. The 
contrast, although seemingly subtle, was actually significant yet complementary.  
According to Bauder (2012), September 11 was the most watched media event in the last 
50 years. Kellner (2004) referred to it as a “media spectacle,” which referred to the uninterrupted 
three days of constant television news or months of newspaper coverage stemming from the 
attacks. The league commissioners and university presidents had made a decision not to play 
scheduled games immediately after the terrorist attacks. In addition to the lack of sporting events, 
entertainment outlets, businesses, and other mundane, yet important pastimes, widely stopped 
after 9/11. The country’s undivided attention was squarely on Lower Manhattan, western 
Pennsylvania, and the outskirts of Washington, as well as the unfamiliar Middle East. There was 
an eventual need for sport to return if not for any other reason than for something else to do.  
Healing. The counterpoint that Jamie Springstead made stating that sport in no way could 
function as a healer, was both notable and surprising. Each participant adamantly objected to the 
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theology that sport was in any way going to heal the country following the attacks. That 
argument seemed counterintuitive to the previous literature examined during the literature 
review, which explicitly stated that healing had been a function sport in relation to tragedy 
(Bernstein, Gavant & Greenberg, 2004; Brown, 2004; Coakley, 2009). However, the contention 
that sport could not and would not serve as a healer may be rooted in the phrasing of the 
question. The respondents were asked if they thought sport had helped heal the country from 
previous tragedies and if that had likewise been a role during 9/11. The crux of the question 
focused primarily on sport as the healing agent rather than part of a larger healing process. 
Perhaps if the question was amended and asked if sport contributed in any way to the healing 
process, that would have rendered different responses.  
As it were, though, the findings are interesting for a couple of reasons. First, both MLB 
and the NFL had stated explicitly that they were going to help the country heal by resuming play. 
They specifically used the word “heal” in their statements. Secondly, the steadfastness with 
which the participants had maintained healing was not a component of the healing process 
implied tension between the sport organizations and the news-gathering companies. The 
differences in opinion may shed light on the diminished significance of sport and sport as a 
distraction frames. It would be understandable for sport organizations to have a heightened 
esteem for their own sport and sporting events with regards to the role they played in the 
recovery. Perhaps, the journalists saw a need to temper that self-valuation and put it in context, 
employing the perspective of sport frame. Further, it was apparent that the organizations and 
their athletes believed that they would contribute to the healing process of the country. Once 
again, the journalists could have moderated that sentiment by downgrading the act of healing to 
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that of distraction. In essence, the sportswriters were playing the role of watchdog, one that has 
traditionally been a function of the occupation.  
A second possibility was that the descriptors of what role sport would play upon its return 
were ambiguous. There was little question that the country needed to heal from the tragedies, but 
what did that mean and how could that be accomplished? One of the greatest challenges 
September 11 presented was its unprecedented nature. The attack on Pearl Harbor certainly drew 
necessary comparisons, but the two events were vastly different. There was no blueprint to 
describe how to begin the healing process. It was suggested that people go back to their routines, 
and for the most part they did (Butterworth, 2005; Chidester, 2009). There were events held to 
commemorate and unite masses of people, which helped also (Brown, 2004). There was a need 
for distraction, which meant doing something other than focusing on tragedy. Sport could do 
that. Sport as a healer, however, was not a possibility. More likely, sport as a distraction added to 
passing the time and, realistically, time was the only thing that could heal the country.   
Logistical understanding. The logistical understanding frame was the most established 
frame because it dealt with the who, what, where, why, when, and how of the sports pages, 
principle tenants of journalism (Carey, 2002). The impact of September 11 had long-standing 
logistical affects. Immediately, all major sports were canceled. The original shift and uncertainty 
over security and other issues affected events scheduled for later on in the year as well. The New 
York City Marathon, the Ryder Cup, the USTA’s defense of the Fed Cup, the World Series, the 
NFL playoffs and Super Bowl all had considerations to make because of 9/11. This frame 
detailed the specifics of the decisions made about holding those events. Contributing to the 
formation of this frame were themes describing the decision-makers involved, the historical 
context as a backdrop, and the changes made post-9/11 specifically as they related to security.  
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The articles written immediately after the attacks had the most influence on this frame 
simply because that was the period that most of the scheduling was in flux and uncertainty was at 
its peak. Commissioners and other decision-makers would regularly have comments or appear as 
the subjects in many of articles written the days following. MLB Commissioner Bud Selig and 
NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue, specifically, were written about extensively in those ensuing 
days. Both men would answer the “who” and their sports would represent the “what” from the 
series of questions before, which were simple to ascertain. The where, when, why, and how, 
however, were much more difficult to determine for both the decision-makers and the journalists.  
Sport had continued immediately following the national tragedies that 9/11 has been 
compared to throughout this dissertation. In the case of the Munich Olympics, the games actually 
went on even during the standoff (Reeve, 2000; Schiller & Young, 2010). Three decades prior, a 
precedent had been set by Major League Baseball resuming its season in the spring of 1942 
despite escalating tensions in both Europe and the Pacific that eventually led to the Unites States’ 
involvement in World War II (Brown, 2004). Roosevelt’s Green Light Letter to MLB 
Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis was referenced in several of the articles involving the 
logistics of canceling games after 9/11. The letter served as a benchmark in many of the previous 
tragedies for how and why the games should continue. The attacks of 9/11 had occurred on 
American soil in two of the biggest cities in the United States, which is not meant to trivialize the 
attacks on Pearl Harbor or any of the impact of WWII, but to put it in logistical perspective. 
September 11 played out in the center of plain view of millions of Americans in places many 
were extremely familiar with.   
The most comparable logistical event among the tragedies that have been mentioned was 
the assassination of President Kennedy. Kennedy died on a Friday and the NFL decided to play 
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its regularly scheduled games two days later on that Sunday. Commissioner Pete Rozelle was 
publicly criticized for playing the games so soon after the shooting and admitted later it was the 
biggest regret of his career (King, 1993; Zelizer, 1992). That event occurred in Dallas, Tx., 
squarely in the middle of the continental United States. The MLB season after the attacks on 
Pearl Harbor (Crepeau, 1982), the Olympic Games in Munich (Schiller & Young, 2010), and the 
Super Bowl during the Gulf War (Kooijman, 2005), were crisis events that happened in places 
distant from the main part of the country. The attacks of September 11, like the Kennedy 
Assassination and natural disaster events like the 1989 earthquake during the World Series or 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, impacted people in a tangible and immediate way. A conclusion may 
be drawn that domestic crisis situations add an increased demand, or at least production, of 
logistical framing simply because of the impact to local communities.  
The distinctiveness of September 11 delineated by the elements just discussed made the 
logistical understanding frame an intriguing finding. First, it demonstrated the massive 
undertaking it took from the decision-makers to navigate the challenges of rescheduling major 
sporting events. Secondly, because 9/11 was unprecedented in magnitude and positioning, it 
introduced a reaction that was unlike the other comparable events mentioned thus far. The most 
notable distinction from a logistical standpoint was the explicit descriptions of the enhanced 
security measures.  
Increased Security. As Jamie mentioned of her trip to Super Bowl XXXV in New 
Orleans, it was an intently watched event from a security standpoint, much more so than years 
past. That aspect of logistics was not unusual to sport. Super Bowl XXV in Tampa, for example, 
during the Gulf War had seen a tremendous increase in security due to the engagement with 
enemies from the Middle East (Le Billona & El Khatibb, 2004). After 9/11, sport was not the 
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only institution impacted, either. Airports, train stations, power plants had all been thought of as 
viable targets and the response was to improve the security protection for each. The major 
change after 9/11 appeared to be the visibility and extent to which the security measures were 
implemented. Mike Freeman and Murray Chass both wrote about the “stringent” changes that 
were to be expected in the NFL and MLB, but Edward Wong’s quote was the most impactful, 
comparing football stadiums to “minimum security prisons.”  
The security was a huge logistical task and it would change many of the routines people 
were comfortable with pre-9/11. Especially in those first days back, fans were not allowed to 
watch batting practice around the outfield walls, there were bag-checkers at each entrance gate, 
the number of uniformed and non-uniformed security personnel was increased, were all facets 
that changed the game-day experience. Again, there was little ambiguity about the writing at that 
time. The logistical understanding frame, specifically the security theme, seemed to acclimate 
and transition sport fans to these sizeable changes. It did, however, complement the loss of 
innocence frame. 
Loss of innocence. The primary difference between the logistics and loss of innocence 
frames was the latter dealt with referenced discrepancies between sport pre-9/11 and post-9/11 
that was expressed with a longing for the past caused by the terrorist attacks. Essentially, the pre-
9/11 period represented a time that was pure and unobstructed by threats of terrorism; while the 
post-9/11 era was wrought was nervousness and change. That defining point was, as Gerard said, 
the minute the second plane crashed into the South Tower. At that moment country knew that 
9/11 was a deliberate attack.  
One fascinating outcome of these findings was the implication that pre-9/11 was pure. As 
Kraus (2004) pointed out, baseball, especially, was encountering a rather tumultuous time in its 
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history with suspected steroid abuse, attendance and labor issues, and talk of contracting teams. 
Perhaps the differences between pre- and post-9/11 were so stark that the negative prior to the 
attacks paled in comparison to the negatives after the attacks. Meaning, Americans reflected on 
what was happening after the attacks and thought those issues before were no longer significant 
and worthy of disregard. Another possibility was the issues prior to the attacks were 
overshadowed by 9/11, similar to the economic downturn that was wrongfully deemed a result of 
the terrorist attacks. The economy was concurrently declining at the time of the attacks. The 
recession was actually an effect of the Federal Reserve tightening credit and a result of large-
scale job losses from a year prior, but most blamed the aftermath of the attacks (Makinen, 2002). 
Likewise, baseball’s issues were prevalent before 9/11, but once the attacks occurred they were 
overshadowed by the new realities of society. Regardless, there was certainly a reference to 
purity that was consistent to the period of time prior to September 11. 
Another interesting result from this frame was the insinuation that the loss of innocence 
was both downbeat and long-lasting. The title of the frame implied a feeling of melancholy and 
the severity of the tragedies did assume a naturally depressed undertone. There was a widespread 
feeling that things would never be the same. However, there was also a projection of 
hopelessness that seemed almost inexhaustible. This aspect of the frame has parallels to some of 
the previous assertions made in this dissertation. Specifically, scholars had predicted that 9/11 
would change the culture of journalism, reverting back to more pure and accurate practices 
(Zelizer & Allan, 2002). Those same scholars had reflected back on their claims a decade later 
and realized they were moderately overzealous in those assumptions (Zelizer & Allan, 2011). 
Journalism regressed back to its traditional habits. Similarly, sport changed after 9/11 and many 
of those alterations were highlighted in the loss of innocence frame. However, the longevity of 
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the changes in sport had not occurred as some had forecasted. Military planes stopped appearing 
in the New York City sky, security at ballparks was no longer as overwhelming as it was after 
9/11, the fear subsided, and eventually the games resembled their pre-9/11 versions. 
The aspect that resonated the most from the loss of innocence frame was the 
understanding that an attack like this could occur and what the consequences are when it does 
happen. Having sport on the television every night of the week was again a luxury enjoyed in 
America. Going to a baseball game with a glove and hoping to catch a fly ball during batting 
practice returned as a privilege. Not having to worry about boarding a jetliner and flying across 
the country safely was once again a normal part of life. However, there remains a memory of 
when the games stopped or when they returned how they changed. And there certainly is a visual 
of a large jetliners flying into skyscrapers or the burning remains of two crashes in Pennsylvania 
and Washington, which act as reminders of that loss of innocence.   
Sociological and Psychological Implications 
 An implied aspect of the logistical understanding frame, as well as parts of the other 
frames, was that it seemed as if it was never a question that sport was going to return. The 
findings of this dissertation indicated that sport was going to have a revised role in society, a 
heightened awareness of terror, and other modifications stemming from the tragic events, but it 
would no doubt return. Cumulatively, these processes were a result of a communal reassessment 
and definition of sport. The perception of the journalists and the subsequent understanding 
derived from readers, however, had significant sociological and psychological implications.  
 The most considerable amendment to the collective mindset was the loss of public trust. 
The people who were in the World Trade Center, Pentagon, or any of the four airplanes on 9/11 
were participating in mundane activities of everyday life prior to the hijackings. They were 
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simply going to work or traveling on an ordinary Tuesday in September. It was implicit that the 
organizations tasked with sustaining public safety were going to do so successfully in all facets 
of life. Of course that did not happen on 9/11. The result was an extensive violation of public 
trust for institutions normally seen as relatively safe and secure. The impact of that altered 
feeling was a tentative reengagement of outlets that were previously overtly embraced. People 
did not know if going to a Yankee game made them more vulnerable to a fate similar to those 
who perished on 9/11. That was an uncomfortable feeling for many and it would have long-
standing affects on the sport industry. 
 Similarly, the journalists’ projection of the loss of innocence could be compared with the 
nostalgic elements of sport fandom. The removal in both time and memory from certain aspects 
of an event can blur the specifics, inciting a more romanticized version of actual occurrences. As 
the events of 9/11 unfolded and the delineation between pre- and post-9/11 became more 
pronounced, a longing for the idealized times before tragedy was heightened. The new reality 
brought about fear, which was rarely part of sport prior to the terrorist attacks. That reticence, 
which could sometimes be seen in anger as well, was extremely impactful to those fans that were 
part of the response to 9/11. The implications of those feelings could be seen as positives or 
negatives. As Brown (2004) argued, engaging in sport helped in the healing process as the 
country moved forward. Butterworth (2005), conversely, attributed some of those sensitivities to 
an unbalanced need for militaristic response. 
 The timeframe examined in this dissertation spanned over three months after the terrorist 
attacks. In that short period, there was a complete overhaul in the way that sport was covered and 
consumed by the public. However, as time continued to pass and the country adapted to the 
procedural modifications, new routines were formed. The shifts in sociological and 
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psychological practices gave way to an understanding of a new reality in the United States. The 
long-lasting effects were entrenched in self-awareness and understanding. The terrorist attacks 
were unlike any other warlike event in United States’ history, which stimulated unrealized 
sociological and psychological responses. Revised patterns and behaviors paired with feelings of 
fear, anger, and vulnerability had become the reality of society. The subsequent outcome was a 
societal reprioritization of its institutions and an awareness moving forward; both longstanding 
results that benefited the public as a result of 9/11.   
Methodological Considerations 
 Framing analysis enables a researcher the ability to examine the construction of a 
meaning (Zaharopoulos, 2007). D’Angelo’s (2002) demarcation of the three paradigmatic 
outlooks to framing analyses brought viable questions to which outlook would be most 
appropriate for this examination. The constructionist outlook was chosen for two reasons. First, 
the co-optation process of the constructionist outlook, which asserts that the construction of the 
frame is an integrative process merging the event, the consumer, and the journalist, met the 
objectives of this line of research. The critical and cognitivist approaches overemphasized the 
journalists’ role in the response (critical) or removed the journalist altogether (cognitivist). The 
constructionist outlook, conversely, held that the journalist, audience, and the event were equally 
responsible for the emergence of frames (D’Angelo, 2002). Secondly, the constructivist outlook 
in an exploratory analysis such as this rendered itself useful by discerning the framing of such a 
unique event.  
 This dissertation aimed to continue to employ the practices of the scholars mentioned 
previously (Chidester, 2009; Entman, 2003; Hardin & Whiteside, 2010a; Lule, 2002; 
Zaharopoulos, 2007). These researchers not only incorporated documentation into their studies, 
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but they specifically examined the New York Times in some capacity. The use of the Times was 
justifiable because of the publication’s reach and standard, which is among the mostly highly 
regarded in the United States (Lule, 2002). In addition, this dissertation also used interviews 
from the journalists themselves to enhance the data from this framing analysis. The interview 
data were supplemental, but provided an introspective view into the assessment of September 11 
and greater detail about how the frames were generated from the journalists’ standpoint. The 
integration of textual analysis and interviews offered an exclusive perspective in the process of 
framing.   
 Documents. The textual analysis performed in this dissertation incorporated the practices 
highlighted by Zaharopoulos (2007) and Baptiste (2001). Zaharopoulos’ work was especially 
influential in guiding the manner in which the documents were organized, while Baptiste’s 
methods helped in coding the documents. The end result was an examination of more than 1,800 
articles written by 46 journalists that produced five frames and ten contributing themes.  
 Procedurally, the articles that were printed in the Times that were supplied by the 
Associated Press, Bloomberg News, and other third-party news organizations were removed 
from the analysis. Although managing editors could certainly select the stories that they used in 
the Times, there was no opportunity for directives from the editors themselves regarding the 
content. The majority of those stories appeared in the later sections of the newspapers and 
typically gave a recap of a game. However, the stories that referenced 9/11were removed as well 
to maintain uniformity throughout the analysis.  
This decision not to use the third party articles was one of the more challenging during 
the research process. The Associated Press, especially, was a highly regarded news source and 
some of the content produced would have contributed greatly to the framing analysis. Ultimately, 
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the factor that mainly influenced the choice not to incorporate those articles was that the aim of 
this project was to examine the New York Times’ response, more specifically those that were in 
New York and experienced writing under adverse conditions. A fundamental component behind 
the constructionist outlook was not only the equality given to the journalist, the event, and the 
consumer, but the cultural implications as well (D’Angelo, 2002). Each participant discussed 
how they watched the World Trade Center burn and then crumble. They lived through military 
jets and helicopters filling the New York City sky. Charles and Jamie actually visited the sites, 
either on individual assignment or with a team. Those experiences would not have influenced the 
writing of a third party writer like it did the journalists at the Times.  
Another methodological consideration with regard to documentation was how to 
negotiate the articles that did not reference the September 11 attacks. From September 12 to the 
beginning of October, almost every article published in the Times referenced 9/11 in some 
capacity. There were still numerous articles after the first month of the examination, but the 
frequency dropped noticeably. Each article was read thoroughly so that those that even implied a 
reference to the attack were included. For example, if an article discussed the uneasiness felt at a 
game because of “recent events,” that was considered a unit of analysis. The crux of this 
examination was the Times’ response to crisis thus the articles that did not allude to 9/11 in any 
way were not used in this examination. 
Finally, there was much consideration given to the order in which the documents were 
reviewed and the interviews were conducted. The order was important because of the 
opportunity for the findings of one to influence the results of the other. In other words, if the 
interviews were conducted prior to the textual analysis, the findings may have suggested a 
predisposition to particular ideas or frames. Similarly, if the frames from the documentation were 
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evident, they may have influenced the questioning, which would have skewed some of the 
findings. For the purposes of this study, the documents were analyzed first and then the 
interviews were conducted. This ordering seemed logical for two primary reasons. First, the 
interviews were viewed as supplemental data in order to reinforce the findings from the 
documents, essentially giving context to the findings. Secondly, the IRB approval form (see 
Appendix A) required a predetermined interview protocol, which organized the line of 
questioning for the interviews. Although the interviews were semi-structured, the conversations 
were handled uniformly and adhered closely to the protocol that was set out before the textual 
analysis began.  
The textual analysis portion of this dissertation rendered a substantial amount of data and 
the findings were closely aligned with the results of the interview data. Again, the data from the 
interviews were viewed as substantive, but complementary in relation to the framing of 9/11. 
 Interviews. Four journalists from the New York Times were interviewed for this 
dissertation. Their identities were kept anonymous in order to protect them from any personal or 
professional retribution that may stem from participating in this study. Each participant had been 
working in or around New York City at the time of the attacks and was impacted from that 
experience. The job responsibilities of the four journalists were two columnists, a reporter, and 
an editor, although most had functioned in multiple roles during their tenure at the paper. The 
interview data was invaluable to this process because it provided a perspective of the events, 
unique insight from a studied population, and a descriptive backdrop to the day-to-day operations 
at the newspaper (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). The information gathered was immeasurably helpful, 
but there were necessary considerations made to optimize this data. 
151 
 
 First, the line of questions was predetermined and highlighted in the interview protocol as 
mentioned before. A consideration was made to attempt to have the journalists analyze specific 
articles in order to, not only crosscheck the perceived frame in the story, but to gain perspective 
of the overall construction process. In effect, have the journalist recall the thought process behind 
choosing particular angles and frames. However, this would have made consistent questioning 
nearly impossible and the aim of the project was much larger than a couple of articles. Framing, 
as it was employed in this analysis, was the culmination of a continual body of work, an 
understanding of 9/11 through days and months of reporting. A handful of articles would not 
produce those results. Additionally, having the journalists reengage the articles 11 years after 
they had written them may have misguided the larger scope of the analysis. The decision to omit 
examining specific articles allowed for the participants to speak unambiguously about topics they 
recalled. 
 The other major consideration regarding the use of interviews was the time that had 
passed between when the interviews took place and the fall of 2001. The participants were asked 
to reflect on experiences that occurred more than a decade prior, which limited some detail in 
their responses. The extent that this portion of the process limited the overall study is listed in the 
“Limitations” section of this dissertation. However, from a consideration standpoint, the time 
that elapsed was reconciled with the fact that September 11 was such a remarkable event that the 
memories from that time were more likely comprehensible than other times in their careers. 
Further, the interviews took place one year after the ten-year anniversary of 9/11, which was 
widely commemorated in the media. Most of the participants acknowledged they had been asked 
to reflect on 9/11 because of the anniversary, which made their recollection of events at least 
marginally more clear. Finally, the objective was to gain perspective about major components of 
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the response to tragedy. The interviews were viewed as context provided for the data derived 
from the textual analysis. It appeared that the interviewees had little trouble recalling the major 
themes of that time, even giving detailed responses when possible. 
 The interviews during this research produced satisfactory findings, which contributed to 
the results of this research. Each participant was given a transcript of the findings and had an 
opportunity to amend their responses. They declined.  
Limitations 
 There were limitations to the scope of this dissertation. The events of September 11 had 
occurred more than 11 years prior to the interviews that were conducted with the participants. 
Their responses were thusly given retrospectively, limiting some of the detail in their recollection 
of the events following 9/11. For instance, each participant was asked if there were specific 
directives given to them by the managing editorial staff through work correspondence. Most of 
the participants remembered having discussions with managers, but did not recall the specific 
details of what those correspondences were. There was a significant amount of useful data 
derived from the interviews, but there were some nuances that remained absent because of the 
retrospective element associated with this examination.  
 Additionally, the perspective was gained from journalists and a newspaper based out of 
New York City, a location central to these incidents, which impacted the generalizability. The 
New York Times was selected because of its stature among news publications and location to the 
attacks. However, the findings demonstrated the reaction to a national tragedy from a newspaper 
that had a predisposition to international and national stories. The findings were invaluable in 
contributing to the understanding of reporting crisis from a large-scale news source, but they 
could not be generalized to newspaper practices throughout the country. In part, that was a result 
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of the teams and sports the Times generally covered, but it also had implications stemming from 
the audience. A newspaper based in northern California or a small town in Missouri, for 
example, would most likely not have generated the same findings. In fact, a framing analysis 
from the Washington Post or the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette could have even rendered different 
results due to their proximities and relations to the events.  
 Lastly, although the journalists that participated in this study were centrally located in or 
close to New York, their schedules were not conducive to face-to-face interviews. Instead, each 
interview was conducted over the telephone, which limited some of the visual and non-verbal 
components of the interview process. There was no noticeable effect seen on the interviews as 
the participants seemed comfortable interacting via this method. As Carr and Worth (2001) 
noted, telephone interviews are a viable replacement for face-to-face interviews, but there may 
have been potential unseen drawbacks to collecting data using this method.   
Implications 
 There are three major stakeholder groups that the implications of this study directly 
impact: sport administrators, journalists, and the audience. During the course of writing this 
dissertation there was a mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut, another 
shooting in a movie theater in Colorado, Superstorm Sandy, and Kansas City Chiefs’ player 
Javon Belcher’s suicide, all incidents that received national attention. Some were related to sport 
and other had little relation at all. In each instance, however, sport administrators, journalists, 
and readers each were impacted by the events in ways similar to those experienced on 9/11.  
 The sport administrators tasked with handling the response to September 11 were widely 
applauded for their efforts. Bud Selig, Paul Tagliabue, NASCAR, the PGA, and NCAA 
conference commissioners each acted swiftly and resolutely following the attacks. There were 
154 
 
two important steps that each administrator took that significantly helped the response. First, 
they assessed the magnitude of the situation completely and thoroughly in order to make an 
appropriate decision on whether to play the games shortly after the attacks. There were several 
stories about Selig and Tagliabue, specifically, agonizing over whether or not to play. Both men 
seemed to seek consultation and carefully weigh all the options, despite a limited amount of 
precedence and a moderate base of opposing sides. Communication was the second aspect of the 
response that was done well. The aforementioned administrators commented in the Times and 
other news outlets to make sure the public was aware of the process. The information was 
important for logistical considerations, of course, but more importantly it demonstrated that they 
were taking painstaking effort to do the right thing and inform the public. By giving the decision 
its due-diligence, the administrators demonstrated a humanized perception of sport. 
 In addition, the administrators did not trivialize the attacks by overt spectacles or self-
serving ceremony upon returning to play. The journalists at the New York Times seemed to assess 
most of the ceremonies as appropriate and respectful. There was never an indication that the 
Mets, Yankees, Jets, or Giants were interested in boosting attendance by associating the games 
with commemorative ceremonies. The league commissioners were predominantly the 
administrators publicly commended for the response, but there was no evidence written or 
spoken that the journalists had any issue with the events. That included the previously mentioned 
preseason hockey game at Madison Square Garden that was cancelled after two periods because 
the crowd had indicated it wanted to watch President Bush’s speech on the Jumbotron instead of 
the game. 
 For their part, the journalists at the Times demonstrated a proper restraint and context in 
their writing. Again, similar to the administrators involved, they did not trivialize the tragedy by 
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writing stories of grandiose athletic achievement or overemphasize the sporting events. In fact, 
the participants all stated in some way that 9/11 was in no way a sport story and that it should be 
avoided unless it was necessary to write about. The important take away from that sentiment was 
not that sports do not matter, but that sports should be written about and received within context. 
As Lee had mentioned, the Times’ writers were excellent at separating sport and tragedy. 
 Javon Belcher’s suicide outside of Arrowhead Stadium in Kansas City, Mo. on December 
1, 2012, was an example of sensationalism and an overestimation of sport’s impact. The Chiefs 
decided to play their game against the Carolina Panthers one day after Belcher murdered his 
girlfriend, Kasandra Perkins, and then took his own life in front of several staff members at the 
team’s facility. The Chiefs won the game, one of only two games they had won the entire season, 
and a variety of stories were written about the inspiration that the Chiefs had played with due to 
the loss of a teammate. Mentioned in many of those articles was the Chiefs’ tribute to Belcher, 
which included the team hanging his jersey outside of his locker and a pregame moment of 
silence. Some stories even intimated that the Chiefs were able to win because they were inspired 
by the tragedy.  
 After the terrorist attacks, journalists at the Times maintained a disconnection between 
tragedy and sport. The articles were written in a manner that highlighted sport’s role and 
athletes’ thoughts, but they rarely, if ever, gave credit to the tragedy as inspiration to win. It 
could be argued that the articles that mentioned the Yankees run as a possible tribute to the 
victims of 9/11 implied that, but they were written so carefully and almost uncomfortably that it 
appeared that the authors were deliberately trying to avoid the parallels. The difference, of 
course, was in the context, which posited the Yankees were winning in honor of the victims, not 
because of inspiration drawn from them. The difference was two-fold: (a) the Yankees place in 
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the writing remained insignificant in the perspective of reality where the Chiefs playing was not 
minimized, and (b) even though some of the Yankees may have felt like they were playing 
inspired, the journalists framed it as just another symbolic gesture. The stories regarding the 
Chiefs, conversely, often made it a point to emphasize the motivation drawn from the tragedy.  
 Finally, the audience was the last grouping in which this dissertation had an implication, 
in that, framing was a fundamental component of the greater understanding of an event. This 
dissertation employed the constructionist outlook (D’Angelo, 2002), which implicated both the 
journalist and the audience in the construction of frames. Meaning, cultural influences and 
experiences would alter the perception derived from the writing in the Times. The journalists, as 
mentioned previously, were in New York City during an extremely tumultuous time. They were 
tasked with covering stories despite a lack of sporting events or a changed perception of sport 
once sport did return, which naturally impacted the way that they wrote. The audience was 
anyone that consumed the New York Times’ sports section, which had a global presence. They 
also experienced the tragedies in varying capacities, which impacted the way that they read. The 
culmination was a constructed reality between the two parties that differ from person-to-person. 
The importance of that dynamic, specifically in exploratory studies such as this, was this 
dissertation uncovered a baseline of findings that aid in a fundamental understanding of how 
reputable sport journalism operated during a national tragedy.  
Future Research 
 In this dissertation, framing analysis was used to examine the projections of realities of 
sport journalists at the New York Times’ through their writing. The constructionist outlook that 
was used describes two central parties in the construction of frames: media and audience. The 
latter is just as important than the former in the process. A media effects examination of the 
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impact these frames had on the audience would add to body of knowledge regarding sport, sport 
journalism, and tragedy.  
 Furthermore, this study only analyzed the New York Times as the local and national voice 
of 9/11. The tragedies also directly impacted the communities surrounding western Pennsylvania 
and Washington. A more comprehensive examination of the three largest regional newspapers, 
the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette would add to the findings 
of this dissertation. Additionally, randomly selecting newspapers from around the country would 
conceivably produce substantial findings in relation to the impact of September 11.  
 September 11 was selected as a benchmark tragedy because of its size and impact. 
Similar tragedies have also affected society on a national scale with implications related to sport. 
Aside from some of those mentioned in the implications section, it may be useful to dissect 
natural tragedies like Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans or international crises like the 2005 
terrorist bombings in London, England. Not only would an examination of comparable tragedies 
render worthwhile results, but also an alternative perspective from the stakeholders involved in 
sport’s response to tragedy would be useful scholarship as well. For instance, an investigation 
into the governance policies and procedures from specific organizations such as MLB, NFL, 
NFL Players’ Association, MLB Players’ Associations, or specific NCAA conferences would 
render beneficial results. The constructionist outlook accounts for the news making organization, 
the journalist, the medium, and the audience as part of the framing process. An examination into 
those news making organizations would be a worthwhile venture.  
 Finally, all of the measures listed before have relied heavily on qualitative methodology. 
The scope of most of the tragedies, however, has been largely national, sometimes international. 
Quantitative analysis examining both journalists and audience members would render more 
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generalizable results, possibly addressing more of a widespread impact analysis. Also, 
newspapers were selected because of the context the medium supplies. Incorporating social 
media, television, or radio may render even more useful findings that add to how sport 
journalists respond to tragedy. 
Conclusion  
 In conclusion, this framing analysis provided insight into how crisis was reported on the 
sports pages of a major newspaper in the United States. The findings of this study produced five 
frames that contributed to that understanding and gave perspective into how one of the largest 
industries in the United States responded to one of the largest tragedies in American history 
through the coverage of one of the country’s largest newspapers. Those five frames were: 
diminished significance of sport, sport as a distraction, united community symbolically moving 
onward, logistical understanding, and loss of innocence.  
 The significance of each frame was a defined reality that shaped the understanding of 
different aspects related to the sports coverage after 9/11. The totality resulting from combining 
each frame was an overall framing, or general understanding, of the event. That understanding, 
simply stated, was sport meant a lot less juxtaposed to the realities of the attacks. However, 
people were unified through powerful expressions delivered through use of symbolism and, 
although sport was explicitly described as less important, it could be used as a distraction. Some 
of the viability of sport as a distraction stemmed from the realization that sport may not be as 
essential to people as it once was, but it was still important in perspective. Predominantly, 
though, the sport section was effective in disseminating when, where, why, and how sport would 
return logistically and when sport did return, it was going to be different than before those planes 
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crashed into two tall skyscrapers, the most pronounced military base in the country, and a 
desolate field in western Pennsylvania.  
 The New York Times’ response was measured and stoic in the face of crisis. The 
journalists exercised integrity and poise during adverse circumstances. Unfortunately, society 
will likely experience another national tragedy at some point in the future. Although the 
influence of the mediums may change and the response of sport may too, it would be advisable 
to use the framing of 9/11 as the standard in covering tragedy.  
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